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INTRODUCTION 
  
 
“No person shall be eligible to the office of Governor or Lieutenant Governor, who shall not 
have been five years a citizen of the United States, and also a resident of the State of Indiana 
during the five years next preceding his election ….” 
 
   1851 Constitution of the State of Indiana 
                         Article 5, Section 7 
 
In early summer of 1816, with Indiana’s impending admission to the Union, a 
constitutional convention, attended by forty-three delegates, was held in the state’s first 
capital, Corydon.  Those in attendance drafted and ratified a state constitution.  Included in 
that document were the eligibility requirements for the office of governor.  Specifically, 
Article 4, Section 4, provided that a governor had to be thirty years old, a citizen of the 
United States for ten years, “and have resided in the state five years next preceding his 
election; unless he shall have been absent on the business of the state, or of the United 
States.”1  Thus, the framers adopted a specific durational residency requirement for anyone 
seeking the office of governor.  They did so for other offices and privileges under the law as 
well. 
Durational residency requirements as a qualification for holding statewide elected 
office are not unusual.  They still appear in some form in most state constitutions.  In fact, in 
the original constitution for most states, language requiring durational residency for the 
office of governor was the rule and not the exception.  At one time, as many as forty-three 
states had some form of residency requirement as a qualification to hold the office of 
                                                 
1 Ind. Const. Art. IV, § 4 (1816). 
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governor.  Of that number, twenty-nine states required at least five years of residence.  
Twelve other states required longer periods, ranging from seven years up to ten. 
These requirements were thought to have a clear public purpose, particularly in the 
early days of our nation when states were young and their inhabitants relatively recent 
arrivals.  The requirements were said to promote legitimate state interests or goals, including 
the goal of giving voters an extended period of time in which to get to know the individuals 
who were interested in holding public office.  This allowed voters the opportunity to 
scrutinize a candidate’s conduct, habits, and to learn his strengths and weaknesses.  
Correspondingly, being a resident of a state for a required period of time afforded a 
prospective candidate the opportunity to get to know the characteristics and ideologies of the 
people he sought to serve, to become familiar with the state’s problems, finances, 
institutions, and laws.  In essence, residency requirements promoted knowledgeable and 
responsive candidates who possessed clear ties to the community while, at the same time, 
discouraging candidacies by persons who were not seriously concerned with or, perhaps, 
even capable of serving their constituents. 
Indiana was no different.  As explained above, the original state constitution 
contained the requirement compelling a citizen to “have resided in the state five years” 
before election as governor.  In a subsequent state constitutional convention in 1850, called 
for the specific purpose of revising the constitution in the midst of a catastrophic financial 
crisis, an amendment was offered to eliminate the residency requirement for governor 
altogether.  It was unsuccessful.2  Article 5, Section 7, of the new Constitution adopted in 
1851 retained the five year durational period, although the requirement that an individual 
                                                 
2 Journal of the Convention of the People of the State of Indiana to Amend the Constitution 537 
(1851). 
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“have resided in the state five years” was changed to “have been a resident of” the state for 
that period of time.  Also, the two explicit exceptions for being absent from the state – that 
is, being on the business of the state or on the business of the United States – were 
eliminated.  Because an Indiana gubernatorial candidate’s satisfaction of it had never been 
questioned, neither the 1816 constitutional residency language nor its 1851 revision had ever 
been interpreted by Indiana courts – that is, until 1988. 
In November of 1987, Indiana Secretary of State Evan Bayh announced his intention 
to seek the Democratic Party’s nomination for governor of Indiana in the upcoming 1988 
election.  To qualify constitutionally to hold office, therefore, Bayh was required to have 
been a resident of Indiana from November, 1983, to November, 1988.  However, for sixteen 
months, from July, 1983 until December, 1984, Bayh lived in Washington, D.C., while he 
worked as a lawyer for the firm of Hogan & Hartson.  Approximately thirteen of those 
sixteen months fell within the “five years next preceding the election” durational 
requirement of the Indiana constitution.  Questions inevitably arose whether Bayh satisfied 
the express provisions of Article 5, Section 7 – that is, was Evan Bayh a resident of Indiana 
while he lived and worked in Washington, D.C.? 
Consideration of the issue was not a mere academic exercise.  The status of Bayh’s 
residency involved significant political as well as legal implications.  In fact, the question 
dominated the early period of the gubernatorial campaign.  Bayh’s qualification to serve as 
governor was formally challenged by leaders of the Indiana Republican Party, including 
Governor Robert D. Orr.  The legal proceeding itself consumed almost four months of the 
campaign and was pursued through the judicial process to the point of final disposition by 
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the Indiana Supreme Court.  Bayh’s eligibility to serve as governor, if elected, was not 
ultimately resolved until five days before Indiana’s May 3, 1988 primary election. 
Long before the formal challenge to Bayh’s candidacy was initiated there was 
considerable political speculation about his eligibility to serve and what implications that 
might have.  Because an interpretation of Indiana’s gubernatorial durational residency 
requirement would be a case of first impression – that is, a question not previously 
determined by a court – there was no established precedent upon which to rely.  As a result, 
all opinions on the matter possessed some measure of validity for the simple reason that 
none was definitive.  As one might imagine, opinions on the matter were plentiful. 
For his part, Bayh asserted that he had been a resident of Indiana his entire life, 
though, admittedly, he had lived elsewhere.  Bayh maintained that to be a resident of Indiana 
did not require continual physical presence in the state.  Rather, residency was akin to 
domicile, a legal concept meaning the place that, once established, an individual considers to 
be his or her permanent home.  Bayh argued that one’s domicile cannot be terminated absent 
evidence of a clear intention to do so.  Because there was no evidence of his intent to end his 
domicile in Indiana and establish it elsewhere, he had remained at all times a resident of 
Indiana. 
 Understandably, those who questioned Bayh’s eligibility offered contrary 
interpretations.  Some of Bayh’s opponents argued that continued and uninterrupted 
physical presence for the entire five years was, in fact, the appropriate standard to be 
applied.  Others alternatively alleged that Bayh’s actions during the time he spent living and 
working in Washington, D.C., were sufficient to show that he possessed the requisite intent 
to abandon his residency in Indiana and re-establish it there.  Accordingly, the argument was 
5 
that Bayh was not a resident of Indiana for at least part of the constitutionally required five-
year period, disqualifying him from being eligible to serve as governor. 
 For almost eight months, Bayh’s eligibility to serve was a focal point of public 
attention in the 1988 Indiana governor’s race.  While Bayh and his opponents pursued 
answers in several legal forums, they also were competing for advantage in the most 
important forum of all – the court of public opinion.  As the story that follows will show, an 
enormous amount of posturing, both legal and political, was a necessary by-product of the 
affair.  Finally, on April 28, 1988, the Indiana Supreme Court rendered a decision declaring 
Bayh eligible to serve as governor.3  It found that Bayh, even while living and working in 
Washington, D.C., had maintained his residency in Indiana.  He, therefore, satisfied the 
constitutional durational residency requirement.  
This thesis will consider not only what happened, but why.  Were those who 
challenged Bayh’s residency motivated by constitutionalism or were extra-legal reasons 
involved?  What were the political implications of challenging Bayh’s eligibility?  What was 
the significance of the “forum-shopping” in which both parties engaged?  Why did Bayh’s 
opponents choose to pursue appeals despite initial setbacks?  Finally, did the attempt to 
disqualify Bayh actually strengthen his candidacy and help propel him to victory in 
November of 1988? 
Some things are certain.  Bayh received an inordinate amount of public attention 
throughout the controversy, thereby gaining a level of exposure that his campaign would 
have been required to pay for otherwise.  Similarly, the legal challenge afforded Bayh an 
early and unprecedented opportunity to emphasize certain themes that would become central 
                                                 
3 State Election Board v. Bayh, 521 N.E.2d 1313 (Ind., 1988). 
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to his candidacy.  For example, because Republicans initiated the residency challenge, Bayh 
was able to portray himself as victim of a desperate partisan attempt to control the outcome 
of an election by taking away from voters the right to choose their next governor.  This 
complemented another one of Bayh’s arguments that, after twenty years of one party 
dominance of the State House, the time had come for change.  The residency challenge also 
helped diminish – in two respects – the effectiveness of one of Bayh’s perceived 
vulnerabilities:  his relative youth and inexperience.  How could Evan Bayh be too 
inexperienced or unprepared when, first, the Republican Party seemed so afraid of his 
political prowess that it was willing to wage war in court to keep him off the ballot and, 
second, after months of publicity, when both a trial court and Indiana’s highest court had 
formally declared Evan Bayh “qualified” to serve as governor?  
 But, before presenting the story, some background information is necessary.  Birch 
Evans Bayh, III was born in Terre Haute, Indiana, on December 26, 1955.  He lived with his 
parents, Marvella and Birch E. Bayh, Jr. in Shirkieville, Indiana, while his father worked on 
the family farm. Although he bore the same name as his father and grandfather, his parents 
called him “Evan.”  Years later, his father recalled that Marvella had insisted on this because 
she wanted to avoid calling out for “Birch” and having three different men come running.  
In September 1958, Bayh’s parents moved to Bloomington, Indiana, and his family lived 
there for three years while Bayh’s father attended law school.  Upon graduation, the Bayh 
family moved back to Terre Haute where they lived until Birch Bayh, Jr.’s election to the 
United States Senate in November of 1962.  From 1962 until his graduation from high 
school in 1974, Bayh lived with his parents in Washington, D.C. 
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 Upon graduation from high school, Evan Bayh entered Indiana University in 
Bloomington, Indiana, and pursued a bachelor’s degree in business.  He graduated in May 
of 1978 and, thereafter, enrolled at the University of Virginia School of Law in 
Charlottesville, Virginia.  Bayh graduated in January of 1982 and returned to Indiana to 
serve as a law clerk for U.S. District Court Judge James E. Noland.  Bayh sat for the Indiana 
bar examination in February of 1983.  Upon conclusion of his federal district court clerkship 
in April of 1983, Bayh traveled for several months.  Then, Bayh joined the Washington, 
D.C., law firm of Hogan & Hartson in July of 1983.  On August 26, 1983, and one month 
after beginning employment with Hogan & Hartson, Bayh was sworn in as a member of the 
Indiana bar.  Bayh continued working as an attorney in the District of Columbia until 
November 30, 1984. 4 
 On December 1, 1984, Bayh returned to Indiana to join his father’s law firm.  He 
lived in Indianapolis and was engaged in the private practice of law until 1986, when he 
began his career in public life by launching a campaign for the office of Indiana secretary of 
state, an office for which there is no durational residency requirement.  In November of that 
year, he enjoyed a significant election victory, and was sworn in as secretary of state on 
December 1, 1986.  On the day of his swearing in, Evan Bayh was thirty years old and had 
never before held political office. 
 Before proceeding, there is also the need to declare an interest.  I am an acquaintance 
of Evan Bayh.  I served as a volunteer on his 1986 campaign for secretary of state and, most 
                                                 
4 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, Record of Proceedings, State Election Board v. 
Evan Bayh, (1988) Cause No. 73S01-8804-CV-380, Volume II, pp. 303-312, Office of the Clerk of the 
Supreme and Appellate Courts, State of Indiana (all subsequent non-consecutive references to the Record of 
Proceedings in State Election Board v. Evan Bayh will be referred to as “Record of Proceedings”).  See also, 
State Election Board v. Bayh, 521 N.E.2d 1313 (Ind., 1988), 1314-15. 
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important to the integrity of this paper, was a paid member of the campaign staff in 1988.  I 
happen to believe Bayh possesses a rare political mind which has been key to his electoral 
success – success that I believe has made a difference in the lives of many people in Indiana 
and in our country.  I am also keenly aware that others do not share that point of view.  In 
disclosing his relationship to the subject matter of his book, Robert Kennedy and His Times, 
the late historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. adapted a phrase A.J.P. Taylor used in his life of 
Lord Beaverbrook, “if it is necessary for a biographer of Robert Kennedy to regard him as 
evil, then I am not qualified to be his biographer.”5  With no pretense of being a biographer, 
but with similar sentiment, I disclose my own degree of “non-qualification.” 
                                                 
5 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (New York:  Ballantine Books, 1978), 
xv. 
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Chapter One 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF EVAN BAYH 
 
 
“… if young Bayh does not mend the error of his ways, who knows, he could wind up … 
well … getting elected to some higher office.” 
 
Editorial in the Indianapolis News 
       February 20, 1987 
 
 On August 8, 1974, Richard M. Nixon announced his resignation as president of the 
United States after three articles of impeachment had been issued against him by the 
Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives.  The scandal known as 
Watergate had consumed his presidency.  Several weeks later, on September 8, 1974, 
Nixon’s successor, Gerald R. Ford, issued a presidential pardon that gave Nixon immunity 
from prosecution.  What followed thereafter, in political terms, was extraordinary.  In the 
November, 1974 election, Democrats throughout the country were swept into office in 
overwhelming numbers. 
 In Indiana, incumbent U.S. Senator Birch E. Bayh, Jr., a two-term Democrat, won 
re-election in a hard fought contest against Indianapolis mayor Richard G. Lugar.  Five of 
the seven incumbent Republican congressmen lost their bids for re-election as Indiana’s 
eleven member delegation in the United States House of Representatives changed from 
seven Republicans and four Democrats to nine Democrats and two Republicans.  Birch 
Bayh led his political party to the kind of sizable victory that is historically infrequent.  But 
the euphoria was short-lived, for, on that night, neither Birch Bayh nor any other Democrat 
10 
could have envisioned the electoral futility that their political party would experience over 
the course of the next twelve years.   
 Rather than wallow in defeat, Indiana Republicans regrouped.  Two years later, 
Republicans again nominated and, this time, successfully elected Lugar to the U.S. Senate.  
They also solidified their control of the Indiana State House by re-electing Governor Otis R. 
Bowen.  In the following ten-year period, Indiana Republicans would elect another 
governor, elect another U.S. senator, and beginning with the 1978 election maintain 
majority control of both chambers of the Indiana legislature.  Also, over this same period, 
the overwhelming advantage from 1974 that Indiana Democrats enjoyed in the United 
States House of Representatives steadily declined as Democrats experienced a net loss of 
four members of Congress and Republicans enjoyed a net gain of three.  The devastation for 
the Democrats in 1980 was especially disheartening with the two most prominent members 
of the Indiana congressional delegation, Senator Bayh and Congressman John Brademas, 
going down to defeat.  In fact, Republican electoral success was so consistent and 
overwhelming that, from 1976 through 1984, Republican candidates for statewide office 
won twenty-five out of twenty-six election contests, most with substantial margins of 
victory.  Democrats won only one statewide race – Otis E. Cox as auditor of state in 1982.6 
In November of 1984, Republicans celebrated their fifth consecutive gubernatorial 
victory when Governor Robert D. Orr was re-elected to a second four-year term.  Orr’s heir 
apparent was his running mate, Lieutenant Governor John M. Mutz.  Most political 
observers assumed that Mutz would seek the Republican Party’s gubernatorial nomination 
                                                 
6 Election Report of the State of Indiana, Office of the Indiana Secretary of State, 1982.  All of the 
information regarding the outcomes of political election years can be accessed through the biannual election 
report compiled by the Office of the Indiana Secretary of State. 
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in 1988, just as Orr had done as lieutenant governor under Bowen.  Clearly, Mutz was the 
choice of the party’s establishment.  Any question in that regard was answered on election 
night when Republican State Chair Gordon K. Durnil publicly endorsed Mutz for governor 
on the same platform and at nearly the same time that the newly re-elected Lieutenant 
Governor Mutz was thanking voters for their re-election support. 
Mutz was a veteran lawmaker and had spent much of his adult life in public service 
– two terms as lieutenant governor and several terms in both houses of the Indiana General 
Assembly.  Many Republicans believed that Mutz would be their party’s most experienced 
candidate for governor ever.  Given the level of success that Indiana Republicans enjoyed 
during the previous ten years, it would not have been foolhardy for a political prognosticator 
on election night 1984 to suggest that Mutz was the odds-on favorite for victory four years 
hence and would continue Republican occupation of the governor’s office that the party had 
experienced for twenty uninterrupted years. 
 The political winds in Indiana began to shift in 1986 when Evan Bayh declared his 
candidacy for the office of secretary of state.  Possessed of a well-known last name, Bayh 
was an energetic campaigner.  Many viewed him as a figure around whom Indiana 
Democrats could rally to re-establish statewide electoral competitiveness.  Andrew E. 
Stoner, biographer of Frank O’Bannon, described Bayh’s style this way:  “Bayh seemed to 
have a confidence and a natural ease to him that generated energy and excitement among 
already hopeful and excited Democrats, interested Independents, and terribly worried 
Republicans.  Bayh seemed destined for greatness.  He answered every question put to him 
with ease and comfort.”7 
                                                 
7 Andrew E. Stoner, Legacy of a Governor:  The Life of Indiana’s Frank O’Bannon (Bloomington, 
Ind.:  Rooftop Publishing, 2006), 135. 
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Durnil, initially, professed to be unimpressed.  “His father never won an election by 
any large margin, and, in fact, was defeated the last time he ran (by [Dan] Quayle in 1980).  
Plus, the liberal perception of his father might be more of a negative.”  Durnil explained that 
Hoosier voters were conservative and, largely, Republican.  “You don’t just get Indiana 
votes based on a last name.”8 
It was not very long before Durnil did an about-face on last names, however.  In 
response to early momentum generated by Bayh’s candidacy, Durnil recruited Robert O. 
Bowen, son of former Governor Otis Bowen, to run for secretary of state.  Bowen resigned 
his position as Marshall County court judge and the Republican State Central Committee 
hired him as a full-time employee to “conduct workshops for local candidates and precinct 
committeemen, assist in preparing the party’s convention platform and be the 
‘communication link’ between the state organization and candidates for legislative office.”9 
While shrewd, the recruitment of Bowen by the Republican hierarchy (as would be 
its challenge to Bayh’s residency two years later) lent even greater legitimacy to the notion 
that Bayh possessed considerable political potential.  The name Bowen was the most 
recognized and politically popular in the state.  But it also subjected the Republicans to 
criticism from the press.  An editorial headline in the Gary Post-Tribune proclaimed that 
“GOP ‘hires’ a candidate.”10  Several other Republicans had expressed an interest in seeking 
the party’s nomination for secretary of state that year.  All were persuaded to step aside for 
Bowen, even though Bowen had limited electoral experience.  His only previous campaign 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
8 Indianapolis News, January 9, 1986. 
9 Gary Post-Tribune, April 6, 1986. 
10 Ibid. 
13 
had been for judge.  The Franklin Daily-Journal argued that Bowen was getting “preferred 
treatment” in spite of the fact that these other less well-known Republicans actually wanted 
to seek the office.  “Of course, none of them have the magic name Bowen – a name panicky 
GOP leaders are convinced is the only one to beat a Democratic candidate with another 
magic name – Evan Bayh.”11 
Patrick J. Traub, the senior political reporter for the Indianapolis Star commented 
that, “The name ‘Otis R. Bowen’ is considered so helpful in Indiana politics that many 
observers believe that Democrat Otis E. Cox benefited from having the same first name in 
1982 when he became the only Democrat in 10 years to win a statewide election.”  In fact, 
Bowen was identified on the November, 1986 ballot as “Robert Otis Bowen,” instead of the 
name by which he was commonly known, “Rob Bowen” or “Robert O. Bowen.”  
Unfortunately, Republican leaders, not Bowen himself, decided how his name would appear 
on the election ballot in 1986.  Embarrassingly, Bowen was unaware how his name would 
be listed until it was called to his attention by reporters at a news conference in September. 12  
In any event, the contest between these sons of two famous Indiana political figures created 
an unmatched level of public interest in a relatively unrecognized statewide office whose 
responsibilities were largely unknown by the electorate. 
Throughout the campaign, Bayh pounded away on themes that would later become 
the watchwords of his public service.  In May, 1986, he asserted that eliminating waste and 
mismanagement must be the top priority of state government.  To emphasize this 
commitment, he bestowed on Gordon Faulkner, the head of the Indiana Department of 
                                                 
11 Franklin Daily-Journal, April 24, 1986. 
12 Indianapolis Star, September 12, 1986.   
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Corrections, a “Golden Faucet Award” for spending thousands of dollars on an elaborate 
renovation of his state-owned residence, which included the addition of gold-plated 
faucets.13  Bayh’s presentation of a “Golden Faucet Award” for examples of wasteful 
spending became a staple of his campaign.  Another instance was his questioning of 
excessive expenditures for overseas travel by state officials.  Accordingly, he awarded a 
“Golden Faucet” to those responsible for spending $700 to teach a foreign trade delegation 
how to eat with chopsticks.14 
Bayh was also outspoken in his criticism of the continued use of license branch 
profits by the Republicans for political purposes.  Bayh proposed that all license branch 
profits be returned to the public treasury.15  In addition, he proposed selling expensive state-
owned aircraft used for travel by state officials and utilizing the proceeds to help pay the 
winter heating bills of 8,000 low income Hoosiers.16 
It proved to be the most expensive and profiled election for Indiana secretary of state 
to date.  Between them, the two candidates raised in excess of $1.1 million and conducted 
statewide television campaigns, a political tactic unheard of in previous elections for that 
office.  Bayh defeated Bowen by more than 123,000 votes and, in so doing, recorded the 
largest margin of victory by any Democratic candidate for statewide office in the preceding 
25 years.17 
                                                 
13 Bayh Campaign Press Release, May 19, 1986, copy in possession of author. 
 
14 Bayh Campaign Press Release, July 31, 1986, copy in possession of author. 
15 Bayh Campaign Press Release, June 18, 1986, copy in possession of author. 
16 Bayh Campaign Press Release, October 22, 1986, copy in possession of author. 
17 Election Report of the State of Indiana, Office of the Secretary of State, 1986. 
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 The importance of Bayh’s 1986 election victory far outdistanced the importance of 
the office to which he was elected.  Beyond the fact that it was the first Democratic victory 
in a marquee statewide election since his father’s re-election in 1974, it was significant for 
other reasons as well.  Bayh won despite Republican victories in every other statewide 
contest that year.  In that sense, it was both a personal victory as well as a victory for his 
political party.  His success helped restore Democrats’ confidence that they could win 
statewide in Indiana again.  Political consultant Dick Sykes had this observation about 
Democrats in Indiana before Bayh’s 1986 victory:  “the number one problem we constantly 
struggled against is that Democrats don’t believe we can win any more.  They’re easily 
psyched out.  So when Gordon Durnil releases a poll showing (the Democratic) candidate 
20 points behind, they believe him.”18  The fact that Bayh had prevailed over as formidable 
an opponent as the son of former Governor Bowen made Republican post-election efforts to 
downplay the significance of his election difficult, if not impossible. 
The disappointment state Republicans felt was apparent.  Governor Bowen openly 
complained that his son had not received the level of political support that he deserved.  In 
turn, Durnil complained bitterly to Marion County Prosecutor Stephen Goldsmith that 
Bayh’s campaign had committed criminal felonies by failing to timely report pre-election 
campaign contributions.  The tenuous nature of these allegations caused an Indianapolis Star 
headline to ask rhetorically whether the Republicans had become “sore losers.”19 
 Bayh’s 1986 victory propelled him squarely into Indiana’s political spotlight.  
Speculation emerged about Bayh running for governor almost immediately after the 1986 
                                                 
18 Jim Mellowitz, “In Search of a New Party,” Indianapolis Magazine (November, 1985):  149-154. 
19 Indianapolis Star, May 17, 1987. 
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election.  Most acknowledged his political assets – his position as a newly elected statewide 
officeholder, his energy and vitality, his name recognition, and his proven fundraising 
prowess.  Many Indiana Democrats viewed Bayh as their party’s best hope for success in the 
1988 gubernatorial race. 
 Bayh’s performance in the first few months as secretary of state did not dampen that 
enthusiasm.  He appeared to set a deliberate course designed to challenge the prevailing 
political orthodoxy.  For years, Indiana Republicans had persuaded Hoosier voters that they 
were the party of fiscal integrity, economic restraint and discipline.  Democrats, on the other 
hand, had been characterized as a party motivated by an agenda of social reform that fueled 
“tax and spend” economic policies.  From the outset, Bayh was suspicious that the qualities 
of compassion and reform that had characterized the political liberalism of his father’s 
generation had lost their political potency.  Bayh observed, in January, 1986, “I’m very 
proud of my father, but the issues he confronted – and the world he served as a public 
official – were much different than the ones today.  My father and I share many values, but 
we differ somewhat on the way to achieve them.”20 
He openly challenged the idea that Democrats were either disinclined or incapable of 
providing prudent and restrained economic stewardship in government.  In fact, in keeping 
with the campaign commitments he had made, Bayh quickly initiated marked cost-cutting 
measures within his office.  He submitted a proposal to the Indiana legislature calling for an 
across-the-board 5 percent cut in his office budget and a 20 percent reduction in staff.  
Specifically, Bayh asked for $435,000 less to operate his office than had been requested by 
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his Republican predecessor in the previous budget cycle and he recommended that the 
number of office employees be reduced from 81 to 64.21 
He continued to rail against public waste and inefficiency and argued that 
government must be more responsive to the people it served.  No longer constrained by the 
limitations of a campaign, Bayh was able to put his rhetoric into action.  To that end, he 
announced that the secretary of state’s office would be more accessible to the public by 
remaining open 45 minutes longer each weekday.  In an unprecedented step for State House 
offices, he initiated Saturday office hours from 9:00 a.m. until noon.22  Bayh also refused the 
use of a state-provided automobile, arguing that public officials ought to be responsible for 
the costs of their own transportation. 
In his effort to de-politicize the workings of government, he called for bold changes 
in the state’s license branch system, viewed by the public as one of the last vestiges of 
institutional political patronage – changes that would, once and for all, take the control of 
the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles out of partisan hands and place it in the hands of 
public reformers.  He eliminated “voluntary” political payroll deductions from the 
paychecks of his office employees – a staple of Indiana political culture known as the Two 
Percent Club.  In a wry editorial, the Indianapolis News observed that Bayh had already 
demonstrated his “misunderstanding” of the workings of government.  The News 
highlighted several of Bayh’s initiatives and suggested that “if young Bayh does not mend 
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the error of his ways, who knows, he could wind up … well … getting elected to some 
higher office.”23 
 Bayh also received favorable exposure for his oversight of the election recount of 
1986’s closest congressional race in the nation.  In Indiana’s Third Congressional District, 
incumbent Republican John P. Hiler was declared the election-day winner over Democratic 
challenger Tom Ward by 66 votes out of a total of 152,000 votes cast.  Bayh, as secretary of 
state, served as the chairperson of the newly created State Recount Commission which, in 
turn, was charged with resolving disputed congressional and legislative elections.  The State 
Recount Commission was a product of the debacle that had occurred two years earlier in 
Indiana’s Eighth Congressional District, a congressional district known in political circles as 
“the Bloody Eighth” because of its intense and perennial competitiveness. 
In the 1984 congressional race, incumbent Congressman Frank McCloskey and 
Republican challenger Richard McIntyre battled to an election night standstill and were 
separated by just a handful of votes out of more than 233,000 cast.  It was the closest 
congressional election of the century.  Then-Secretary of State Edwin Simcox, a Republican, 
initially certified McIntyre as the winner by 34 votes.  After a series of protracted and 
haphazardly conducted individual county recounts, McIntyre’s margin of victory increased 
to 418 votes.  However, during those recounts, over 5,000 ballots were disqualified because 
they lacked the written initials of a precinct worker, the number of the precinct, or some 
other inadvertent error by precinct poll workers.  That result was overturned by Democrats 
in the United States House of Representatives, who conducted their own “special recount” 
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and declared McCloskey the winner by a four-vote margin.24  Partisan bitterness over the 
result did not quickly subside.  McCloskey, for example, was thereafter derisively referred 
to by Republicans as “Landslide Frank.” 
As a result of the confusion created by the 1984 post-election county-by-county 
recounting process, the 1985 Indiana General Assembly created a uniform procedure 
overseen by a State Recount Commission.  The make-up of the commission itself was 
partisan.  Members included the Republican and Democratic state chairs (or their designees) 
and the secretary of state.  Thus, the commission was structured so that the political party 
that controlled the secretary of state’s office would enjoy majority status.  Because Bayh, a 
Democrat, had replaced Simcox, a Republican, by virtue of Bayh’s election victory over 
Bowen in November, the partisan advantage on the State Recount Commission shifted from 
the Republicans to the Democrats in December of 1986. 
The 1986 Hiler/Ward recount was the first time the State Recount Commission 
carried out its responsibility in a congressional race.  At issue in the recount was the validity 
of several hundred ballots that had been challenged, primarily by Democrats, due to 
technicalities or poll worker error.  The success (or failure) of an election recount had 
traditionally resided in a determination of the validity of allegedly defective ballots being 
challenged.  Under Indiana law, a ballot was void if there were any deviations from 
prescribed election procedures for handling and counting ballots.  The Indiana Supreme 
Court had repeatedly upheld the principle that strict compliance with election law was the 
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prevailing consideration, even in the absence of any evidence of intentional wrongdoing or 
fraud.25 
After weeks of review and testimony, the commission had to decide whether to 
count the challenged ballots.  The two partisan appointees on the commission split along 
partisan lines with the Republican member, Rex Early, arguing that all of the allegedly 
defective ballots should be counted – a position that put him directly at odds with his 
political party’s legal position two years earlier.  Bayh provided the swing and decisive vote 
in favor of upholding the validity of the hundreds of ballots that had been challenged due to 
technicalities or poll worker error.  While Bayh acknowledged that poll workers make 
mistakes, he found that in the absence of evidence of fraud or intentional wrongdoing, the 
ballots should be counted.  Because the majority of these challenged ballots had been cast in 
favor of the Republican Hiler, his slim election night lead was affirmed and he was 
ultimately declared the winner. 
The decision subjected Bayh to intense criticism from within his own political 
party.26  Some Democrats argued that if Bayh had simply followed established legal 
precedent, the disputed ballots could have been justifiably disqualified and Tom Ward, the 
Democratic challenger, would have been elected.  Also, according to the Democrats, this 
was entirely consistent with the way Republicans had interpreted and applied the law in 
previous election contests whenever Republicans controlled the recounting process.  In other 
quarters, however, Bayh’s conduct was seen as elevating principle over political 
expediency.  The Elkhart Truth opined that Bayh had decided “fairly,” and praised his 
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honesty and political courage.27  Even the chief lawyer for the Indiana Republican Party, 
Daniel F. Evans, Jr., commented that the recount commission had acted in “not only … a 
bipartisan manner, but in an almost non-partisan manner, much to my own surprise.”28 
Ironically, it was Bayh’s own conduct – his reasoned and impartial decision-making 
– that would later adversely impact his credibility when, during the course of the litigation 
challenging his own gubernatorial candidacy, he would assert that state administrative 
boards made up of political appointees were incapable of rendering judgments absent 
political bias or pressures.  If nothing else, Bayh had shown himself to be one who could 
rise above purely partisan interest and make decisions according to what was in the best 
interest of the public as a whole. 
 Not all Hoosiers were overwhelmed by Bayh’s gubernatorial potential, however.  
Bayh’s youth and inexperience were repeatedly offered as significant political impediments 
to any gubernatorial aspirations.  Indiana had occasionally elected young candidates to high 
statewide office.  For example, Bayh’s own father was elected to the United States Senate at 
the age of 34, then replaced by a 33-year-old Dan Quayle.  History, though, suggested that 
Hoosiers preferred their governors to be more seasoned – satisfying the so-called “gray 
line.”  The average age of Indiana governors upon entering office was 50 years old.  At the 
time, Robert Orr was one of the nation’s oldest governors at the age of 70.  Of the twenty-
one governors serving Indiana in the twentieth century, only five were under the age of 50 
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when inaugurated, with Governor Paul V. McNutt in 1933 the youngest at 41.29  If elected, 
Bayh would be almost ten years younger than McNutt was when sworn in. 
For all of these reasons, there was no lack of interest among Democrats in the 1988 
governor’s race and few potential candidates were inclined to simply concede the 
nomination to Bayh.  Because Republicans had enjoyed twenty years of uninterrupted 
control of the governor’s office, many Democratic politicians and their strategists were 
hopeful that voters would respond favorably to a “time for change” message, no matter who 
was the party’s nominee.  And there were indications that the “time for change” message 
possessed some measurable strength.  In 1984, while President Reagan enjoyed a 535,000-
vote plurality over former Vice President Walter Mondale in Indiana, Governor Orr 
defeated former state Senator W. Wayne Townsend by little more than 100,000 votes. 
Pointing to the narrowness of the governor’s re-election victory as an indication of 
voter discontent, Democrats argued that Hoosiers had grown weary of Republican 
leadership.  Optimism among Democrats was widespread.  Former U.S. Attorney Virginia 
Dill McCarty began her campaign for the Democratic Party’s 1988 gubernatorial 
nomination as soon as the 1984 winner had been declared.  In 1986, Kokomo Mayor 
Stephen J. Daily announced that he would not seek re-election as mayor because of his 
intention to campaign for governor – a decision that he made formal in January of 1987.30  
By early 1987, at least a half dozen prominent Democrats were being mentioned as 
legitimate candidates for the party’s nomination. 
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 Favorable reviews in several newspapers aside, not all Hoosiers were charitable in 
their early assessments of Bayh.  Bayh’s most persistent antagonist was Republican State 
Chair Gordon K. Durnil.  Durnil’s criticisms were strident and rife.  As noted earlier, Durnil 
believed that Bayh’s campaign for secretary of state had violated campaign finance laws by 
failing to disclose all campaign contributions by prescribed deadlines.  Durnil asked Marion 
County Prosecutor Stephen Goldsmith to investigate his allegations.  In response to the 
allegations, Goldsmith “reviewed” the campaign bank records that Bayh voluntarily 
produced.  Once Goldsmith compared those records to the public disclosures, he found no 
criminal violation and closed the matter.31 
Durnil contended that his allegations against Bayh were not “sour grapes,” but were 
in furtherance of his responsibility as a political leader to ensure that all candidates for 
public office follow the rules.  “If he [Bayh] is going to be a candidate in the future, I just 
want to make sure he adheres to the law.”32 
For his part, Bayh protested that Durnil “has accused me of violating the 
Constitution … as having said everything I said was a lie.  He has called me a felon.  I think 
he even accused me of beating my dog and I don’t even own a dog.”  Traub, the 
Indianapolis Star’s senior political reporter described Durnil’s accusations as “part of an 
open and growing bitterness that has raged since Bayh defeated Republican Robert O. 
Bowen … to become secretary of state.”33  Whether or not all notoriety was favorable, Bayh 
was receiving his fair share of attention as Indiana turned its political focus toward 1988. 
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 The first public acknowledgment that Bayh was seriously considering a run for 
governor came with the release of the results of a poll that he commissioned in the spring of 
1987.  On April 13, 1987, the Indianapolis Star reported that Bayh’s own poll showed him 
with a commanding lead over all other potential Democratic gubernatorial primary 
opponents.  In a multi-candidate primary, Democratic primary voters favored Bayh 46 
percent to Townsend’s 16 percent, McCarty’s 8 percent, Fort Wayne Mayor Winfield 
Moses’ 7 percent, Daily’s 3 percent and Indiana State Senator Frank O’Bannon’s 2 percent.  
Perhaps more importantly, the poll results suggested that Bayh would be the most 
competitive Democrat in the general election against either of the two likely Republican 
nominees – Lieutenant Governor John M. Mutz or Indianapolis Mayor William H. Hudnut.  
In a general election trial heat, likely voters preferred Bayh over Mutz, 51 percent to 37 
percent, and Bayh over Hudnut, 45 percent to 40 percent.  When asked why the poll had 
been commissioned, Bayh said “it is no secret that a lot of people have been talking to me 
about [running for governor], and I have been thinking about it and asking advice of people 
I respect.”34 
 In the spring and summer of 1987, the political pace accelerated and the prospective 
Democratic gubernatorial field began to assume a more definite shape.  Bayh began meeting 
privately with top party leaders as well as other potential primary opponents.  The 
Indianapolis News reported that “the aim of the meetings seems clear – convincing potential 
rivals that he – and not them – has the best chance of defeating any Republican opponent in 
1988.”35  McCarty ended her campaign in April saying she did not have enough money to 
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run.36  In early May, Terre Haute Mayor P. Pete Chalos dropped his consideration of a 
gubernatorial run and expressed his support for an unannounced Bayh candidacy, while 
Evansville Mayor Michael D. Vandeveer declared that his immediate and sole political 
interest was limited to serving out the rest of his mayoral term.37 
Even among those Democrats who remained committed to actively pursuing their 
party’s nomination, Bayh cast a long shadow.  Daily’s campaign warned that Bayh would 
be open to attacks about being inexperienced.38  Frank L. O’Bannon, a five term state 
senator, announced his gubernatorial candidacy on May 17, 1987, declaring that his own 
“record shows I know how to hold office as well as run for office”39 and that “you can’t run 
a race based on what polls say or don’t say.”40 
On the other hand, Republicans were worried about Bayh.  During the last week of 
June, 1987, representatives for both Mayor Hudnut and Lieutenant Governor Mutz released 
competing poll results.  While the stated purpose of each was to identify the strongest 
Republican candidate, neither poll contained a head-to-head trial heat between Mutz and 
Hudnut among likely Republican primary voters.  Rather, both polls tested the relative 
electoral strength of each individual against Bayh in a general election.41  In other words, 
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Bayh had become the standard by which Republicans were judging the strengths and/or 
weaknesses of their party’s own prospective candidates. 
 Significantly, on July 22, 1987, Townsend, the 1984 Democratic gubernatorial 
nominee, provisionally withdrew his name from further consideration and endorsed Bayh.42  
According to Townsend, his decision was based in large part on the results of a statewide 
poll that he had commissioned.  Townsend described the poll results as showing Bayh 
handily beating all other Democrats in a primary, including Townsend himself, and beating 
either Hudnut or Mutz in a general election.  While Townsend made clear that he had no 
intention of opposing Bayh in a primary, he went on to assert that “if Evan does not run, I 
will.”43  Largely unreported by the press was Townsend’s observation that “there have been 
those who have felt Evan’s age and lack of governmental experience would be a detriment 
to his campaign.  The best evidence that we have suggests that is not the case.”44  This 
affirmation was not lost on Bayh, however.  Pointing to Townsend’s twenty-two years of 
legislative experience, Bayh said that he was honored Townsend “feels I’m best-qualified to 
lead our party and our state forward.”45 
 In August, Bayh’s momentum continued when former Democratic governor 
Matthew E. Welsh announced his support if Bayh chose to run.  “I know what people expect 
of the governor and I know personally that not only does Evan have what it takes to be 
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governor, he would not disappoint the people of Indiana.”46  The Welsh and Townsend 
announcements directly addressed the issue of Bayh’s age and experience and both seemed 
designed to thwart criticism in that regard.  Daily and O’Bannon dismissed the 
endorsements as “predictable” and declared that neither would have any effect on their 
campaigns.47 
 Two days later, O’Bannon’s campaign responded with endorsements of its own.  
Five state Democratic legislative leaders declared their support for O’Bannon, citing his 
seventeen years of experience in the General Assembly.  They characterized O’Bannon as 
“better prepared to be governor than his two likely primary opponents, who are relatively 
inexperienced in state government.”48  The emphasis of the express criticism was clearly 
focused on Bayh’s age and lack of experience.  House Minority Leader Michael K. Phillips 
indicated that he had personally encouraged Bayh to shift his focus and consider a run for 
the U.S. Senate.  House Assistant Democratic Leader Chester “Chet” Dobis said Bayh 
should consider running for lieutenant governor to allow him time “to get the seasoning he 
needs to someday be governor.”  Bayh’s spokesperson, Phil Schermerhorn, noted the irony 
in those who found Bayh to be sufficiently qualified to serve as a U.S. senator or as 
lieutenant governor, but not governor.49 
 A more critical look at the specific comments made by these Democratic legislators 
at the O’Bannon endorsement is revealing.  They foretell the emergence of an issue that had 
been quietly discussed in political circles as Bayh’s most significant (and, perhaps, only) 
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political weakness – his eligibility to serve, if elected.  Dobis warned that the race for 
governor would be “an entirely different race than last time” and that Republicans were 
“chomping at the bit” to run against Bayh.50  If Dobis was referring only to the bruising 
nature of a campaign for governor, it is difficult to understand how O’Bannon, who had 
never run for statewide office, would be better prepared than Bayh.  Additionally, why 
would Republicans be “chomping at the bit” to be matched against the individual whom all 
polls suggested would be the strongest Democrat? 
Dobis also claimed that Durnil and the Republicans were “already gathering 
ammunition” against Bayh.51  If Dobis felt that Bayh’s age or experience were disqualifying 
vulnerabilities, why would Republicans have the need to gather “ammunition?”  Perhaps 
most revealing were O’Bannon’s own comments in response to these endorsements.  When 
asked if his campaign had considered the possibility of combining forces with Bayh to run 
as a ticket, O’Bannon dismissed the idea by saying that he was campaigning for governor 
“based on [his] strengths,” which included his life-long residency in Indiana.52 
 According to public opinion polls, Bayh’s age and level of experience were not 
dampening the public’s enthusiasm for his candidacy.  Those who sought to derail Bayh’s 
candidacy were forced to look elsewhere to find other, more compelling, arguments.  In the 
late summer of 1987, one issue was gaining steam.  There is a political truism that, if you do 
not run, you cannot win.  Bayh’s skeptics seemed hopeful that 1987 might bring the 
following corollary:  if you cannot run, you cannot win.  Democrats themselves were 
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reluctant to raise the question because of an understandable fear of internal party backlash.  
For the most part, to date, Republicans had remained silent on the issue as well.  As Bayh’s 
potential candidacy continued to gain legitimacy, however, all of that would change.  In 
September, 1987, a unique moment in Indiana’s political history would begin to unfold. 
30 
Chapter Two 
 
 
 
PRELUDE TO THE CHALLENGE 
 
 
“I have paid taxes every year in Indiana.  I have voted ever since I was 18 years old in 
Indiana.  I registered with the Selective Service in Indiana.  I went to college in Indiana.  I 
am living here with my family.  Unquestionably, I have always been a resident of the state 
of Indiana.” 
 
Evan Bayh 
September 17, 1987 
 
Questions about Evan Bayh’s eligibility to serve as governor first surfaced publicly 
in September, 1987.  On September 16, 1987, Gerry C. LaFollette, a political reporter for 
the Indianapolis News, disclosed the results of an investigation that he had conducted 
regarding facts surrounding Bayh’s “residency.”  LaFollette explained that he initiated his 
investigation because “the Indiana Constitution requires that to become governor one must 
live here for five years preceding Election Day” and that, along with others, he was aware 
that Bayh had worked in Washington, D.C., until the fall of 1984.  For LaFollette, “that 
raised a red flag.”53 
 As part of his investigation, LaFollette made inquiry of voter registration records in 
those places where he knew Bayh had lived.  LaFollette reported that Bayh registered to 
vote and had, in fact, voted in Vigo County in every election (both primary and general) 
since he turned 18, “although he has not lived on the family farm in Shirkieville since he 
was 7.”54  Bayh’s voter registration was changed only when he registered to vote in Marion 
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County on December 31, 1985, a date LaFollette found odd and which suggested to him that 
Bayh wanted little public notice of the change.  “Normally, one does not register to vote or 
perform other civic duties on New Year’s Eve afternoon as they usually are planning that 
night’s activities,” LaFollette later observed.55  LaFollette also checked with the Monroe 
County voter registration board and found no record of Bayh being registered there while a 
college student at Indiana University.  Similarly, LaFollette reported that “there is no record 
of Evan Bayh voting in the District of Columbia going back to 1982, according to a clerk 
there.”56 
 LaFollette also checked property records in both Vigo County and Marion County.  
The Center Township Assessor’s Office in Marion County confirmed that Bayh purchased a 
condominium in downtown Indianapolis from his father after he returned from Washington, 
D.C., in 1984.  It would later be established that this was the first real estate Bayh owned.  
LaFollette reported that, although Bayh had voted in Vigo County from 1974 to 1984, 
“officials in the [Vigo] county assessor’s office checked and no property in Fayette 
Township [which is where the Bayh family farm is located] is in Evan’s name.”57 
 LaFollette checked with the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles and found that Bayh 
had obtained an Indiana driver’s license on March 8, 1986.  In so doing, Bayh “turned in a 
Washington, D.C., drivers license, with two years left on it.”  At the time of LaFollette’s 
investigation, there was no way of determining whether Bayh had ever previously possessed 
a license from Indiana.  Bayh had obtained a driver’s license in the District of Columbia at 
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the age of 16 while living with his family in Washington, D.C., during his father’s tenure in 
the United States Senate.  In 1976, 1980, and 1984, Bayh renewed his driver’s license in the 
District of Columbia until he applied for and was granted a driver’s license from the State of 
Indiana in March of 1986, as reported by LaFollette.  LaFollette’s investigation also 
confirmed that Bayh had filed Indiana state income tax returns for the years 1982, 1983, and 
1984.58   
 Possessed with these facts and for the apparent purpose of giving his story some 
context, LaFollette asked the chairperson of the Marion County Election Board, former 
Marion County Superior Court Judge Charles W. Applegate, for his opinion on the 
definition of residency.  Judge Applegate initially responded that residency was determined 
by where one pays taxes, but then added, “residence is also a matter of intent, supported by 
physical acts.”  LaFollette asked the same question of Thad Perry, a deputy attorney general 
and counsel to the Indiana State Election Board, who responded that “generally, your 
residence is where you live.  If you get into fine questions, you can get hazy.”  While 
LaFollette’s investigation only scratched the surface regarding Bayh’s eligibility, LaFollette 
was already comfortable in offering one conclusion:  “if Evan Bayh were unable to enter the 
race for governor, the political ramifications would be enormous.  He is the only statewide 
Democrat holding office and the possessor of a famous Hoosier name.”  Lastly, LaFollette 
suggested that the question of eligibility “could be decided by the State Election Board.”59 
 Though LaFollette first broke the Evan Bayh residency story, he later acknowledged 
that, during the course of his investigation, it had become clear to him that he was not the 
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only one making inquiry about Bayh’s background.  LaFollette recalled that a Washington, 
D.C., election official had remarked, when answering one of LaFollette’s questions, “that’s 
funny, someone asked for that same information three weeks ago!”60   
Bayh was prepared when questions surrounding his eligibility surfaced.  On the day 
that LaFollette’s story went to print, Bayh held a press conference to refute any implication 
that his consideration of a run for governor was in legal jeopardy.  The law was clear, 
according to Bayh.  His residency in Indiana was established at birth and remained 
uninterrupted in spite of temporary absences because his intent, at all times, was to maintain 
it here.  Furthermore, he insisted that his actions were consistent with that intent.  “I have 
paid taxes every year in Indiana.  I have voted ever since I was 18 years old in Indiana.  I 
registered with the Selective Service in Indiana.  I went to college in Indiana.  I am living 
here with my family.  Unquestionably, I have always been a resident of the state of 
Indiana.”61 
Bayh also released an undated memorandum prepared by D. William Moreau, Jr., a 
lawyer and political confidant, that provided legal analysis and supporting facts.  In relevant 
part, the memorandum anticipated that “it will undoubtedly be suggested that the few 
months of legal training you had at the Washington law firm of Hogan and Hartson effected 
a change in your legal residency.  Such an allegation would be based on the notion that 
one’s physical location is synonymous with one’s legal residence, a notion which even 
under the most cursory review, has absolutely no merit.”62  Attached to the memorandum 
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were copies of several court opinions that Bayh suggested were instructive.  One was a 1975 
Indiana Supreme Court decision, captioned In re: Matter of Evrard, in which the court 
upheld the Indiana voting residency of a candidate for judge in Perry County, Indiana 
although he had lived outside the state for a considerable period.  Another was a Missouri 
decision involving the 1972 gubernatorial candidacy of Republican Christopher “Kit” Bond.   
Bayh dismissed as benign LaFollette’s journalistic interest in the question.  Rather, 
Bayh took immediate aim at Republican officials and declared that they were the ones 
responsible for orchestrating the investigation into his eligibility.  He suggested that, “there 
may be some people who hope to keep the election next year from being decided by the 
public by having it decided by the courts.”63  While denying any complicity in the 
LaFollette investigation, Durnil admitted that he had been studying the issue.  Durnil further 
acknowledged his affirmative intent to challenge Bayh’s eligibility, if and when Bayh 
declared his candidacy.  Durnil disputed Bayh’s interpretation of the applicable law and 
argued that one’s absence from the state does interrupt residence for purposes of 
constitutional qualification.  Durnil commented that Bayh “was [in Washington, D.C.] for 
private career purposes, he paid taxes in Washington, D.C., he had a driver’s license there.  
He was a resident of Washington, D.C.”64  The Indianapolis Star reported that “a legal 
challenge to Bayh’s candidacy could be filed by any registered voter and would be heard by 
the State Election Board.”65 
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The facts offered by Bayh in his public defense also caused Durnil to call on Marion 
County and Vigo County prosecutors to charge Bayh with felony violations of Indiana 
election law, similar to the allegations that served as the basis for the Evrard case.  By 
admitting that he had voted in Vigo County in November 1984 while “living” in Marion 
County – i.e., at his father’s condominium – Durnil maintained that Bayh had violated 
Indiana laws that prohibited voters from unauthorized voting and from casting ballots in 
precincts where they do not live.  “The guy thinks he’s above the law and now the 
Constitution,” Durnil said, referencing Bayh’s voting history and Bayh’s insistence on his 
gubernatorial eligibility.66 
In “The Chairman’s Memo,” a bi-weekly newsletter sent to Republican activists 
across the state, Durnil penned an article entitled “Evan Bayh:  A Deliberate Fraud or Just 
Stupid.”  In the article, Durnil repeatedly characterized Bayh as a liar who believed that the 
laws of the state and nation were inapplicable to him.  Never straying too far from the issue 
of Bayh’s residency, Durnil asked rhetorically, “The question is, … can Evan Bayh rely on 
an illegal act (voting in Vigo County, but not living there) to prove residence? The answer is 
no….  Every person who has sought the office of Governor and Lt. Governor since 1851 has 
had to meet the requirements of that constitution.  What kind of arrogance does it take for 
Evan Bayh to claim that he is not subject to the Indiana Constitution?”67 
Durnil, however, was not alone in expressing concern about Bayh’s emerging 
predicament.  Spokespersons for Bayh’s two potential Democratic primary opponents 
immediately underscored the political, if not legal, uncertainty that the residency issue 
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created.  John Whikehart, Daily’s campaign manager, characterized it as “a cloud that would 
hang over Evan’s head.”  O’Bannon’s campaign director, John R. Goss, was more 
circumspect but nonetheless conceded, “at this point there’s definitely a question which 
needs to be clarified.”  Both men suggested that Democratic leaders and officials needed to 
give thought to the possibility of some kind of definitive resolution.68  By week’s end, 
O’Bannon issued a statement acknowledging the legitimacy of the issue, but defending 
Bayh as being unfairly attacked by Durnil.  On the issue of Bayh’s eligibility, O’Bannon 
declared, “I accept Evan at his word.”69 
 Though the initial public skirmishing over Bayh’s eligibility lasted only a few days, 
it was already apparent that quick answers to the questions raised were going to prove 
elusive.  However, the debate was taking shape.  After having been discussed in closely held 
political circles for months, the issue had finally emerged for public consumption.  And the 
Republicans, led by Durnil, went on the attack.  As previously mentioned, the revelation of 
Bayh’s voting history prompted allegations from Durnil that Bayh had committed myriad 
criminal election law violations.  By unleashing these allegations against Bayh, Durnil 
unwittingly shifted the press corps’ attention, in turn, to Governor Orr, who some suggested 
was doing the same thing – living in Marion County but voting in his home county of 
Vanderburgh.  The Indianapolis Star reported that, “Indiana Republican Chairman Gordon 
K. Durnil thinks it’s perfectly okay that Governor Robert D. Orr lives in Marion County but 
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votes elsewhere.  But Durnil would like to see Democratic Secretary of State Evan Bayh 
prosecuted for the same thing.”70 
Republicans quickly responded that Governor Orr’s voting history was legally 
permissible because of the constitutional requirement that state officeholders “reside” in 
Indianapolis during their term of office for purposes of conducting state business.  At the 
time, Article 6, Section 5, of the state constitution provided that, “the governor and the 
secretary, auditor and treasurer, shall severally reside and keep the public records, books and 
papers, in any matter relating to their respective offices, at the seat of government.”71  
Republicans pointed out that, unlike Governor Orr who was a constitutional officer when he 
cast votes in Vanderburgh County while “residing” in Marion County, Bayh was a private 
citizen when he voted in Vigo County in 1984. 
Yet the Republican defense of Governor Orr, in turn, led some in the press to 
question why then it was constitutionally permissible for State Auditor Ann DeVore, a 
Republican, to commute each day from her home in Columbus if, as a constitutional officer, 
she was required to “reside … at the seat of government?”  For that matter, press accounts 
pointed out that the same argument could have been made about former State Treasurer 
Julian Ridlen, a Republican, who had commuted from Logansport during his time in office, 
or former State Auditor Otis Cox, a Democrat, who had commuted from Anderson. 
Durnil responded that a literal interpretation of the term “reside,” as used in that 
particular section of the Indiana constitution, was historically outdated and inapplicable.  He 
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argued that such a reading would have been relevant only for that period of time when travel 
made it impossible to do the job required of a state officeholder without living in the State 
House itself or, at least, the immediate community where the state capitol was located.72  In 
so doing, Durnil first encountered how difficult it would prove for him to remain logically 
consistent in this case.  Durnil had previously argued that the term “reside” as used in 
Indiana’s durational requirement for governor should be interpreted narrowly – that Bayh 
was required to have maintained uninterrupted physical presence in the state for five 
continuous years preceding the election.  Why then was it inappropriate or “historically 
outdated” to apply the same narrow reading to the exact same term when it appeared 
elsewhere in the constitution?  Durnil either underestimated the coming challenge from the 
press on issues involving residency, or he failed to adequately understand or prepare for 
those challenges.  Durnil was fond of reminding his audiences of his long and successful 
tenure as a political professional.  Yet at a time when that experience would serve him best, 
he seemed unable to capitalize on or take advantage of it. 
Durnil found himself faced with public relations battles on more than one front.  
Although he had made it clear that Republicans would challenge Bayh if no one else did, 
Durnil was reluctant to be seen as the antagonist in the matter any more than was already the 
case.  Republicans wanted the issue to be litigated, but, as a matter of political strategy, they 
preferred litigation absent their own “fingerprints.”  To accomplish that, Republicans 
wanted to generate a sufficient amount of concern among Democrats about the potential dire 
political consequences of Bayh being ruled ineligible that Bayh himself or other Democrats 
would feel compelled to take steps to resolve the matter. 
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The Republicans’ first and easiest targets for encouraging litigation against Bayh 
would be from his primary opponents, who, in a narrow political sense, had the most to gain 
were Bayh to be ruled ineligible.  Jack Colwell, a political reporter for the South Bend 
Tribune, observed:  “But attention to the possible residency problem, even if it doesn’t force 
Evan Bayh out of the race, could give pause to Democratic primary voters who might not 
want to pick a nominee with a question about residency, perhaps depriving Bayh of the 
landslide primary win he has hoped for to build momentum for a fall challenge to long-time 
Republican control of the governor’s office.”73 
Because the residency issue surfaced in September, 1987, and the period for 
candidate filings for governor did not close until March, 1988, Durnil had over five months 
to exert political pressure on Democrats.  Initially, it appeared that his efforts might be 
successful.  The more Durnil talked about filing a complaint challenging Bayh’s eligibility 
in front of the Republican-controlled state election board, the more nervous Democrats 
became.  Again, Colwell explained that, although Bayh insisted he was constitutionally 
eligible, “the State Election Board, however, is Republican controlled.  It could see things in 
a different light.  Decisions on election matters get pretty political in Indiana – even though 
Bayh, as chairman of the State Recount Commission, gave an honest count to Republican 
[John P.] Hiler at a time when he could have found ways to throw out Hiler votes and make 
a political decision to knock Hiler out of Congress.”74  It is fair to observe, therefore, in the 
fall of 1987, Bayh and his political opponents found themselves “eyeball-to-eyeball,” 
waiting for the other to blink. 
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 In October, the political pressure on Democrats intensified when Hudnut announced 
that he would not seek the Republican nomination for governor in 1988, thereby avoiding 
the possibility of a potentially divisive Republican primary.  Hudnut had been consistently 
competitive in all previously released polls and had outpaced Mutz in head-to-head match-
ups with Bayh.  Hudnut was charismatic, an outstanding public speaker, and credited with 
the urban renewal and revitalization that downtown Indianapolis had enjoyed.  By any 
measure, he would have been a formidable candidate.  However, Hudnut cited “personal 
reasons,” as well as his unfinished agenda for the city, as the impetus for his decision not to 
run.75  Without question, Hudnut’s decision strengthened Mutz’s candidacy, as Republicans 
were able to coalesce around Mutz and begin focusing their time, money, and attention on 
the fall campaign.  With the Republicans appearing united, pressure was increased on 
Democrats to get their own house in order if they were to be competitive. 
Meanwhile, Bayh responded to inquiries about his eligibility, encountering questions 
nearly everywhere he went.  At an event in South Bend, for example, Bayh expressed his 
hope that “state Republican Chairman Gordon Durnil makes an official challenge to 
[Bayh’s] meeting residency requirements for governor because such a ‘frivolous’ challenge 
‘would not serve [the Republicans] well in the arena of public opinion.’”76  Bayh was 
adamant that he would not initiate a lawsuit on his own.  That being said, it was manifestly 
important for him to allay growing fears among worried Democrats. 
For Bayh, the most effective way to instill internal party discipline was to project 
confidence in his legal position and, at the same time, create as much political momentum as 
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possible in support of the inevitability of his own political success.  Bayh’s campaign staff 
believed that Democrats could be persuaded that the Republican threats of a legal challenge 
were a sign of weakness, not strength.  But the strength of Bayh’s candidacy needed to be 
underscored at every turn.  Bayh described to a reporter that the “efforts to knock him out of 
the governor race are a sign of ‘growing desperation’ on the part of Republicans.”  He 
further argued that “Republicans, in control of the governor’s office since the 1968 election, 
will ‘resort to just about any tactic’ to retain control.”77 
 Bayh took advantage of every opportunity to ratchet up the political momentum in 
his favor.  In late October, his gubernatorial exploratory committee reported having raised 
$330,000 in just five months, a figure that exceeded what any previous Democratic 
gubernatorial candidate had ever raised in a comparable period.  Neither the O’Bannon nor 
Daily campaigns were required to file campaign finance reports at that time.  Spokespersons 
for each campaign, however, conceded that neither had raised an amount equal to Bayh, and 
it was widely believed that Bayh’s effort had significantly outpaced both.  There was even 
speculation that Bayh’s fundraising numbers nearly equaled those of Mutz.  Michael D. 
McDaniel, manager of Mutz’s campaign, characterized Bayh’s finance report as “mildly 
impressive.”  “It sounds to me [that] what they’re trying to do is scare O’Bannon and Daily 
out of the race,” he said.78  Durnil’s reaction was not surprising.  Because Bayh’s committee 
was not a formal candidate’s committee, Durnil claimed that contributions received by Bayh 
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from corporations and labor organizations were illegal and had been accepted in violation of 
Indiana campaign finance law.79 
 Shortly thereafter, and after months of speculation, Bayh made his decision official.  
On the chilly morning of November 12, 1987, from the front porch of his family’s 
farmhouse in Vigo County, Bayh publicly declared his candidacy for governor.80  Two days 
before, Mutz had done the same.  On the day of the Mutz announcement, Durnil distributed 
a nine-page legal memorandum prepared by unnamed lawyers for the Indiana Republican 
Party which concluded that Bayh was constitutionally ineligible to serve as governor.81  The 
legal analysis cited Indiana law in support of the proposition that moving out of Indiana for 
an indefinite period of time divested one of residency “even if the person intends to return at 
some time.”82  Thus, Republicans first argued that physical presence was required to 
maintain one’s residency unless absence was for reasons of the business of the state or of the 
United States.  “Evan Bayh’s fifteen (15) month absence from the State of Indiana was not 
due to either of the enumerated constitutional reasons:  business of the State of Indiana or 
business of the United States.  Evan Bayh’s absence from the State of Indiana occurred 
because he was pursuing a private career as an attorney in Washington, D.C.”83 
The memo also suggested that Bayh’s reliance on the court decisions cited in his 
previously released legal “white paper” was misplaced.  Attached to the Republican memo 
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were decisions from North Dakota and Arkansas standing for the proposition that one’s 
intent to return does not, by itself, create or maintain residency within a state.  The memo 
also examined the potential effect of someone winning a nomination or an election then later 
being judged ineligible to serve.  Characterizing the consequences as “complicated” and, 
potentially, “severe,” the memo implied that, absent some immediate resolution of the 
controversy, Bayh’s candidacy could wreak havoc on the entire process.  The Republicans 
also distributed a recently published editorial from the Democratic-leaning Fort Wayne 
Journal-Gazette admonishing Democrats to “get some sharp, independent legal advice 
instead of just conducting a primary campaign with the assumption that Evan Bayh is a 
qualified candidate for governor.”84 
 Democrats were listening.  Bayh once again found himself under increasing pressure 
to initiate action on his own and resolve the concerns that some suggested would overwhelm 
his candidacy.  While asserting that he had no intention of mounting a legal challenge, 
sources close to O’Bannon confirmed that he had been approached by lawyers who were 
willing to file such a challenge to Bayh.  Goss, O’Bannon’s campaign director, described the 
urgency of the matter:  “It’s imperative for the party that this question be cleared up as soon 
as possible.  The burden is on the Bayh campaign to clarify this as soon as possible.”  Daily 
was even more succinct, declaring, “the residency problem should be resolved before the 
primary.”  State Democratic Chair John B. Livengood revealed that several Democratic state 
central committee members wanted Bayh to either initiate a resolution himself or consent to 
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the filing of a “friendly legal challenge” against him in order to “put the matter to rest, one 
way or the other.”85 
 The calls by Democrats to dispel these doubts forced the Bayh campaign to seek 
“independent” legal support for their position.  In November, 1987, Moreau, Bayh’s deputy 
secretary of state, announced that a panel of legal advisors had already been asked to 
conduct a thorough review of the matter and render an advisory opinion.  Apparently, Bayh 
had convened the panel even before his official announcement.  Work had been ongoing for 
several weeks.  Furthermore, Moreau explained that “these are going to be folks who have a 
standing in the legal community, who have looked at it with a fresh eye and with a level of 
objectivity that hasn’t been voiced yet.”86 
 Bayh was pushing back politically as well.  The day after the formal announcement 
of his candidacy, Bayh received the near-unanimous endorsement of the Indiana State AFL-
CIO, the state’s largest labor organization.  Not only did the endorsement mean that Bayh 
would begin receiving a significant financial boost from labor union political coffers, the 
timing of the announcement was critical for political reasons.  In the midst of the uncertainty 
caused by the residency issue, this particular endorsement sent the unequivocal message that 
a very important constituency of the Democratic Party – organized labor – was willing to 
assume the risks associated with Bayh’s candidacy because they were convinced that he had 
the best chance of winning in the fall election.87 
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Bayh was also beginning to receive some discernible level of support in the court of 
public opinion.  The release of the Republican legal memo at the same time as Bayh’s 
declaration of candidacy prompted several newspapers’ editorial boards throughout the state 
to begin weighing in.  The Gary Post-Tribune observed that “State Republicans are reacting 
almost predictably to the Bayh announcement.  They are shouting that he is a kind of alien 
who flunks the residency requirements.  They even warn that he might be elected but could 
not serve ….  These may indeed be weighty matters requiring legal decisions.  But 
Republicans would do better if they prepared to take on the Democratic winner on issues 
that count ….”88  Other editorial boards were more pointed.  The Evansville Courier opined 
that “until the issue is put to rest, the campaign is likely to focus a disproportionate amount 
of attention on what is essentially a technicality.”89  The Marion Chronicle-Tribune called 
the Republican allegations a “cheap shot” that had the potential to backfire:  “Republicans 
ought to challenge Bayh on the real issues that concern most Hoosiers instead of trying to 
raise the peripheral issue of residency.”90 
For the first time, evidence also began to surface that even some Republicans were 
beginning to express quiet concern about Durnil’s role in promoting the controversy.  “It 
makes us look like we’re paranoid about Evan Bayh,” said one GOP state lawmaker from 
northern Indiana, who asked not to be identified.  “This (the challenge) should be something 
the Democrats should be fighting about, not us.”91 
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Not all political commentary was favorable for Bayh, however.  Mary Dieter, a 
political reporter for the Louisville Courier-Journal, noted that though Bayh claimed to be 
unconcerned about the residency issue, his actions indicated otherwise.  She observed that 
Bayh had conspicuously refrained from mentioning his work history in Washington, D.C., 
in the political biography that he had provided during his campaign for secretary of state.  
She also noted that, in an interview she had with Bayh before news of the residency issue 
first surfaced, “he hedged when asked the dates of his various jobs.  The subject at that 
moment was not whether Bayh was eligible to be a candidate, but whether he had lived in 
Indiana long enough to know the state.”92 
Similarly, Jim Mellowitz, a political columnist for the Fort Wayne News-Sentinel, 
noted that the debate over Bayh’s residency had “brought to light some intriguing facts 
about Bayh, facts that clearly irritate Bayh’s staff when they are brought up.”  Most notably, 
Mellowitz pointed out that Bayh had not yet released his 1983 or 1984 Indiana state income 
tax forms.  State tax forms require taxpayers to declare themselves as a “resident,” “non-
resident,” or “part-time resident.”  When specifically asked about Bayh’s tax forms by 
Mellowitz, Bayh’s staff claimed that they had not seen them.  Mellowitz observed, “this 
convenient lack of knowledge is troubling.”93 
By the first week of January, 1988, reporters began pressing about the public 
commitment Bayh’s campaign had made in November to produce a definitive legal analysis 
prepared by dispassionate experts that would “settle questions over [his] eligibility to be 
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governor.”  When no report had been released by early January, Bayh’s opponents, both 
Republican and Democratic, were quick to raise questions about reasons for the delay. 
Durnil claimed no surprise at all that a report supporting Bayh’s legal position had 
not been released.  “I don’t expect them to ever have any kind of report … because if they 
do, and it’s a legitimate report, it’s going to be negative to them.”  Durnil emphasized that 
Bayh had yet to release his 1984 federal tax return or his Indiana state or District of 
Columbia tax returns for 1983 and 1984.  Durnil argued that the release of those tax returns 
would prove determinative with respect to the question of Bayh’s eligibility:  “If they really 
do have a group of people looking at it, and he shared his Indiana tax returns and his 
Washington tax returns with them, they would tell him he’s not eligible to run.”94 
As for the Democrats, Steve Daily claimed personal disinterest in Bayh’s residency 
problems.  The O’Bannon campaign, on the other hand, expressed serious concern about 
Bayh’s delay in the release of a definitive legal analysis.  O’Bannon reiterated his intention 
to refrain from filing a lawsuit.  However, his campaign director echoed reservations some 
Democrats had been expressing since the formal declaration of Bayh’s candidacy in early 
November.  “I think it’s important to clear up the issue,” John Goss said.  “Many people in 
the party are concerned about clearing up the issue as soon as possible.”95 
As pressure for a legal resolution of the issue continued to mount, Bayh received 
significant political support from the release of findings of a statewide poll commissioned 
by the Indianapolis Star and conducted during the first week of January.  In its January 10, 
1988, edition, under a headline entitled “Bayh leads Mutz, Democrats in governor’s race,” 
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the Star reported that, in a head-to-head match-up, Bayh enjoyed a 10 percentage point lead 
over Mutz among likely voters who had already made a decision.  The poll also revealed 
that Bayh was favored by 60 percent of those self-identified Democrats surveyed when 
asked who they supported in their party’s primary.  From those same likely Democratic 
primary voters, O’Bannon received 8 percent and Daily received 5 percent of support.  In 
addition, while Bayh polled ahead of Mutz, both O’Bannon and Daily trailed Mutz by 14 
percentage points when matched with him head-to-head.  The Star observed that the poll’s 
findings “indicate the powerful Republican state committee might have to come from 
behind to extend its 20-year domination of the governor’s office” and that “a 31-year old 
with a 1-year old career in government is in a strong position to upset a veteran politician 
who is completing his second term as lieutenant governor.”96 
Also accelerating the political dynamics facing Bayh and his opponents was the 
January 15 deadline for filing year-end campaign finance reports.  O’Bannon filed first.  On 
January 13, his campaign committee revealed that, during 1987, it had raised a total of 
$367,000 – about the same amount that Bayh had reported raising three months earlier.  
More importantly, O’Bannon’s disclosure revealed that his committee had only $90,371 
remaining as his campaign entered the new year.97  On January 14, the reports filed by Bayh 
and Mutz showed that each had raised a nearly equal amount of money in 1987 – Bayh 
reported raising $773,702, while Mutz raised $790,639.  Additionally, they were neck-and-
neck as far as cash-on-hand at the end of 1987 – Bayh reported $661,138 in the bank, while 
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Mutz had $773,910 (which included monies Mutz had raised in 1986 and 1987).98  These 
reports confirmed that Bayh was financially competitive with Mutz, that he was 
significantly outpacing both of his primary opponents, and he was establishing at each 
milepost new records for the amount of money raised by an Indiana Democrat running for 
governor.99  The Bayh campaign also highlighted the fact that Bayh’s fundraising had come 
from over 3,100 contributors, which it characterized as evidence of widespread and 
“significant encouragement to seek the governorship.”100 
The Star’s poll results combined with the fundraising figures made it nearly 
impossible to reach any conclusion other than that Bayh’s candidacy was going to be 
extremely competitive against the Republicans.  In the wake of these disclosures, internal 
Democratic party concern over Bayh’s eligibility quieted significantly.  Though poll 
numbers and fundraising figures did not alter Bayh’s legal position, their release solidified 
party support behind Bayh’s candidacy.  Talk that a challenge to Bayh’s eligibility would 
come from Democrats – whether by way of a “friendly lawsuit” or from a primary opponent 
– almost entirely disappeared.  O’Bannon’s own polling revealed that, after almost a year of 
campaigning, O’Bannon’s net positive rating was only 7 percent, with 73 percent of those 
polled unable to recognize his name.  This was in stark contrast to the 54 percent of voters 
who gave Bayh a positive rating.  Most notably, O’Bannon’s polls confirmed that, while 
voters generally regarded experience in government as important, they did not apply that 
standard to Bayh, or if they did, they did not care and “liked him anyway.”101 
                                                 
98 Indianapolis News, January 15, 1988. 
99 Indianapolis Star, January 15, 1988. 
100 Louisville Courier-Journal, January 15, 1988. 
101 Stoner, Legacy of a Governor, 121. 
50 
Durnil’s desire to convince Democrats to mount their own challenge against Bayh 
had all but vanished.  If someone were going to initiate a legal challenge, Durnil remained 
the only outspoken proponent.  It remained possible that Bayh could be forced to initiate his 
own legal proceedings, but such effort to “quiet title” was becoming less likely by the day.  
Bayh would only do so to protect or preserve advantageous legal position in response to any 
preemptory action taken by Durnil and the Republicans. 
As if he sensed the inevitable, Durnil became more animated and provocative in his 
attacks on Bayh.  When asked to comment on Bayh’s January 14 fundraising report, Durnil 
accused Bayh of hiding campaign contributions in out-of-state banks.  Durnil characterized 
these contributions as “unreported cash … from organized labor and New York Jewish 
money.”102  A firestorm erupted immediately.  A spokesperson for the Indianapolis Jewish 
Community Relations Council called the comment “reprehensible” and having “no place in 
American public life.”  Livengood called it “an appeal to bigotry” and accused Durnil of 
being obsessed with Bayh.103  Durnil apologized and explained that he had used or intended 
to use, the term “Eastern liberal money” rather than “New York Jewish money.”  A Mutz 
spokesperson expressed shock and made clear that the Mutz campaign “would gladly accept 
contributions from members of the Jewish faith who did not live in Indiana.”104 
 Though Durnil remained the principal public advocate of pursuing a residency 
challenge against Bayh, Mutz’s campaign closely monitored the effect of the issue on 
voters.  To that point, Mutz had refrained from taking any direct role.  That changed on 
                                                 
102 Indianapolis Star, January 16, 1988. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
 
51 
January 18 when Mutz, during a press conference, released his own personal income tax 
forms for the previous five years and called on Bayh to do the same.  McDaniel, Mutz’s 
campaign manager, argued that the release of the lieutenant governor’s tax information was 
prompted solely by the release of similar forms by the 1988 Republican presidential 
candidates, and not as a pretext to pressure Bayh to disclose what could be critical evidence 
for an impending challenge to Bayh’s eligibility.  McDaniel noted that Republican statewide 
candidates in both 1984 and 1986 had released tax information.  Thus, Mutz was merely 
being consistent with precedent previously established.105   
Nonetheless, the timing of the Mutz release appeared calculated.  In 1984 and 1986, 
tax returns by Republican statewide candidates had been released in August, not January.  In 
addition, no explanation was offered as to why Mutz had chosen to release five years worth 
of tax information.  During his campaign for secretary of state in 1986, Bayh had released 
tax information for 1985, his first full year of employment in Indiana after his return from 
Washington, D.C.  While release of candidate tax information had become standard political 
fare, Republican sources conceded that their previously identified interest in Bayh’s income 
tax returns for 1983 and 1984 was growing: “[the Republicans] say the tax forms will help 
prove that Bayh considered Washington his residence in 1984.”  McDaniel asserted that “all 
we are asking is for [Bayh’s campaign] to release their returns.  If they don’t, you can draw 
your own conclusions.”106   
Bayh charged that the release by Mutz of five years worth of tax records along with 
Mutz’s call for Bayh to do likewise was evidence that Mutz himself was part of an 
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organized effort by Republicans to keep Bayh off the ballot.  Bayh reiterated what was 
becoming his standard mantra:  “Gordon Durnil is not confident enough in his candidate to 
have the people decide this election.  And now John Mutz is trying to take the case away 
from a trier of fact (a judge) by challenging me to release this information bit by bit ….  I 
have consistently said I am not going to dribble out the information.  We will release all of 
the information concerning my residency at once.”107 
 Politically, the 1988 election shifted into overdrive on January 20 when, together, 
Bayh and O’Bannon announced that O’Bannon would discontinue his seven-month-old 
campaign for governor and join forces with Bayh by running as his lieutenant governor.  
The political realities facing O’Bannon had caused him to conclude that he could only wage 
a campaign against Bayh that was “negative” in tone – something he was unwilling to do.108  
Democrats were exuberant.  The party could now unite behind the two individuals most 
believed were their strongest candidates.  The potential of a divisive primary would be 
avoided.  Bayh and O’Bannon’s candidacies seemed to complement each other.  As Bayh 
remarked during the press conference announcing the decision:  “I don’t know a public 
official who is more respected and honored and has more integrity than Frank O’Bannon ….  
I hope we can provide the best of fresh leadership and seasoned experience.”109 
Years later, Bayh would recall that O’Bannon was “someone who cared about the 
state and who cared about the Democratic Party ….  He wanted to do what was best for [us] 
both, even if that meant subordinating his own ambitions ….  Frank O’Bannon was a man 
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who cared very deeply about the greater good more than he cared about his own narrow 
self-interest.”110  O’Bannon’s biographer, Andrew E. Stoner, writes, “to describe Democrats 
in Indiana as jubilant at the Bayh-O’Bannon announcement would be an understatement.  
State Senator Carolyn Mosby of Gary declared it ‘the happiest day of my political life.  For 
the first time ever, I really believe we Democrats can control the Statehouse.’  State 
Representative Earline Rogers of Gary … took fellow Democrats aside and persuaded them 
to sing and dance in the statehouse halls following the announcement.”111  The Indianapolis 
News observed, “both the announcement and the gesture, understandably, touched off 
jubilation among Indiana Democrats.  Democrats have had the Statehouse doors shut to 
them for many years.  Children have been born, gone through school and voted since the last 
time a Democrat sat in the governor’s chair.  Now, after many cold winters, Indiana 
Democrats feel they will be able to warm themselves at the fireplace in the governor’s 
mansion next January.”112 
The Mutz campaign claimed to be elated by the development, characterizing the 
Bayh-O’Bannon ticket as a “dream” for Republicans.  “It will make it much easier to point 
out that this campaign is [between] the most qualified candidate ever for governor (Mutz) 
versus the least qualified candidate ever (Bayh),” said Mike McDaniel.113  Privately, the 
story was altogether different, as McDaniel later conceded.  “We would have preferred to 
run against Frank O’Bannon … (the partnership) was troublesome, certainly ….  The big 
difference for us would have been that Frank O’Bannon had a voting record, and Evan Bayh 
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had no record at all ….”114  The Mutz campaign also preferred O’Bannon as a prospective 
opponent because O’Bannon had never run statewide, whereas Bayh had just won the race 
for secretary of state.  Mutz also appreciated the advantage that Bayh possessed in name 
recognition, in large measure because of his father.  McDaniel feared that the Bayh-
O’Bannon ticket provided advantageous geographic balance.  “With O’Bannon, ‘you had 
someone who could probably deliver a good part of southern Indiana, which is always very 
important for the Democrats.’”115 
 How formation of the Bayh-O’Bannon ticket would affect the residency issue was 
not immediately clear.  Most observers assumed that, with O’Bannon firmly ensconced as 
the party’s presumptive lieutenant governor nominee, he was positioned to assume the 
party’s mantle of leadership should Bayh be ruled ineligible.  Such a conclusion was not 
accurate, however.  Daily remained a candidate for governor.  The question then became 
one of timing.  If O’Bannon did not file for governor and if Bayh were declared ineligible 
after the close of the filing period (March 4), but before the primary election (May 3), then 
Daily would be the only remaining eligible gubernatorial candidate on the ballot and would 
win the Democratic nomination by default. 
As a result, even at a time when Democrats were rallying behind their newly formed 
ticket, consideration had to be given to filing O’Bannon’s name in the gubernatorial 
primary.116  To qualify for placement on the ballot, a candidate for governor was required to 
obtain certifiable signatures from 500 registered voters in each of the state’s ten 
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congressional districts.  Goss, O’Bannon’s campaign director, explained “we are completing 
the petitions for Frank and they will be ready to be filed so that Frank can be on the ballot 
(for governor), in case he needs to be.”117  All of this could have been avoided if Daily could 
have been persuaded to discontinue his candidacy as well.  In point of fact, on the day of 
their joint announcement, Bayh and O’Bannon invited Daily to join their team, albeit in an 
unspecified capacity.118  O’Bannon confirmed that his offer to Daily was not specific, but 
that other Democrats had suggested to Daily that he consider running for state 
superintendent of public instruction because he was a former teacher and could add valuable 
insight to the debate about the future of public education.  Daily declined and continued his 
quest for the party’s nomination for governor.  Stoner writes that, “Daily says he recalls 
hearing directly from O’Bannon that he was planning to withdraw, but if Daily ever 
considered dropping out, at that point, it didn’t show publicly.  Describing himself as a ‘pit 
bull terrier’, Daily dug in ….”119 
 On January 23, a formal challenge to Bayh’s eligibility inched closer when Durnil 
admitted that Bayh’s “whereabouts” for the last five years had been under investigation for 
more than a year.  Apparently, at Durnil’s direction, Republicans had been pursuing this 
investigation since shortly after Bayh had assumed office as secretary of state in December 
of 1986.  Durnil further asserted that he was “certain” that Bayh did not satisfy the 
constitutional qualifications.  The Republican effort had been directed toward “accumulating 
evidence from a network of volunteers who … have supplied more than 50 pieces of 
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information indicating Bayh gave up his Hoosier residency.”  Durnil bragged to Chuck 
Clark, a reporter for the Evansville Courier, that he had in his possession “a two inch thick 
file, stuffed with clippings and reports on Bayh, at his fingertips in his office ….”  Durnil 
announced that Republicans would challenge Bayh’s candidacy shortly after Bayh formally 
entered the race because “when it comes to the Constitution and somebody tries to bluff 
their way through, you’ve just got to stop them.”120 
 On Monday, February 1, Bayh once again took the offensive on the residency issue 
by issuing the long-awaited report submitted by three legal advisors.  Members of the panel 
included Dean David T. Link of the University of Notre Dame School of Law, Indiana 
University constitutional law professor Patrick L. Baude, and former Indiana Supreme Court 
Justice Dixon W. Prentice.  All three possessed legal resumes that could not be dismissed 
lightly.  Yet, it should be noted that all three were Democrats and all had been asked by 
Bayh to review the law and offer their opinion.  In addition, Justice Prentice had been a 
member of the Evrard court in 1975 and had joined the majority opinion, finding Evrard 
eligible to vote in the Perry County primary although he had not yet moved home. 
The panel’s partisan orientations aside, they offered a thorough and thoughtful legal 
analysis.  They concluded that a “candidate for governor need not be physically present in 
the state to meet the Indiana Constitution’s residency requirement.”  Rather, they said, a 
judge, or judges, must consider evidence “indicating how Bayh lived and where he intended 
to permanently live.”  According to the panel, a review of the decisions of the Indiana 
Supreme Court revealed that a person must first abandon Indiana and then establish a new 
residence elsewhere in order to lose residency.  On behalf of the panel, Baude explained that 
Bayh would have had to “buy a house in Washington, enter into long-term commitments, 
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changing his voter’s registration to Washington, making Washington his home, the center of 
his civil, political, personal, family and religious life.”121 
 Because it was undisputed that Bayh was domiciled in Indiana at birth, and because 
the panel was not aware of any facts that would show that Bayh had affirmatively 
abandoned Indiana and established a new domicile in Washington, D.C., during his 1983-84 
stint with a law firm, the panel concluded that Bayh was “a ‘resident’ of Indiana during that 
period for purposes of complying with Article 5, Section 7.”122  Baude further observed that 
“a person keeps whatever domicile he has until he changes it.  In light of a century of 
unbroken interpretations in the Indiana Supreme Court, it is just difficult, in fact, impossible, 
to see how there could be any serious question about Evan Bayh’s eligibility.”123 Baude 
explained that “the question of residence under the Indiana Constitution does not mean what 
your mailing address is.  It refers to those deep bonds and connections between an individual 
and his state that link him in the long run to the state.”124  Bayh characterized the report as 
“an exhaustive study.”  He also expressed his hope that the report would put the residency 
matter to rest, but he acknowledged that, in all likelihood, the matter was headed to court.125   
 While the panel’s report could be categorized as just another opinion, it was the joint 
and considered judgment of individuals who were undeniably legal scholars.  The report did 
have one important additional effect.  For the first time, the concept of “residency as 
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domicile” was publicly explained.  This explanation began to delineate the contrast between 
“residency as domicile” and the “physical presence” standard upon which some Republicans 
were insisting.  Among contemporaneous press accounts, there was a growing recognition 
that, as a legal matter, the mere fact that Bayh had not been physically present in Indiana for 
the entire five-year period was insufficient to render him ineligible.  Rather, the 
determinative issue might very well turn on whether evidence existed to prove that Bayh 
had “intended” to change his residency. 
 Republican reaction to the findings of this panel was immediate. Durnil’s lawyer, 
Daniel F. Evans, Jr., focused on the panel’s unsubstantiated factual assumption that Bayh 
intended to maintain residency in Indiana through the time he spent in Washington, D.C.  
Evans said, “the problem is the facts.  They [the panel] had to assume certain facts to reach 
this conclusion.  Overt acts must be examined by a trier of the facts (a judge or judges).”  
Evans argued that Bayh’s own previous characterizations of where he lived and worked 
would prove that he had divested himself of his Indiana residency.126  Furthermore, in an 
attempt to cling to the idea that continued physical presence was not irrelevant, Evans 
reiterated that Indiana law regarding “voter eligibility” unquestionably provided that voters 
who move to another state for an indefinite period do, in fact, lose their eligibility to vote.  
Evans reiterated the position he had first articulated in the Republican legal memorandum of 
November 10, 1987, wherein he had written: “Evan Bayh moved to Washington and 
maintained a residence there for an indefinite time.  Based solely on those facts, he lost his 
residency in the State of Indiana.”127 
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 The only “new evidence” presented by Bayh’s panel of legal advisors was oral 
confirmation that Bayh had filed “part-year” Indiana income tax returns for both 1983 and 
1984.  The tax returns themselves were not released as a part of the panel’s press 
conference.  Dean David Link acknowledged that, once released, Bayh’s returns would 
show that he claimed tax status in 1983 and 1984 as a “part-year” Indiana resident, not “full-
year.”  Link said that tax returns were “not that determinative.”  He did concede, however, 
that filing taxes as a part year resident would constitute a “confusing factor” to Bayh’s 
assertion that he intended to remain a resident of Indiana.128   
Republicans picked up on this distinction and magnified it.  They asserted the tax 
returns and other documents were “highly damaging to Bayh’s case.”  Durnil argued that 
Bayh’s refusal to provide his tax returns was proof that he was avoiding the release of 
damaging evidence.  Durnil repeated his intention to challenge Bayh’s eligibility before the 
state election board and suggested that the tax returns would serve as the best evidence that 
Bayh did not consider himself an Indiana “full-time” resident during 1983 and 1984.  “He 
signed his name in 1984 to something in which he admitted he was less than a full-time 
resident” of Indiana.  Beyond the tax returns, though, Durnil continued to assert that he had 
compiled substantial evidence, including the testimony of witnesses, that would prove that 
Bayh terminated his Indiana residency when he moved to Washington.129  “I’m surprised 
that they [the panel] didn’t give any facts,” said Durnil.  “Those things are important.  I’m 
surprised that they didn’t have a hat to hang it on.”130 
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 Republican efforts to investigate all aspects of Bayh’s background during the 1983-
84 period continued unabated.  On February 2, 1988, Clerk of the Courts Daniel R. Heiser 
wrote Bayh informing him that a review of Heiser’s office records revealed that Bayh had 
failed to pay the required annual registration fee in 1983 to maintain his status as a lawyer in 
good standing in Indiana.  Bayh had been admitted to practice law in Indiana on August 26, 
1983 and, according to Heiser, had until October 1, 1983 to pay the $25 fee.  Bayh’s failure 
to pay the fee was not detected at the time but, if it had been, Bayh could have been 
suspended from the practice of law.  On February 4, 1988, Bayh paid the fee along with a 
$40 late charge.  Heiser, who provided the press with copies of this exchange of 
correspondence, claimed that he checked Bayh’s records after reading about questions 
surrounding Bayh’s eligibility to run for governor.131  Later records also showed that Heiser 
called Durnil when Heiser made the discovery and provided Durnil with “copies of a letter 
Heiser sent to Bayh reminding him he owed the money and copies of Bayh’s response, 
Bayh’s check, and the receipt Heiser issued for the payment.”  He defended his decision to 
share all of the information about Bayh with Durnil because “it was public record and I 
would be happy to provide a copy to the Star.”132 
 In early February, the Indianapolis News editorial page offered its analysis of the 
situation.  While the News did not directly refute the legal conclusions drawn by Bayh’s 
experts, it also noted that “even Al Capone could always find a lawyer to argue before a jury 
that his client was clearly not guilty.”  However, the newspaper encouraged Bayh to seek a 
prompt resolution of the matter by way of filing a “friendly lawsuit” so a resolution could be 
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obtained and the gubernatorial campaign could focus on issues, not “arcane legal doctrines 
and interpretation.”  While not recommending it as a course of action, the editorial also 
observed that the politically expedient course for Republicans was to simply let the issue 
remain unresolved and make it the primary issue against Bayh in the fall campaign.133 
At the same time, however, evidence began to grow of the unease among 
Republicans about whether challenging Bayh was politically wise.  “Some say the 
Republicans are trying to hook the Bayh campaign, which is moving like a political 
steamroller in the early going, on a technicality.  Others, though, say it is a legitimate 
question that should be resolved.”134  Traub argued in his February 7 political column in the 
Indianapolis Star that the Republicans were winning the “political” battle because “their 
accusation is simple, straightforward and easily understood” – Bayh had to live in Indiana 
for five years prior to the election and he did not.  “To defend himself, Bayh and his 
supporters are forced into long, complicated explanations of Indiana Supreme Court 
decisions that define residency.  Bayh’s attorneys use words such as ‘dispositive,’ 
‘domicile,’ ‘trier of fact’ and other terms seldom heard in neighborhood taverns.  (In order, 
those words mean ‘proven or settled,’ ‘the place you consider your home’ and ‘a judge’).  
Bayh and his supporters must explain that a person can live and work somewhere else but 
still be considered to have proper legal connections.”135 
However, having said that, Traub argued that Republicans would eventually lose the 
“legal” war because Bayh would ultimately be adjudged eligible by a court of law.  Traub 
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warned that the Republicans would eventually pay a significant political price because they 
risked being viewed as wanting to take choice out of the hands of the voters and would be 
seen by the public as such.136 
In the end, Traub suggested that the Republicans would be better off to focus on 
Bayh’s qualifications – his youth and inexperience – not on his residency or his eligibility. 
Keeping such a choice from voters indicates weakness, something the 
Republican Party should not be concerned with.  John Mutz is a strong 
candidate.  He has a record, and he should campaign on it.  The Republican 
Party has an obligation to describe the difference between its likely candidate 
and the Democrats’ likely candidate.  That difference is simple.  Bayh was 
still going to school when Mutz was elected lieutenant governor of the state.  
Bayh had yet to actually live in Indiana until Mutz was seeking re-election.  
Those are simple political judgments.  And voters understand that.  In fact, 
Republicans will be better served by political arguments than by the legal 
arguments of residency.  If the legal argument is lost, and it should be, the 
political argument will be weakened.137 
 
 By mid-February, the tide had turned and some in the Mutz campaign were 
beginning to agree with Traub’s assessment.  There was growing concern that formally 
challenging Bayh’s residency might backfire.  Confirmation of that occurred on February 
14, when it was reported that, during the previous week, a group of Mutz supporters had 
gathered in Indianapolis to discuss the campaign’s overall strategy.  Much of the discussion 
was dominated by how the Republicans should handle the residency issue.  Apparently, a 
“spirited debate” ensued with some Mutz supporters arguing against a legal challenge.  It 
was clear that Durnil lacked the full and enthusiastic support of Mutz and his campaign for 
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the challenge.  “The Mutz camp is trying to separate itself from the fray without appearing 
disloyal or unsupportive of Durnil until it can make up its mind.”138 
Such hesitancy may very well have proved fatal.  By mid-February, 1988, the 
controversy had been unfolding in the public arena for five months.  The Mutz campaign 
had surely monitored the public’s reaction by both scientific means – polling data – and 
unscientific anecdotal testimony.  By any measure, it would have been impossible to 
conclude that the issue was breaking decidedly in Mutz’s favor.  At best, it might be said 
that both sides were still unsure what the public’s ultimate conclusion would be.  Yet even 
in the face of significant reluctance and doubt, the Mutz campaign offered no public 
objection to Durnil’s resolve to pursue the process he had repeatedly laid out.  There seemed 
to be no turning back.  Durnil was convinced that, if pursued, the Republicans would be 
successful in their effort to have Bayh declared ineligible.  Perhaps Mutz had been 
convinced of that as well. 
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Chapter Three 
 
 
THE LEGAL CONTEXT 
 
 
“A person running for office from a particular area should be so closely associated with the 
problems of that area that he can effectively represent the inhabitants thereof; that having the 
candidate live in the area assures the accomplishment of such objective; and that the 
question is not what group of people the candidate wishes to represent, but where the law 
considers him best qualified to exercise his political rights and privileges.” 
 
Moore v. Tiller, 409 S.W.2d 813 (1966) 
 
As discussed above, the Indiana Constitution requires the governor to “have been a 
resident” of the state for five years preceding election.  Ironically, the question of whether 
Evan Bayh satisfied this residency requirement surfaced at a time when the validity of 
similar requirements in other states were being challenged.  Because Republicans appeared 
determined to pursue the issue, Bayh had several legal options to consider.  On one hand, he 
could argue that he satisfied the requirement of being a resident of Indiana for the five years 
prior to the November, 1988 general election, although he had not lived in Indiana the entire 
period.  This option was dependent on two things.  First, it required a determination that 
one’s continued physical presence was not the way the law measured or defined residency.  
If it were, he would not be a “resident.”  Secondly, it was dependent on the likelihood that 
an impartial fact-finder could be persuaded that Bayh had taken no action to abandon his 
Indiana residency and establish it elsewhere – that he had been a resident of Indiana for the 
full five years. 
On the other hand, rather than argue that he met the Indiana Constitution’s residency 
requirement, he could argue that the Indiana requirement violated the United States 
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Constitution and was, therefore, invalid.  This option would admittedly involve a less fact-
sensitive determination, but would require Bayh to convince a court that, as a matter of law, 
the requirement should be invalidated.  Court decisions from other jurisdictions supported 
consideration of both options.  In order to understand the dilemma Bayh faced in deciding 
which path to choose, a review of some of those relevant decisions is helpful. 
Throughout the last half of the twentieth century, durational residency requirements 
around the country were being challenged.  The challenges were constitutional in nature; 
that is, they alleged that state residency requirements violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution or that they infringed on the 
exercise of other federally protected constitutional rights, like the right to vote, to travel, of 
free expression, and to associate freely with others.139  If and when courts were asked to 
review an alleged unconstitutional classification, such as a durational residency requirement, 
the United States Supreme Court had established two analytical tests.  The first, the “rational 
basis” test, required only that the court determine the classification to be rationally related to 
a state’s legitimate goal.  However, if a reviewing court found the classification impeded a 
fundamental constitutional right, a “strict scrutiny” test was to be used to determine whether 
the state had a higher or a “compelling interest” justifying the classification.140  Over time, 
courts using these two tests had reached various conclusions regarding the validity of state-
mandated durational residency requirements for state and local offices. 
 In those cases where durational residency requirements were declared invalid, the 
requirement was found by the court to be overly broad, imprecise or ineffective in satisfying 
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its sought-after goals, thus rendering it constitutionally impermissible.  For example, in 
Zeilenga v. Nelson, a California court struck down a five-year residency requirement for the 
office of county board of supervisors.141  The court held the requirement to be a denial of 
equal protection in that citizens were required to wait “an unreasonable length of time” 
before being eligible to run for office.  No compelling state interest was found to support 
it.142 
Similarly, in Mogk v. City of Detroit, a federal district court in Michigan declared 
unconstitutional a one-year residency requirement for membership on a Detroit city 
commission because “the right to candidacy is inextricably intertwined with the right to 
vote.”143  Likewise, in Cowan v. City of Aspen, the Colorado Supreme Court found that, 
absent the necessary compelling state interest to justify it, a durational residency 
requirement for candidates for office in Colorado was unconstitutional because holding 
public office “is one of the valuable and fundamental rights of citizenship” that cannot be 
infringed upon unless there exists “a reasonable relation to the object sought to be 
accomplished by the imposition of the qualification.”144 
 As has been previously mentioned, the common principle traditionally supporting 
the need for such requirements was the idea that lawmakers should have a sustained 
presence within a community in order to familiarize themselves with local issues and 
problems.  Even this historical basis came under assault in light of modern technology.  For 
example, the court in Mogk observed that a residency requirement, enacted in 1909, had 
                                                 
141 Zeilenga v. Nelson, 484 P.2d 578 (Ca., 1971). 
142 But see, Beil v. City of Akron, 660 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1981), 169. 
143 Mogk v. City of Detroit, 335 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mich. 1971). 
144 Cowan v. City of Aspen, 509 P.2d 1269 (Colo. 1973).   
67 
outlived the vast changes that had since taken place.  “In 1909, Marconi’s wireless was in its 
infancy; that the vacuum tube and radio had not yet arrived and carriage makers were just 
turning to making automobiles … if a short sojourn in the community is considered to be a 
disqualification, the electorate may voice its sentiment at the ballot box.”145  Similarly, in 
Zeilenga, the court said, “perhaps in the horse and buggy days the five year requirement 
could have been reasonable, but in these days of modern public transportation, the 
automobile, newspapers, radio, television, and the rapid dissemination of news throughout 
all parts of the country, the requirement is unreasonable.”146 
 That is not to suggest, however, that constitutional challenges were routinely 
successful.  In fact, for the most part, constitutional residency requirements for candidates 
for office (particularly state office) have been upheld.  The reasons vary.  Most courts have, 
at least as a preliminary matter, acknowledged that they exist in most state constitutions.  In 
addition, courts have also found that they possess a long-held political and historical 
significance and that they are supported by reasonable objectives.  And the United States 
Supreme Court has never expressly held that the federal constitution prohibits state 
residency requirements.147  Not surprisingly, several lower reviewing courts have pointed 
out, with some degree of irony, that our federal constitution contains provisions of similar 
character – the president must be a resident of the United States for fourteen years, a senator 
must possess a nine year residency, and a seven year residency is required for members of 
the House of Representatives. 
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 In 1973, the United States Supreme Court let stand without comment a federal 
district court decision upholding a seven-year durational residency requirement for governor 
of New Hampshire.  In Chimento v. Stark, a three judge lower court found that New 
Hampshire’s seven-year requirement was not an impermissible method of prohibiting new 
citizens of the state from becoming candidates and officeholders.  Rather, the court held that 
the requirement was intended to ensure highly qualified and knowledgeable candidates for 
state office.  It also ensured that “the chief executive of New Hampshire is exposed to the 
state and its people, thereby giving him familiarity with and awareness of the conditions, 
needs and problems of both the state of New Hampshire and the various segments of the 
population within the state, while at the same time giving the voters of the state the 
opportunity to gain by observation and personal contact some firsthand knowledge of the 
candidates for governor.”  That court did not, however, write a blank check for all such 
requirements.  Even in finding seven years to be “reasonable,” the court noted that such 
length may approach the constitutional limit.  Thus, the court left open the question of what 
constitutes an excessive duration.148 
 Thereafter, in Hankins v. State of Hawaii, the plaintiff, John Hankins, asked a 
federal district court to compel election officials in Hawaii to include his name on a 
gubernatorial primary ballot, even while conceding that he failed to satisfy the state’s 
constitutional durational residency requirement.149  Hankins sought the Republican 
nomination for governor in 1986.  The state constitution required candidates to “have been a 
resident of this State for five years immediately preceding” election.  Although he claimed 
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to have resided in the state for an aggregate total of seventeen years, Hankins did not 
challenge the assertion that he had not been “a resident of” Hawaii for the five years 
immediately preceding the election.  Rather, he asked the court to declare him eligible 
because the durational residency requirement violated his right to equal protection under the 
law – that is, he questioned whether a state “may discriminate against recently-arrived 
residents who wish to enter an upcoming gubernatorial election.”150 
 The court in Hankins found that the state constitutional requirements did not impact 
a fundamental constitutional right (such as the right to travel).  Thus, the court applied 
traditional “rational basis” analysis.  In that regard, the court said, “at issue here is more than 
simply a desire on the part of the chief election officer that gubernatorial candidates be 
known to the electorate.  The State has a strong interest in the assurance that its governor 
will be a person who understands the conditions of life in Hawaii.”151  Hankins had spent a 
significant period of time away from Hawaii.  The court found he had “arguably lost contact 
with the crises, the culture, and the people of Hawaii.”152 
While the durational residency requirement was found to be constitutional, the court 
did express some reservation.  “Employing the complete arsenal of strict scrutiny 
techniques, it would be next to impossible to justify any particular period of residence, since 
there would always be conceivable exceptions and counterexamples, and there would 
always be less burdensome alternatives (such as some yet shorter period of residency, or 
else leaving the question of a candidate’s fitness for office to the political process).”153 
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 A residency requirement for the office of state senator was considered by the 
Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel. Gralike v. Walsh.  The court held that, insofar as the 
constitutional concepts relate to durational residency requirements, the right to vote and the 
right to be a candidate cannot be equated.  Because there is no constitutionally protected 
“right” to be a candidate, the application of a “strict scrutiny” analysis was inappropriate.  
Rather, the “rational basis” test should be applied.  The court sustained the one-year 
requirement finding that the citizenship, age and residency requirements for public office are 
nationally-based because they “have been provided throughout the history of our 
country.”154   
 Six years later, when a federal appellate court was asked to review Missouri’s ten-
year durational residency requirement for office of state auditor, it affirmed a lower court 
ruling that the requirement was not reasonably related to any asserted state interests.  In 
Antonio v. Kirkpatrick, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the requirement 
“only minimally” infringed on voter’s rights and, in addition, did not “irretrievably foreclose 
a person from running” for auditor.155  The court also held that the requirement had “some 
rational relationship” to the state’s interest in having candidates for statewide office 
“demonstrate their interest as citizens in the welfare and problems of the State.”156 
However, despite these findings and according to the court, the decision rested on 
whether “the requirement so imposed violates constitutional standards as being arbitrary or 
so restrictive as to erase any rational relationship to the legitimate State interest of having 
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qualified and knowledgeable candidates.”  Acknowledging it to be a close question, the 
court upheld the lower court’s decision to invalidate the requirement as it related to Mr. 
Antonio’s desire to be a candidate for state auditor.157 
 In summary, by 1987, when Evan Bayh began considering a run for governor of 
Indiana, lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of durational residency requirements were 
not unusual in other parts of the country.  From a legal standpoint, the validity of Indiana’s 
gubernatorial residency requirement was as vulnerable to challenge as any similar 
requirement in any other state for the same or similar legal reasons.  But Bayh had to also 
consider the political ramifications of a constitutional challenge to the requirement’s 
validity. 
In challenging the validity of a durational residency requirement, one must all but 
concede that insufficient evidence exists to satisfy its provisions.  Accordingly, an attack on 
the validity of a requirement could be characterized as an attempt to “change the rules in the 
middle of the game.”  As a matter of law, an effort to “change the rules” may be appropriate 
and defensible.  But as a matter of public opinion, it is unlikely that it would be viewed the 
same way.  At bottom, by challenging the legality of Indiana’s constitutional residency 
requirement under the federal constitution, Bayh would open himself up to the charge that 
he did not want to be held accountable to the same standards that every candidate for 
governor of Indiana before him had been required to satisfy. 
Unless it is unavoidable, no candidate for public office wants to appear to be arguing 
that the law should be changed in order to allow him or her to run.  Beyond its obvious 
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disadvantages, that position would be contrary to a predominant theme of Bayh’s campaign.  
In short, to the extent that a formal challenge to his residency was initiated, Bayh would be 
best served politically if it appeared that it was being pursued by his political opponents.  
This is not to suggest that Bayh ever considered himself to be constitutionally ineligible to 
serve as governor.  Rather, it is meant to underscore the fact that legal and political 
determinations often are made in a vacuum.  A candidate’s ability to recognize, assess and 
respond to the political implications of any particular legal decision has a premium attached 
to it that defies measurement.  If nothing else, Evan Bayh intuitively appreciated, perhaps as 
well as anyone could have, the political implications of various legal strategies 
contemplated. 
The alternative to challenging the provision’s constitutionality was for Bayh to argue 
that he actually satisfied the requirement.  He could point to court decisions from other 
jurisdictions that supported such a conclusion.  In those cases, the primary legal issue 
reviewed was not the validity of the requirement, but whether sufficient evidence existed to 
satisfy that particular state’s required residency period.  Because Bayh eventually chose this 
option, it is the analytical framework developed in these cases that captured the focus of 
attention during the ensuing legal process. 
 In 1926, the Supreme Court of Alabama was asked to decide the issue of residency 
in the case of Baker v. Conway.  Calloway, a member of the Chilton County, Alabama, 
board of education, moved to Florida in December 1923 to work there under a four-year 
contract.  The relevant state statute provided that “any office in this state is vacated … by 
[the incumbent’s] ceasing to be a resident of the state, or of the division, district, circuit, or 
county, for which he was elected or appointed.”  Although the evidence at trial suggested 
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that Calloway might have only been absent for “three months, six months,” rather than the 
four-year contract period, the court was asked to determine, in light of this uncertainty, 
whether Calloway had ceased to be a resident upon moving to Florida.158 
 As a harbinger of decisions that followed, the Alabama Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the definition of the terms “reside,” “residence” and “resident” were 
elusive and subject to various interpretations.  “For some purposes, a merely constructive 
residence, resting chiefly upon the intention of the citizen, is sufficient ….  For other 
purposes, an actual residence is intended or required.”159  The court then took notice of a 
Colorado decision where the phrase “shall reside within his district” was held to require 
actual or continuous physical presence.  In light of that particular precedent, the court 
interpreted the relevant statutory language as clear direction by the Alabama legislature that 
officeholders must physically reside in their districts or face having their office declared 
vacant.  The fact that Calloway had contracted to work in Florida for four years was 
sufficient evidence for the court to conclude that Calloway ceased to be a resident of Chilton 
County, Alabama.  However, the court did caution that “we do not mean to hold that any 
temporary absence by a public officer would have that [same] effect.  Each case must be 
decided on its own facts, with due regard for the elements of intention and actual 
absence.”160 
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 A decade later, the North Dakota Supreme Court was called upon to determine 
residency in the context of an explicit state constitutional durational requirement.  In State 
ex rel. Sathre v. Moodie, the court interpreted a state constitutional provision that prohibited 
persons from qualification for governor who have not “resided five years next preceding the 
election within the state.”161  Thomas Moodie was the owner of a newspaper in Mohall, 
North Dakota.  In August, 1929, Moodie sold the newspaper and moved to Minneapolis, 
Minnesota.  Moodie lived in Minneapolis for approximately two years and was employed 
by the Minneapolis Tribune.  He testified that he used this period of employment to search 
the Minneapolis area for opportunities to purchase newspapers back in North Dakota 
because he possessed the intention of returning once a purchase had been made.  Therefore, 
Moodie claimed that his residence in Minneapolis was temporary and that his primary 
purpose for being in Minneapolis was not employment, but to find opportunities that would 
provide him the opportunity to return to North Dakota in the newspaper business.  Moodie 
did, in fact, return to North Dakota in April of 1931.  He then ran for governor in 1934 and 
won.  Shortly after that, his eligibility to serve as governor was challenged. 
 The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to embrace a “physical presence” test for 
residency.  If so, Moodie would have failed to satisfy it by virtue of the time he spent in 
Minnesota.  Rather, it held that legal residence is established or abandoned as a result of a 
union between one’s action and intent.  That is to say, for residence to change, there must be 
a literal change, together with an intention to make such change.  The court said, “a person’s 
residence is the place of his domicile, or place where his habitation is fixed without any 
present intention of removing therefrom.  The words ‘inhabitant,’ ‘citizen,’ and ‘resident,’ as 
                                                 
161 State ex rel. Sathre v. Moodie, 258 N.W. 558 (N.D., 1935). 
 
75 
employed in different constitutions to define the qualifications of electors mean substantially 
the same thing; and one is an inhabitant, resident, or citizen at the place where he has his 
domicile or home.  Every person at all times must be considered as having a domicile 
somewhere, and that which he has acquired at one place is considered as continuing until 
another is acquired at a different place.”162 
 After reviewing all of the relevant facts, the court concluded that Moodie “did intend 
to return to the state of North Dakota some time.”163  However, Moodie had voted in a 
primary and general election in 1930 in Minnesota, though North Dakota had an absent 
voter’s ballot law, of which Moodie had been aware, but had failed to take advantage.  
Consequently, the court found that “his moving to Minneapolis and establishing a voting 
residence there deprived him of his legal residence in North Dakota during the time he was 
in Minneapolis, and it necessarily follows that he was not a resident of North Dakota for the 
five years next preceding the election in November, 1934 ….”164  While the court found that 
Moodie did “intend” to maintain his North Dakota residency, certain acts, on his part, 
deprived him of the ability to prove that there had been no break in legal domicile.  Thus, in 
a dramatic turn of events, Moodie was declared ineligible to serve as governor, despite 
already having been elected to the post. 
 A few years later, the Montana Supreme Court, in the case of Snyder v. Boulware, 
adopted a “physical presence” standard, at least with respect to the “establishment” of one’s 
residency.  Like the Moodie case, this matter involved a challenge to serve in office after 
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someone had been elected.  The Montana constitution provided that “no one shall be elected 
as a member of [the county commission], who has not resided in said district for at least two 
years next preceding the time when he shall become a candidate for said office.”165 
W. F. Boulware was elected county commissioner in November of 1938.  However, 
the court found that he had not established his residence within the appropriate district until 
November 14, 1936 – five days short of the required two-year period.  While Boulware 
conceded that he had not physically resided in the district until November 14, 1936, he 
argued that, as early as March 1936, he had announced his intention to reside in the district 
and, in addition, took affirmative steps to purchase a home there.  Yet, the court found that, 
even if one leaves a residence “with the intention of making his home in another place, he is, 
while in itinere [a Latin phrase meaning “on a journey”] from the old to the new, a resident 
of the place he had left, and remains so until he reaches the new abode.”  Because there was 
no evidence that Boulware was physically present in his new residence until November 14, 
he was declared ineligible.166 
In a 1966 decision by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, Secretary of State v. 
McGucken, an individual’s “residency” was not considered but, rather, the candidate’s 
satisfaction of the required period of “citizenship.”167  Maryland’s constitution required 
candidates for governor to have been a citizen of the state for ten years and “for five years 
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next preceding his election, a resident of the state.”168  On November 2, 1965, William 
Albaugh filed papers confirming his intention to seek the Republican nomination for 
governor of Maryland in 1966.  In his certificate of candidacy filed with the secretary of 
state, Albaugh asserted that he had been a citizen of Maryland for eight years and a resident 
of the state for more than ten years.  When his candidacy was challenged, Albaugh 
explained that his eight-year citizenship denoted the extent of his “continuous residence” 
and that his statement regarding residency “for more than ten years” was intended to 
confirm his “discontinuous total citizenship.”  The court said that, as those terms appear in 
Maryland’s constitution, “citizen” and “resident” are not synonymous, nor were their 
requirements interchangeable.169  Because Albaugh had revealed on the face of his own 
certificate of election that he had not been a “citizen” for the required ten year period, he 
was not qualified to be a candidate. 
An analogous precursor to the Bayh case occurred in 1972 when Christopher S. 
(Kit) Bond announced his intention to seek the Republican nomination for governor of 
Missouri.  Bond was born and raised in a small town outside of St. Louis.  After his 
sophomore year in high school, he enrolled in the Deerfield Academy in Deerfield, 
Massachusetts, and, thereafter, completed his secondary, undergraduate and graduate 
education outside the state.  Factually, the case was quite similar to Bayh’s because Bond 
graduated from the University of Virginia School of Law in 1963, and went to work as a 
clerk to a federal judge in Atlanta, Georgia, during 1963 and 1964.  Thereafter, he was 
employed by a Washington, D.C., law firm for three years.  In October 1967, Bond returned 
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to Missouri, established a law practice and immediately entered politics.  He unsuccessfully 
ran for the U.S. House of Representatives in 1968, but, in November of 1970, Bond was 
elected Missouri State Auditor.170  In 1972, Bond declared his candidacy for governor.  R.J. 
“Buzz” King, Jr., a Republican primary opponent, filed a lawsuit charging that Bond failed 
to satisfy Missouri’s durational residency requirement for candidates for governor. 
In State ex rel. King v. Walsh, the Missouri Supreme Court was asked to interpret 
the state constitutional requirement that “the governor … shall have been … a resident of 
this state at least ten years next before the election.”171  Bond admitted he had been 
physically absent from Missouri for nearly five of the constitutionally-required ten-year 
period.  Instead, he argued that, despite his physical absence, he had never abandoned his 
residence in Missouri nor had he established it elsewhere.  All parties agreed at the outset 
that “residency,” as referred to in the Missouri state constitution, was synonymous with the 
concept of “domicile.”  One’s residence “is largely a matter of intention, to be determined 
not only from the utterances of the person whose residence is in issue but in light of all of 
the facts and circumstances of the case.”172  As a result, the court quickly dismissed the 
notion that the state’s durational residency requirement meant “actual, physical presence, 
continuous and uninterrupted for ten years.”173  The case turned on whether Bond, by his 
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acts or by the manifestation of his intentions, abandoned his Missouri domicile, acquired at 
birth, and established a new one at any point while away from the state. 
The court reviewed the evidence presented by the parties, which included Bond’s 
applications for bar examinations, his purchase and titling of automobiles, the application 
for a marriage license, Bond’s state income tax returns, his voter registration records and 
voting history, his payment of annual bar enrollment fees, records pertaining to his church 
membership, Bond’s social security and selective service records, his acquisition of hunting 
and fishing licenses, and contributions to political campaigns.  Several witnesses testified 
that, throughout Bond’s time in Atlanta and Washington, D.C., he made it known that he 
was interested “only in temporary employment for the purpose of gaining experience, … 
and that he intended to return to Missouri to practice law.”174 
The court found that evidence existed that Bond “did not abandon his residence in 
Missouri and acquire a new one; that although he lived for brief periods in Virginia, Georgia 
and the District of Columbia during the ten years before the 1972 general election and made 
statements which, on the surface, were consistent with an intent to choose a new residence, 
[Bond] intended to and did continually maintain his domicile of origin.”175  Because the 
court concluded that Bond satisfied the durational residency requirement, “we need not, 
should not, and do not rule on the question of whether these durational residence 
requirements violate the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States ….”176 
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The acknowledgement of inconsistent statements reveals that the court’s eventual 
decision was not easily reached.  Five judges joined the majority opinion, but two filed 
strongly worded dissents.  In dissent, Judge Donnelly re-affirmed his oath to support the 
state’s constitution, then proceeded to recount Bond’s inconsistent positions or statements.  
Donnelly emphasized that Bond had not physically resided in Missouri from 1954 until 
1967.  “I do not believe this type of ‘sporadic residence’ is what the people of Missouri had 
in mind when they adopted Art. IV, s. 3, Constitution of Missouri.”177 
The dissent filed by Judge Bardgett was more extensive.  Bardgett argued that 
Bond’s acquisition of a Georgia law license, though not required for his federal clerkship, 
made clear his intent to establish his “residency” in Georgia.  “The only way that [Bond] 
could have been allowed to take the Georgia Bar examination and thereafter be admitted to 
the Georgia Bar under the Georgia statutes was to be a citizen and a bona fide resident of the 
State of Georgia ….”178  Also relevant to Bardgett was the fact that Bond failed to file 
Missouri income tax returns for years 1964, 1965 and 1966.  “The non-filing of Missouri 
income tax returns for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966 is consistent with intent to maintain 
residency outside Missouri and in the District of Columbia.  It is inconsistent with Missouri 
residency during those years.”179 
Another case considering the question of gubernatorial residency was Ravenel v. 
Dekle, decided by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in 1975.180  The previous year, 
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Charles D. “Pug” Ravenel announced he would seek the Democratic nomination for 
governor of South Carolina.  In March of 1974, his candidacy was “attacked” by way of a 
“friendly lawsuit,” naming Charles D. Ravenel and Donald L. Fowler, chair of the South 
Carolina Democratic Party, as defendants.  That lawsuit led to a judgment being entered 
ruling Ravenel “eligible” to enter the Democratic primary for governor.  Subsequently, that 
judgment was challenged by Ben H. Dekle and Milton J. Dukes as having been a “sham” 
and “invalid” insofar as adjudicating Ravenel’s eligibility.  Eventually, Ravenel’s 
representatives conceded that the earlier order was not binding.  Dekle and others were not 
prevented from asserting that Ravenel was ineligible.  Ravenel’s candidacy was alleged to 
violate the constitution of South Carolina, which provided that, “no person shall be eligible 
to the office of Governor who … shall not have been … a citizen and resident of this State 
for five years next preceding the day of election.” 
Ravenel was born in South Carolina in 1938.  He graduated from high school in 
Charleston in 1956.  He attended college and business school outside of the state, and from 
1964 until March, 1972, Ravenel was employed by the investment banking firm, 
Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette, in New York City.  He returned to South Carolina in 1972, 
started his own business, and made the decision in 1974 to campaign for governor.  Like 
many of the other cases previously reviewed, Ravenel argued that his fifteen-year absence 
from South Carolina “was of a temporary nature and for the purpose of attending school and 
procuring training desirable and necessary for the avocation [sic] which he intended to 
pursue ….”181 
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At trial, the evidence revealed that Ravenel, while employed in New York, 
purchased real estate there, registered to vote and voted there, filed New York state income 
tax returns and joined several social and country clubs.  He also registered his automobile in 
Connecticut.  Ravenel did not pay taxes, register to vote or obtain a driver’s license in South 
Carolina until his return in 1972. 
The court initially noted that Ravenel’s challenge was not a challenge to the validity 
of the residency requirement.  Rather, Ravenel’s legal argument was that he had considered 
South Carolina to be his place of domicile his entire life.  In a lengthy decision, the Supreme 
Court declared Ravenel ineligible because it found the language of the state constitution to 
require actual physical presence for the five-year period prior to the gubernatorial election.  
The court found the terms “citizen” and “resident” to have separate meanings, both of which 
must be satisfied for the required time.  “In view of the plain language of the Constitution 
and the long standing concept of the distinction between the terms ‘citizen’ and ‘resident’, 
we think it clear that the framers of the constitutional provision intended to require actual 
physical residence in the state rather than mere domicile as one of the prerequisites to be 
eligible for the office of Governor.”182 
The court found that requiring actual physical presence in the state for a five-year 
period satisfied a compelling purpose.  “By requiring a durational five-year actual residency, 
the people have reserved to themselves the right to scrutinize the person who seeks to 
govern them ….  [T]hey wanted a candidate to actually live in the state for five years 
immediately preceding the election in order that he might become acquainted with the 
state’s problems, its people, its industries, its finances, its agencies, its laws and its 
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Constitution, and become acquainted with other officials with whom he must work if he is 
to serve effectively.”183  Dismissing Ravenel’s argument regarding domicile, the court found 
that, “despite his sincere intention to return to his native state some day, the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence is to the effect that in November, 1969, the crucial period of time, 
Mr. Ravenel was an actual resident of, domiciled in and a citizen of the State of New 
York.”184 
While, prior to the Bayh case, no Indiana case had ever considered application of the 
gubernatorial durational residency requirement, a review of relevant case law would be 
incomplete without referencing a case in which the Indiana Supreme Court considered the 
concept of “residency” for purposes of the application of Indiana state election law.  In 
1975, the Indiana Supreme Court was asked to determine the “voting residence” of a 
candidate for judge of a county circuit court.  More specifically, a petition for removal had 
been filed against the judge of the Perry County circuit court alleging various violations of 
Indiana election law which occurred during May of 1970 when the judge was first a 
candidate for office in the primary election. 
In the fall of 1969, the judge of Perry County circuit court announced his intention to 
resign.  David E. Evrard, a Tell City, Indiana, native, who had moved out of Indiana after 
college and lived, as a result of military service and employment with the federal 
government, in the Washington, D.C., area, decided to return to Perry County because he 
had interest in running for the opening on the bench.  Evrard did not physically move back 
to Indiana until July, 1970.  However, he announced his candidacy for judge on February 
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10, 1970, registered to vote in Perry County on March 7, and returned periodically to Tell 
City throughout January, February, March and May of 1970 in order to promote his 
candidacy.  He also voted in the May, 1970 primary in the precinct where his parents had 
their family home.  The petitioner’s challenge in the matter focused on the allegation that 
Evrard had no legal residence in Perry County either when he filed his declaration of 
candidacy in March nor when he voted in the primary in May of 1970.  Thus, the question 
presented to the Indiana Supreme Court was the standard by which one’s “voting residence” 
is established.185 
The Indiana Supreme Court said that “the law requires that the person definitely 
intend to make a particular place his permanent residence and act upon that intention in 
good faith.”186  In this case, the court found that the steps Evrard took were sufficient to 
establish a voting residence in Perry County, thereby validating his declaration of candidacy 
for judgeship and his act of voting in the primary election.  “To require a person in 
respondent’s position to have sold his house in Virginia and acquired one in Tell City, given 
up his employment abruptly and entirely, moved his wife’s children from their school to 
Indiana, obtained an Indiana driver’s license, and accomplished all such other odds and ends 
as would have severed completely all connections with Virginia and the Washington area, as 
a condition of establishing a residence in Indiana, would be unreasonable.”187 
The involvement of the Indiana Supreme Court in Judge Evrard’s case presaged its 
role in the Bayh residency case.  As will be discussed later, Chief Justice Givan, Justice 
                                                 
185 In re: Matter of Evrard, 333 N.E.2d 765 (Ind., 1975). 
 
186 Ibid., 767-768. 
 
187 Ibid., 769. 
 
85 
Hunter, and Justice Norman Arterburn (the fifth member of the court when it decided 
Evrard, he did not participate in the decision) were Republicans; Justices DeBruler and 
Prentice were Democrats.  (Judge Evrard was also a Democrat).  Along with Justice 
Prentice, Justices Hunter and Arterburn had retired by the time the Bayh case reached 
Indiana’s high court; each was succeeded by a Republican. 
The Indiana Supreme Court majority in Evrard did not measure or define residency 
by “physical presence.”  Instead, Evrard’s intention, made manifest by his acts, was deemed 
sufficient to establish the minimum residency required to be considered an eligible voter.  
Therefore, even in light of those cases from other jurisdictions where “physical presence” 
was required (most notably, the Ravenel decision in South Carolina), Evrard provided a 
precedent from which to predict that the Indiana courts would apply the law in a way more 
akin to the Kit Bond case in Missouri. 
Justice Donald Hunter, in a stinging and lengthy dissent, argued that Evrard was not 
a qualified voter in the May, 1970 primary.  Justice Hunter suggested that the majority’s 
legal conclusion was motivated by the acknowledgment that Judge Evrard had acquired an 
excellent reputation since his election as judge and was held in high regard by the bar in 
southern Indiana.  Justice Hunter wrote, “it is unfortunate that [Evrard] did not adhere to the 
same high standards [of ethics] when he was a candidate ….”188  Hunter, minimally, called 
for a public reprimand.  “Only then would we announce with judicial vehemence that the 
office of circuit judge is not yet a prize in a race where no holds are barred.”189 
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If the “residency as domicile” standard was applied, and if Bayh could persuasively 
establish that he had not taken sufficient action to become divested of his Indiana residency 
and establish it in the District of Columbia, then he stood a good chance of being found 
eligible to serve.  Bayh’s road ahead was neither straight nor paved.  Refraining from a 
federal constitutional challenge to the validity of the Indiana constitutional requirement was 
the right thing to do.  But the choice that was taken left little room for error.  As a legal 
matter, the eventual outcome was not predictable.  As a political matter, the parties to the 
action would be sailing in uncharted territory. 
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Chapter Four 
 
THE STATE ELECTION BOARD V. THE COURTS 
 
“Can you imagine having the … Constitution of the State of Indiana passed upon by a 
Realtor?” 
 
Evan Bayh 
February 20, 1988 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I resent the hell out of it; that’s how I feel ….  I’m going into this thing with an open mind, 
but I’ll have to admit it’s a little difficult with [Bayh] throwing accusations that I’m 
dishonest and unqualified.” 
 
Donald Cox 
February 20, 1988 
 
If a formal challenge was inevitable, several critical issues of legal strategy and 
political tactics loomed as noted in the previous chapter.  The timing for the initiation of a 
challenge had nearly reached the point of no return.  Durnil had repeatedly committed to 
waiting until Bayh filed his formal declaration of candidacy before initiating a lawsuit.  
Candidate filings in 1988 were open from February 3 through March 4.  As a legal matter, 
any registered voter in Indiana could contest Bayh’s constitutional qualifications.  However, 
it was widely assumed that Bayh must file an official declaration of candidacy before Durnil 
or any other citizen possessed legal “standing” to file a lawsuit challenging his eligibility.  
The filing of a declaration of candidacy was a predicate to having something to contest.  
Therefore, in some measure, Bayh controlled the timing of a challenge.  By waiting to file, 
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Bayh was able to increase pressure on those who wanted the issue litigated.  The longer 
Bayh waited, the narrower the window became for a timely resolution in advance of what 
was viewed as a critical date – the primary election on May 3. 
 As has been previously referenced, Bayh could have expedited a resolution by 
initiating his own lawsuit.  That action would have afforded Bayh the advantage of being 
able to exercise initial control over both the timing and the choice of forum.  Yet, Bayh was 
reluctant to institute such action.  It would be contrary to his repeated public assertions that 
he had nothing whatsoever to prove.  It would also compromise his ability to characterize 
the entire matter as an attempt by his political opponents to “keep him off the ballot.”  For 
purposes of public consumption, it was important that Republicans be seen as promoting the 
effort to keep him off the ballot and, thereby, denying the voters the right to make their own 
choice for governor. 
 Besides timing, a pre-eminent strategic issue was the choice of forum.  Who would 
make the initial decision of this sensitive, highly public constitutional controversy?  Bayh 
was confident that a decision rendered by a court of law would find him eligible.  However, 
most contemporaneous press accounts mimicked the general assumption promoted by 
Durnil that a legal challenge to Bayh’s eligibility must first be heard and decided by the 
Indiana state election board. 
 Created by statute, the state election board was an administrative body of state 
government charged with the responsibility of overseeing Indiana election law.  The board 
was authorized to conduct investigations and pass upon questions concerning the 
qualifications of persons seeking to have their names placed upon the ballot for the general 
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election.190  Specifically, Indiana law provided that “all questions concerning the validity of 
a declaration made to the Secretary of State shall be referred to and determined by the State 
Election Board.”191  The declaration requires a candidate to certify that he or she is a 
registered voter in Indiana and that the candidate resides (at the time the declaration is filed) 
at a given address.  The declaration also requires that the candidate be a member of a 
particular political party and state that he or she wishes to be placed on the primary ballot of 
that party.  Governor Orr, by virtue of his position, served as the board’s chairperson.  In 
most instances, Governor Orr was represented at board meetings by John Whitaker, an aide 
who served as the governor’s proxy.  Other members of the board included Donald B. Cox, 
a member of the Republican National Committee and a realtor from Evansville, and Kevin 
Butler, an attorney from South Bend and a Democrat.  Both Cox and Butler were appointed 
to their positions by their respective state party chairs – Durnil and Livengood. 
 Although responsible for highly sensitive politically matters, the state election board 
resembled in many respects the myriad of administrative agencies through which the work 
of modern government is conducted.  These agencies – with names like Department of 
Environmental Management, Department of Labor, and Department of Natural Resources – 
make regulations, grant permits, and resolve disputes within their respective areas of 
expertise.  A substantial body of law, usually referred to as “administrative law,” dictates 
how agencies are to decide these matters and, importantly, how courts are to review agency 
decisions. 
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Under the law, the state election board holds a hearing, considers all of the evidence 
presented, makes its own determination as to the applicable law and, then, renders a final 
decision.   Assuming normal rules of administrative law apply to the state election board, a 
final decision by the board is subject to review by the courts, but such review is limited and 
narrow in scope.  Courts are, by law, required to grant particular deference to the 
administrative agency’s findings of fact.192  “When a trial court … or an appellate court, on 
appeal, reviews the decision of an administrative agency, the court is bound by the findings 
of fact made by the agency if those findings are supported by substantial evidence.”193  That 
is to say, decisions made by the board regarding the facts of the case are not subject to 
change even if a reviewing court comes to a different conclusion. 
The standard of review of agency conclusions of law is different.  “The court is not 
bound by the agency’s interpretation of law, and the court is free to determine any legal 
question which arises out of an administrative action.”194  While an administrative agency’s 
interpretation of law is entitled to “great weight,” it is not controlling.  However, throughout 
the 1980’s, courts had used generic language to describe the level of judicial review to be 
given to administrative decisions.  The overarching principle was that the determination of a 
state administrative agency on a question of law would be upheld so long as it was 
“reasonable” in light of the findings of fact.195  And there was very little disagreement by 
anyone involved in the Bayh case that this was going to be a highly fact-sensitive matter.  A 
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1981 decision by the Indiana Court of Appeals described the standard as “whether the 
determination comports with applicable law.”196 
One might well imagine that courts would not defer to administrative agencies on 
matters of constitutional law, on the theory that, while administrative agencies may have 
expertise when it comes to their particular area of law, courts have more expertise than any 
administrative agency could have when it comes to constitutional law.  But even here, court 
precedent supports the idea that courts are willing to defer constitutional issues to 
administrative bodies.  In the case of Drake v. Indiana Natural Resources Commission, a 
landowner claimed that he was denied his constitutional right to due process by an 
administrative body because he did not receive notice of the ruling following a final 
hearing.197  The court held that the landowner’s constitutional rights had not been violated 
because administrative law “provides adequate means for review of constitutional issues 
….”198  Further, in Midwest Steel Erection Co. v. Commissioner of Labor, the court was 
asked to review an administrative agency’s determination concerning occupational safety 
and health regulations which a contractor alleged were unconstitutionally vague.199  While 
the Indiana Court of Appeals agreed with the contractor, in so doing, it looked favorably 
upon a hearing officer reviewing the constitutionality of a rule.200 
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In sum, a court reviewing a decision of an administrative body will reverse or 
change the decision only if the court finds the decision to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, unsupported by the facts or contrary to law.  Even if the court, on review, 
comes to a different conclusion, a decision by an administrative body is to be affirmed, or 
upheld, as long as it comports with judicial concepts of reasonableness.  Appeals from 
decisions of administrative agencies, then, are not trials in the usual sense.  A court does not 
consider the case “de novo” and reach its own conclusions.  Rather, the court only reviews 
the record of the proceeding before the agency. 
On the other hand, if the matter starts in a court of law, then the court (or a jury on 
its behalf) hears all of the testimony and other evidence and makes the initial determination 
based on application of relevant law, as established by the court, to the relevant facts, as 
established in the court.  The key point is that if the election board made the initial 
determinations of the facts concerning Bayh’s residency, the authority or “jurisdiction” of a 
court to make any subsequent decision would be subject to limitations that would not apply 
if the court itself were responsible for the initial determination. 
It is important to understand, however, that the parties to a dispute do not necessarily 
have a choice as to whether an administrative agency or a court makes the initial 
determinations concerning their dispute.  Legal principles, often framed using terms like 
“exhaustion of remedies,” “exclusive jurisdiction,” and “primary jurisdiction,” dictate when 
a case must begin in an administrative agency, must begin in a court, or can begin in 
either.201 
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 Whether the case went to the election board or to a court first had enormous 
implications on the eventual outcome of the Bayh case.  The strategy for success by both 
parties depended on who was the initial decision maker.  While Republicans offered 
arguments that administrative law dictated that the matter start with the state election board, 
the board was, by its nature, partisan.  The decision makers would be its members – 
Governor Orr (or his designee), Donald Cox (appointed by Durnil) and Kevin Butler 
(appointed by Livengood).  For Republicans, this presented the proverbial “good news/bad 
news” dilemma.  A state election board decision motivated by partisanship would ensure 
that Bayh would be declared ineligible.  In addition, given the extremely limited standard of 
review by any reviewing court, a board decision would be difficult to overturn.  Therefore, 
in a highly fact-sensitive case, all relevant evidence would be presented to and considered 
by the fact-finder.  Bayh’s ineligibility could be established by a partisan 2 to 1 vote.  Then, 
this “fact-sensitive” decision could be sustained on appeal as a result of the limited standard 
of review afforded the courts.  But the “bad news” was that a decision motivated by 
partisanship ran the risk of being viewed with suspicion, if not with hostility, by the press 
and public.  The question was, therefore, how much political controversy were Republicans 
willing to absorb in order to guarantee a favorable outcome. 
Most observers understood that both sides were doing everything possible to find the 
forum most likely to render a favorable decision.  The primary Republican legal strategy 
had, all along, depended on an initial favorable decision rendered by the state election board, 
then vigorously defended and upheld through trial and appellate consideration in reliance on 
the well-established and narrow standard of judicial review.  Accordingly, Republicans 
could argue that because Bayh could insist of a “judicial review” of any decision by the 
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board, then his rights were fully protected.  In other words, Bayh would have been afforded 
his “day in court” by having the board’s decision scrutinized by several layers of both trial 
and appellate court review. 
With Bayh apparently content to wait until the last day for filing his declaration of 
candidacy, it is not surprising that on Thursday, February 18, Governor Orr announced that 
he was directing the state election board to determine whether Evan Bayh met the 
constitutional residency requirement to be governor.202  Orr insisted that the state election 
board had sole authority to make the initial determination because it possessed the 
jurisdiction to decide questions of candidate eligibility.  Consistent with that jurisdiction, Orr 
explained, “all of the pertinent facts and the resulting ‘official record’ are established by law 
at the Election Board level.  Subsequent appeals deal only with the facts and conclusions 
determined by the Board.”203 
Orr insisted that this action was necessary and should be completed immediately 
because, by waiting for Bayh to formally file his declaration of candidacy, insufficient time 
might remain for a decision to be rendered prior to established primary election deadlines.  
“While the Secretary of State has not yet officially filed for the gubernatorial race, ‘there has 
been a tremendous amount of debate and confusion over the constitutional question of Evan 
Bayh’s residency as it relates to his candidacy for Governor,’ Orr said.”204 
Pursuant to Indiana law, the secretary of state in his official capacity was required by 
March 11 to certify to county clerks the names of all persons who had filed declarations of 
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candidacy to be on the primary ballot.  According to Governor Orr’s press release, the full 
53-day period between March 11 and the date of the primary election was necessary in order 
for county clerks to have enough “time for printing ballots … for absentee voting 30 days 
before the election (April 3), and ultimately in time for distribution to the polling locations 
for the May 3 Primary Election.”205  In point of fact, Indiana law allowed the state election 
board until March 17 to determine questions brought before it regarding the eligibility of 
candidates for office.  But regardless of the operative deadline, little more than six weeks 
existed between the end of all filing deadlines and primary day – a day before which, most 
people agreed, some decision on the Bayh question needed to be made. 
In addition, Orr claimed that his action was necessary to avoid what he termed 
constitutional chaos.  “Now is the time to lift any cloud from the 1988 gubernatorial race 
and to insure that the integrity of the election process is maintained,” Orr said.  “We must 
begin the process now to avoid the chaos that may result if the matter is not resolved as 
quickly and fairly as possible.”206  There is some truth to the assertion that chaos can result 
where courts are not asked to determine a candidate’s eligibility to hold public office until 
after a candidate has been elected to serve and can lead to so-called “quo warranto” lawsuits 
(a concept to be discussed at length later).  Governor Orr insisted that he was not motivated 
by partisan considerations.  Rather, he argued that it was the integrity of the process that 
needed protection.  Orr denied that Durnil had asked him to take action, although the 
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governor admitted that he had consulted with Durnil on the matter prior to the 
announcement.207 
 In an effort to remove the appearance of a partisan conflict of interest, Orr recused 
himself or any member of his staff from participating in the state election board’s 
deliberations.  Orr appointed former Wayne County Circuit Judge James C. Puckett, a 
Republican, to serve as the governor’s special proxy for the limited purpose of considering 
the question of Bayh’s eligiblity.208  Orr said that he had intentionally sought out an 
experienced jurist to ensure that the board’s proceedings would be fair and proper:  “I 
decided three or four weeks ago it was time to take the matter out of the political realm and 
into the government realm.”  In the same press release, Judge Puckett announced that the 
board would meet the following Monday, February 22, at 5:30 p.m. to determine how to 
proceed with an investigation of Bayh’s eligibility. 209 
Judge Puckett had many of the qualities that Governor Orr ascribed to him.  He had 
achieved an excellent reputation while serving as a judge in the Richmond City Court from 
1964 to 1966 and in the Wayne County Circuit Court from 1967 to 1984.  At the time he 
was called on by Governor Orr, he was serving as a member of the prestigious Indiana 
Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission.  But he was a Republican in private law practice 
with two of the state’s leading Republicans, former long-time Republican Congressman 
David W. Dennis and former Republican State Chairman Thomas S. Milligan, and so had a 
partisan image. 
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 Attorney General Linley Pearson also recused himself and his office from its 
obligation to provide legal representation to the board.210  Because he would also be on the 
ballot as the Republican candidate for attorney general in 1988, Pearson recommended that 
outside or “independent” counsel be retained to represent the board.  Pearson then hired 
David F. McNamar and sent him a letter on February 19 confirming McNamar’s agreement 
to serve as counsel for the state election board for the pendency of the investigation as well 
as “all subsequent hearings involving the residency requirement question.”211  McNamar 
was a partner in the law firm of former three term Republican Attorney General Edwin K. 
Steers and had served for eight years as a Master Commissioner to Republican Judge 
Patricia Gifford of the Marion County Superior Court.  McNamar, too, had a partisan 
profile. 
 Bayh’s reaction to Governor Orr’s announcement was predictable.  Bayh had earlier 
argued he would not get an impartial hearing before the state election board because two of 
the three members were Republicans, and, therefore, political opponents to his candidacy.  
“Do you think they would give me a fair hearing,” Bayh asked rhetorically.  “There are no 
rules of judicial ethics governing the State Election Board ….  There are none of the normal 
protections of rights governing this body.  They [the state election board] are solely a 
political body ….  I am not naive.”212  In the wake of Orr’s announcement, Bayh charged 
that “the Republicans do not want this election to be decided by the voters, so they have 
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selected a political tribunal to prevent me from running.”213  “I didn’t know they’d go to 
such lengths to try to remove me from the ballot before I’ve even filed.”214 
Furthermore, Bayh challenged the competency of the board to rule on a question of 
constitutional interpretation.  One of the board members, Donald Cox, was a real estate 
agent, not a lawyer.  Bayh argued that Cox was not particularly well-suited to make rulings 
on questions of constitutional interpretation.  “Can you imagine having the … Constitution 
of the state of Indiana passed upon by a Realtor?” Bayh said.215  When asked for his 
response, Cox said angrily: “I resent the hell out of it; that’s how I feel.”  Cox denied that his 
judgment on the question of Bayh’s eligibility was “a done deal” even in light of his position 
as a member of the Republican National Committee from Indiana and he claimed “I’m 
going into this thing with an open mind, but I’ll have to admit it’s a little difficult with 
[Bayh] throwing accusations that I’m dishonest and unqualified.”216  Responding to a 
similar question by a different political reporter, Cox said that Bayh “is a kid who needs to 
grow up.”217 
 Not surprisingly, Durnil supported the governor’s decision to order the election 
board to consider the question.  Durnil admitted that he had discussed the use of the election 
board with Orr, but said that the governor had made the final decision.  “The only thing I’ve 
ever wanted out of this process is a hearing, a quick and fair hearing and get it over with,” 
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Durnil said.  “We will not appeal the decision of the state election board.”218  This latter 
statement is interesting.  At that point, at least technically, Durnil was not involved in the 
state election board’s investigation.  Yet Durnil felt that he, as the Republican state chair, 
had some authority to make decisions regarding how the matter would be handled by the 
board after it rendered a final decision.  This is further evidence how, throughout the entire 
affair, it was never entirely clear who was “calling the shots” and who was reporting to 
whom. 
 Early the next day, Friday, February 19, lawyers for Bayh responded to Governor 
Orr’s announcement by filing a declaratory judgment lawsuit in the Marion County Superior 
Court.219  A declaratory judgment seeks a legal decision on a question that may not yet be 
fully in dispute, but will be.  Such lawsuits are authorized by, and subject to special rules 
contained in, a special law called the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.  In filing the 
declaratory judgment action, Bayh was asking for a determination of his eligibility by a 
court of law.  He requested an expedited trial and offered to consent to a direct appeal of any 
verdict to the Indiana Supreme Court.  Bayh maintained that “allowing the election board to 
act first would assure that the Indiana Supreme Court would not be able to render a verdict 
‘until it was too late to give the voters a choice.’”220 
The institution of Bayh’s lawsuit added one interesting element that had not yet been 
discussed to any wide degree.  Bayh claimed that he was entitled not only to a decision 
rendered in a court of law, but also to a trial by jury.  In other words, Bayh believed that 
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neither a partisan-controlled administrative body nor a partisan trial court judge, should 
make the initial determination concerning his residency.  Rather, Bayh insisted that the 
Indiana constitution allowed this decision to be made by a jury of his peers – in Bayh’s 
words, not a decision by the politicians, but by the people.  “I place my political fortunes 
squarely in the hands of my fellow citizens.  Any candidate for a state’s highest office 
should be willing to do as much.  It is to them that the process belongs.  It is in them that my 
faith resides.  I ask only that the people’s will – not that of the politicians – be done.”221 
 Bayh’s legal team, made up of Jon D. Krahulik, Robin L. Babbitt and Paul J. Knapp 
of the Indianapolis law firm Bingham Summers Welsh & Spilman, insisted that the right of 
an individual to “hold” office had traditionally been determined by the remedy of quo 
warranto, not by a procedure before the election board.  Bayh’s lawyers pointed to the 
section of Indiana law that provided that “any information may be filed against any person 
or corporation in the following cases:  (1) when any person shall usurp, intrude into, or 
unlawfully hold or exercise any public office or any franchise within this State ….”222 
Previously, the Indiana Supreme Court had identified a writ of quo warranto as a 
proper procedure to determine the right to an office.223  Because a quo warranto action was 
civil in nature, Bayh insisted that he was entitled to have his case decided by a jury.  A jury 
trial is not contemplated or afforded by administrative law.  Under the state election board’s 
jurisdictional scenario, according to Bayh, he would be deprived of his “right” to a jury trial.  
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Therefore, where a right to jury trial exists, an administrative body simply could not exercise 
jurisdiction. 
 A demand for jury trial as part of their action for declaratory judgment was a critical 
tactical move by Bayh’s lawyers.  To that point, the debate about jurisdiction had been 
solely focused on whether the case would be considered by the Republican-dominated state 
election board or by a Republican or Democratic trial court judge.  In either case, Durnil had 
a reasonably high level of confidence that the initial decision in the Bayh matter would be 
controlled by Republicans.  A jury trial demand had now been added to the mix.  The only 
thing certain about jury verdicts is their unpredictability.  Bayh had complicated the 
litigation strategies for both sides with the addition of this possibility. 
 Republicans insisted that the jury trial demand was a canard.  Bayh was not entitled 
to a jury trial – pure and simple.  To Republicans, even debating the issue was a waste of 
time and energy.  But what if Bayh could persuade a judge that he was entitled to a jury 
trial?  The political implications would be unmeasurable.  It would eliminate any “partisan” 
control over the process because the ultimate decision would no longer be in the hands of 
partisans – the election board or a politically elected judge.  It was a nearly impregnable 
political position as well.  If nothing else, in the American system of justice, the public 
believes in and values the idea that, as individuals, we are entitled to a trial by a jury of our 
peers.  This demand would become an invaluable bargaining chip as the litigation evolved 
over the course of the following weeks. 
Under the supervision of Marion County Clerk Faye I. Mowery, a Republican, the 
case was assigned at random to Judge Gerald S. Zore, a Democrat.  The lawsuit named as 
defendants the Indiana State Election Board and Gordon K. Durnil, in his capacity as chair 
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of the Indiana Republican Party.224  Upon receiving his copy of Bayh’s Complaint, Durnil 
remarked that “it’s a pretty amateurish effort at putting together a lawsuit ….  The governor 
hopes to resolve the issue as quickly as possible, and I said I wouldn’t appeal the decision of 
the election board.  The only person who can slow it down is Evan Bayh.”225  Durnil’s claim 
that he was not at all involved in the governor’s action before the election board belied his 
repeated suggestion that he had authority to control whether an appeal would be taken from 
the board’s decision.  Perhaps unintentionally, Durnil sounded as if he had reason to be 
certain of the outcome before the board. 
 At a press conference on the morning of February 19 announcing the filing of his 
lawsuit, Bayh explained that “this is not an action of my choosing.  We have been forced 
literally to take this step by people who are intent on taking the right of choosing the next 
governor away from the voters.”226  Bayh insisted that the state election board possessed 
neither the jurisdiction nor the requisite temperament or discernment to determine questions 
of constitutional significance.  The decision, he argued, should be made by a jury of citizens 
“and not some political tribunal appointed by my opponent’s supporters.”227 
 Attached to Bayh’s Complaint for Declaratory Judgment were several exhibits, 
including Bayh’s 1983 and 1984 “part-year” state income tax returns.  Those exhibits 
revealed that Bayh had filed an amendment to his 1983 Indiana State tax return on 
November 6, 1987, six days before he publicly declared his intent to seek the office of 
governor.  On this amended return, Bayh conceded that he owed an additional $243 on 1983 
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income he had earned while living in Indiana.  There was no amendment for the 1984 return 
wherein he listed himself as a “part-year” Indiana resident from November 30 to December 
31, 1984.228 
 Bayh also sharply attacked Mutz for trying to distance himself from the Republican 
efforts to have Bayh declared ineligible:  “I think it is a sad day when someone who wants to 
be governor isn’t willing to take on all comers.  No one should become governor of Indiana 
by clinging to the skirts of his predecessor or hiding behind legal arguments.”229  In 
response, Mutz acknowledged that he approved of Governor Orr’s action asking the state 
election board to investigate Bayh’s eligibility.  Mutz argued that he was willing to run 
against anyone, but “it is impossible to drop this matter when clearly there is a question and 
there are legal means to settle it.”230  Mutz affirmed his desire to run a campaign on the 
issues and denied that he had participated in any way in decisions leading up to Governor 
Orr’s announcement.  He claimed that he had no knowledge of questions surrounding 
Bayh’s eligibility until reading about them in the newspaper.  He also denied being aware 
that his own campaign manager had asked lawyers, including Daniel F. Evans, Jr., to 
research Bayh’s eligibility. 231 
 On the Friday that the Bayh lawsuit was filed, Judge Zore scheduled a pre-trial 
conference for 9:00 a.m. the following Monday, February 22.  That, of course, was the same 
day that Judge Puckett had ordered the state election board to begin its investigation.232  The 
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contest to determine Evan Bayh’s eligibility to run for the office of governor was now being 
pursued simultaneously on two separate fronts in two different forums. 
  Although the state election board, at that point, had neither decided nor taken an 
official position with respect to the validity of Bayh’s prospective candidacy, McNamar 
announced that he, on the board’s behalf, would seek to have Bayh’s lawsuit dismissed at 
the pre-trial conference.  “Primary jurisdiction (of election matters) is with the election 
board,” he insisted.  Further, if Judge Zore denied his motion to dismiss, McNamar was 
prepared to take an immediate appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court and ask that Judge Zore 
be ordered to send the case to the election board for a determination.233  In so doing, it could 
be argued that McNamar was only protecting the board’s jurisdictional authority to decide a 
question of this nature.  Yet, it is inescapable that Republicans, who professed to want 
nothing more than a quick resolution, were insisting that the process involve an additional 
step.  It was also with strained credibility that Republicans argued that a partisan state 
administrative board, comprised in part of non-lawyers, was better suited to decide questions 
of constitutional interpretation than a court of law.  As Bayh’s legal team would later argue, 
“it is difficult to understand how the Board can take the position that it is more competent to 
act like a court than the court itself.”234 
On that same day (February 19), Durnil announced that “a legal attempt [by the state 
election board] may be made at the pretrial hearing Monday to have the residency 
jurisdiction placed squarely with the election board, effectively postponing any legal action 
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by Bayh until the election board has acted.”235  Again, Durnil apparently possessed some 
authority over the course and direction of the legal proceeding.  Governor Orr and Attorney 
General Pearson had gone to great lengths to minimize the perception that the process was 
in any way partisan.  Orr had appointed a special judge.  In fact, Orr appointed a new 
member to the board to hear this particular matter so that, ostensibly, the proceeding could 
mirror, as completely as possible, the proceeding that would take place in a “real” court of 
law.  Pearson had hired outside legal counsel for the specific purpose of disavowing partisan 
motivation.  Yet, Durnil consistently bungled their carefully orchestrated effort to avoid the 
appearance of partisanship with his public comments about the residency challenge and 
about Bayh himself. 
If it appeared that Governor Orr was willing to go to considerable lengths to see that 
the election board maintained control over the initial decision-making, he was equally 
adamant that his efforts in that regard were not motivated by political considerations.  
Governor Orr’s aides conceded that Bayh had a right to appeal his case in a court of law 
after a ruling by the state election board, but they insisted that the election board was a step 
that could not be skipped.  “The governor is committed to having this done in a quick and 
fair fashion,” said James E. Knoop.  “The only thing that can slow that up now is some sort 
of legal proceeding somewhere that gets it off track.  That puts in jeopardy an organized 
primary election.”236 
For his part, Durnil insisted that the election board was the forum designed to hear 
election disputes.  “The law is the law,” Durnil said.  “The Legislature has devised a way to 
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resolve these situations.”237  To another reporter, Durnil went even further:  “The [Marion 
County] superior court has no jurisdiction.”238 
 On Bayh’s behalf, Krahulik acknowledged that Indiana law provided that the 
election board had the authority to make determinations on questions concerning the 
“validity of candidate declarations.”  However, according to Krahulik, that power was 
limited to the information requested on the declaration itself.  “The candidate fills in the 
office for which he is running; his address, including the precinct, ward and county; and the 
date of the primary.  There are no questions pertaining to the office’s constitutional 
qualifications.”239 
Because the election board intended to proceed with its investigation late Monday 
afternoon, Bayh’s legal team prepared to ask Judge Zore at the pre-trial conference early 
Monday morning for an injunction that would prohibit the election board from proceeding 
in any way with an investigation or hearing.240  Bayh appeared resolute.  “Despite the hopes 
of some and the fears of many, there will not be a coronation or a crowning this November.  
The next governor of the state of Indiana will be elected by the citizens of our state.”241 
 On Saturday, February 20, Democratic State Chair John B. Livengood upped the 
political ante by releasing the results of a Democratic poll that showed the joint Bayh-
O’Bannon ticket leading a prospective Mutz-Goldsmith ticket by a margin of 52 percent to 
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40 percent.  (Stephen Goldsmith, the Republican prosecutor in Marion County, would later 
be selected as Mutz’s running mate).  It also purported to identify overwhelming 
disapproval by voters of  “efforts to remove Bayh from the ballot.”  The poll, conducted by 
a Washington, D.C., public opinion research firm, interviewed approximately five hundred 
randomly sampled voters between January 29 and February 7 and suggested that 41 percent 
of voters would “look less favorably on the Republican Party if Bayh is forced off the 
ballot.”242  Livengood charged that, “the Mutz campaign wants to avoid a fair election 
process, apparently at any cost.”  Livengood also repeated Bayh’s earlier assertion that a fair 
hearing before the Republican-dominated state election board was unlikely.  “This 2-to-1 
control of the board makes it impossible for that body to have any credibility.”  He said that 
Governor Orr’s action was motivated by his support for Mutz and was “an act of 
desperation by the Republicans.”243  McDaniel, Mutz’s campaign manager, responded by 
arguing that the Bayh campaign was trying to direct people’s attention away from the real 
issue—Bayh’s eligibility.  “He’s [Bayh] clearly tried to skirt the process by taking this to 
court,” McDaniel said.  “The state law is clear that the election board decides these 
matters.”244 
 Mutz personally disputed the findings of the Democratic poll and, not surprisingly, 
took issue with Livengood’s assertions.  He argued that voters would not react unfavorably 
to the legal challenge because “thoughtful people ultimately will recognize this is a 
constitutional question.”  Mutz also directed criticism at Bayh, calling his lawsuit “the 
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strangest thing I’ve ever seen.”  For Mutz, Indiana law was clear in that the state election 
board was the proper venue for questions of candidate qualification.  Mutz questioned the 
timing of Bayh’s lawsuit and suggested that Bayh was interested only in slowing down a 
ruling by the election board, which was “the fastest way to get the question settled.”245 
In truth, the matter was becoming increasingly complicated for Mutz.  He obviously 
believed that the challenge to Bayh was legitimate enough to pursue, but he also must have 
been fearful that the public’s impression of the motivations involved, particularly those of 
Durnil, could adversely affect his candidacy.  There is little doubt that Mutz wanted the 
questions answered, but not in ways that would compromise his campaign.  As Traub 
observed, “it’s a tough leap for Mutz to try to stay above this battle.”246  Traub had argued 
all along that “the political issues of experience and talent should not be washed away in the 
confusion of a Supreme Court decision over eligibility.  It is too easily confused with 
qualification.”247 
 Thus, the first week of the Bayh residency challenge came to a close.  It had been a 
tumultuous week, filled by legal maneuvering and political accusations.  Adding to the 
political intrigue were rumors of the existence of other public opinion polls commissioned 
by the candidates themselves that confirmed what Livengood’s partisan poll had suggested – 
the gap in public support between Bayh and Mutz was widening.  This apparently prompted 
several Republican leaders from around the state to approach newly re-elected Indianapolis 
Mayor William Hudnut about reconsidering his decision to stay out of the 1988 
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gubernatorial race.  Hudnut acknowledged that he had been contacted by some Republican 
leaders, but he insisted that his decision would not change.248 
 On Monday, February 22, an Indianapolis newspaper reported that “the trials of 
Evan Bayh began today, in legal hearings so unusual that few people will ever have to 
weather them.”249  An expedited pre-trial hearing was held before Judge Zore at 9:00 
o’clock a.m. in the Marion County Superior Court.  Prior to the hearing, and as promised, 
McNamar, on behalf of the state election board, filed a motion asking the court to dismiss 
Bayh’s lawsuit.  McNamar argued that the board had “exclusive” jurisdiction over the 
matter because Indiana law provided that the board was solely empowered to administer the 
election laws of the state.  In addition, the board had “primary” jurisdiction because Bayh 
was required to exhaust all administrative remedies before the law allowed him to proceed 
to court, and he had failed to do so.  “The State Election Board falls within the purview of 
the new Indiana Administrative Adjudication & Court Review Act. I.C. 4-21.5.  It is also 
well settled in Indiana that where administrative remedies and judicial review are available, 
the initial determination shall be made at the administrative level and a court of law will 
only have jurisdiction to judicially review the same in accordance with the Adjudication & 
Court Review Act.”250 
 Krahulik countered that “the issue of constitutional qualifications is a judicial matter, 
and there is no state law that allows the election board to make that determination.”  
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Krahulik further observed that the Indiana Constitution should not be trivialized by 
characterizing it as an election law.251 
Krahulik also pointed to a recent decision by the Indiana Court of Appeals, which 
had also originated in the Marion County Superior Court, as being instructive.  It, too, dealt 
with the issue of a trial court’s jurisdiction over questions of candidate eligibility.  In Mason 
v. Gohmann, a Marion County voter had filed a declaratory judgment action challenging 
Goldsmith’s qualifications to be a candidate for Marion County Prosecutor.252  Mason 
argued that Goldsmith was not a duly registered voter and, therefore, was not qualified to be 
a candidate.  The Indiana Court of Appeals eventually affirmed the decision by the Marion 
County Superior Court that Goldsmith was, indeed, qualified to be a candidate for 
prosecutor.  In finding for Goldsmith, Judge Anthony J. Metz, III of the Marion County 
Superior Court, a Republican, rejected Goldsmith’s motion to dismiss, which had argued 
that Mason had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.  In other words, Goldsmith 
had asserted that, before a court of law could properly consider the question of his 
eligibility, Mason should have first filed his complaint before the county election board.  
Judge Metz concluded that the trial court had primary jurisdiction over the subject matter.  
Metz also denied Goldsmith’s assertion that Mason’s lawsuit should be dismissed because 
“the issue of the validity of Goldsmith’s Registration [was] pending before another 
court.”253  While the Court of Appeals did not explicitly address the jurisdictional issues in 
its opinion, it did append all of Judge Metz’s findings to its opinion. 
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 Next, Daniel F. Evans, Jr., the attorney for the Republican Party, entered his 
appearance on behalf of Durnil.  As noted above, Bayh had sued Durnil, as chair of the 
Republican Party, as well as the election board.  Evans asked the court to dismiss the lawsuit 
against Durnil on the grounds that there did not exist a real or actual “legal” controversy 
between Bayh and Durnil.  In a sworn affidavit attached to the motion, Durnil conceded that 
he had made repeated public statements about his intention to challenge Bayh’s eligibility.  
However, the initiation by Governor Orr of the state election board’s investigation 
“remove[d] the need for myself or anyone else to initiate a proceeding to challenge or 
question Bayh’s qualifications ….”  Bayh’s lawyers responded by offering, at the court’s 
request, to produce “numerous articles and documents which clearly show that there are 
‘antagonistic claims’ being actively pressed on one side and opposed on the other which 
create an ‘actual’ controversy or, at the very least, that the ‘ripening seeds’ of such a 
controversy exist.”254  Judge Zore took all of the motions under advisement. 
 Later that day, Judge Zore issued a terse two-paragraph order denying the state 
election board’s motion to dismiss by citing the precedent established in the Mason v. 
Gohman case.  Judge Zore did, however, grant Durnil’s request that he be dismissed from 
the lawsuit.255  Zore also indicated that, on Tuesday, February 23, he intended to set a date 
for a three-day trial to be conducted sometime the following week.256 
 Late that same Monday afternoon, February 22, the state election board convened its 
own special meeting and began its investigation into Bayh’s eligibility.  The board, acting as 
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an administrative law judge, consisted of James C. Puckett, chair and proxy for the 
governor, and Donald B. Cox and Kevin J. Butler, as appointed members.  In its first order 
of business, McNamar presented to the board a formal Petition for Investigation, which 
requested board authorization for McNamar to investigate “whether Birch Evans Bayh, III, 
has engaged in or is about to engage in any acts or practices which might constitute a 
violation of state election laws.”257  By a 2 to 1 vote, along party lines, the board approved 
the petition and, in so doing, made a finding that it had “exclusive jurisdiction” over the 
matter.  The board also approved, by a 2 to 1 party line vote, the issuance of a 19 point 
subpoena requiring Bayh to produce a series of documents, including tax records, motor 
vehicle registrations, driver’s licenses, employment applications, and “copies of any 
documents you intend to produce at a hearing on this matter to demonstrate your Indiana 
residency for five (5) years immediately preceding November 8, 1988.”258  Bayh was given 
until 4:00 p.m. on Thursday, February 25 (or about three days) to produce all of the 
requested documents. 
 Lastly, the board voted along party lines to hold a pre-hearing conference on Friday, 
February 26, at 10:00 a.m. and scheduled a formal evidentiary hearing on Wednesday, 
March 2.  Judge Puckett, the board’s chair, promised to provide a judicial-like hearing.  
“‘That is my intent, to the best of my ability,’ Puckett said.”  The board, aware that Judge 
Zore had earlier in the day denied its motion to dismiss Bayh’s lawsuit, directed McNamar 
to immediately appeal that decision to the Indiana Supreme Court.  Specifically, McNamar 
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was to ask the high court to remove Bayh’s action from the Marion County Superior Court 
and transfer it to the board.259 
 Krahulik requested that the board issue a subpoena requiring Durnil to respond to 
questions and to produce documents.260  Bayh’s attorneys had presented Judge Zore with the 
same request earlier in the day, but that request had been denied as part of Judge Zore’s 
dismissal of Durnil as a defendant from Bayh’s lawsuit.  This information was requested 
from Durnil because Bayh’s campaign believed that Republicans had hired International 
Investigators, Inc. of Indianapolis or its president, C. Tim Wilcox, to conduct a private 
investigation into Bayh’s past.  If true, Bayh’s legal team believed that had they had the 
right to see the results of any investigation that may have been conducted. 
Years before, Wilcox had gained local notoriety as a personal private investigator for 
Indianapolis Police Department officials and high-ranking Republicans.  In furtherance of 
that task, Wilcox had electronically monitored the telephones and offices of prominent 
Democratic lawyers and political figures.261  Wilcox, when asked by reporters, denied he 
was involved in the Bayh matter, but added this caveat:  “even if we were hired by them 
(Republicans), we wouldn’t admit it … I’d lie to you …  Draw your own conclusions.”262  
The board tabled Krahulik’s request.  In response, Durnil denied hiring anyone to conduct 
investigations on Bayh and insisted that the Republican case against Bayh could be 
established on Bayh’s admissions alone.  Evans, Durnil’s attorney, indicated that Durnil 
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would eventually be willing to answer under oath any and all questions asked of him 
“because it is in his best interest to make sure the truth gets out.”263 
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Chapter Five 
 
 
THE FIRST APPEAL 
 
“The effect of the majority position is to allow both forums to go forward on the same issue 
simultaneously.  I find this to be unjudicial and confusing.” 
 
Justice Alfred Pivarnik 
March 1, 1988 
 
 First thing Tuesday morning, February 23, Krahulik asked Judge Zore to issue an 
injunction to prohibit the state election board from proceeding with its investigation on the 
matter of Bayh’s qualifications.  Krahulik argued that the board was exercising quasi-
judicial power for which it had no authority.  In addition, allowing the board to proceed 
would deny Bayh his constitutional right to a jury trial because the hearing procedure 
contemplated by the board would not afford one.264 
Meanwhile, McNamar submitted his request for the Indiana Supreme Court to 
expeditiously consider an appeal of Judge Zore’s earlier order.  By Tuesday mid-day, the 
Supreme Court had agreed to accept an immediate appeal, and it set the matter for a hearing 
the following Monday, February 29, at 1:30 p.m.  The Supreme Court’s administrator, Karl 
L. Mulvaney, indicated that “a ruling probably would be issued the same day.”265  Thus, it 
appeared that a determination by the Supreme Court as to which forum would initially 
review the Bayh case would be made no later than the following Monday. 
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 McNamar was confident that the Supreme Court’s acceptance of his appeal from 
Judge Zore’s court would be enough to convince Zore to halt all judicial proceedings:  “If I 
were a judge, I’d wait to see what the Supreme Court says one way or another.”266  While it 
appeared, at least initially, that the board would continue its investigation, by Tuesday 
afternoon the lawyers were back in Zore’s court arguing whether the board should be 
formally restrained from going forward.  After lengthy arguments in open court, the lawyers 
themselves agreed to halt all proceedings, both judicial and administrative, until a ruling 
could be issued by the Supreme Court.267  However, the parties also agreed that Bayh’s 
response to the board’s discovery request for documents would not be delayed so that 
preparation for an eventual hearing on the merits would continue.  Although he approved the 
open-court agreement reached by the lawyers, Zore made clear that he would not hesitate to 
issue a restraining order if, in the interim, the board proceeded to take any additional 
action.268  To that end, McNamar agreed that the board’s scheduled February 26 pre-hearing 
conference and March 2 evidentiary hearing would be temporarily postponed. 
 The “truce” reached by the parties as they awaited a decision by the Indiana 
Supreme Court allowed editorial boards from major daily newspapers around the state to 
comment on the controversy.  The Indianapolis News commended Governor Orr for acting 
“properly” and called on the Supreme Court to allow “the Election Board to do its duty.”  
As for Bayh’s contention that he could not receive a fair hearing before an administrative 
board dominated by Republican members, the News observed, “it is up to the members of 
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that Election Board to faithfully and impartially carry out their duty, just as Bayh and other 
members of the State Recount Commission carried out their duties several years ago.”269  
The South Bend Tribune disagreed.  “The Election Board is designed to be biased toward 
the party in power.  Courts are supposed to be unbiased.  Also, it seems that a constitutional 
question by its very nature should be a court province ….  We think it is in the interest of the 
state to have the matter determined fairly, in court.”270  The Indianapolis Star underscored 
the importance of the issue, but refrained from offering its preferred forum:  “Indiana’s 
voters and the cause of justice can be served rightly only by a decision based on the merits 
of the case – a decision that is non-partisan, legal and fair.”271  The Gary Post-Tribune 
characterized the controversy surrounding Bayh’s residency as “the most exciting issue in 
the Democratic campaign for governor so far, which says something about the state of 
politics in the state of Indiana.”  The editorial went on to opine that neither the election 
board nor a jury is the appropriate way to settle an issue of this nature.  “Why can’t a judge 
check the constitutional requirements for residency against Bayh’s record, using all the 
documents available, and decide whether he is enough of a Hoosier to run for governor?  
Because that is logical, probably.  Eventually, a court probably will make the final 
determination anyway.”272 
 Beyond the burgeoning editorial commentary, there were several other 
developments in the litigation.  The parties exchanged previously requested documents on 
Friday, February 26.  Bayh turned over information that responded to the election board’s 
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19-point subpoena, and in so doing, argued that the only documents produced that were 
likely to be used by his adversaries were his Indiana part-time resident tax returns.  He 
insisted that they were insufficient to prove that he had abandoned his residency in the state. 
More immediately newsworthy, though, was the response Bayh’s lawyers received 
from Durnil as a result of their request for production of documents from him.  Bayh 
explained, “they, in essence, gave us nothing but some newspaper articles.”273  On earlier 
occasions, Durnil had confidently asserted that he possessed the names of key witnesses and 
a file folder full of information that would prove Bayh’s ineligibility.  According to Bayh, 
when forced to produce what he claimed to have, Durnil “had to sign on the line that he had 
nothing.”274  The file contained little more than “newspaper clippings, television newscast 
tapes and personal notes written on message pads.”  Durnil had written memos to himself, 
one of which read, “what kind of office application has Bayh filled out where he would have 
had a drug question?”  Another memo considered what federal income tax documents Bayh 
would have prepared.275  Durnil’s lawyer, Daniel F. Evans, Jr., downplayed the significance 
of Durnil’s response to the document request.  “I don’t know what they’re talking about.  He 
(Durnil) doesn’t have 50 items.  There is no file.  There is a file of newspaper clippings.”276 
 On Sunday, February 28, the Indianapolis Star reported that the Bayh residency 
challenge was “creating a quiet but deep split among state Republicans.”  An increasing 
number of Republican activists were expressing the fear that, no matter how meritorious the 
challenge actually was, the public’s ultimate perception would be that Republicans were 
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guilty of “dirty politics” and that it would “unify Democrats, anger the electorate and open 
the GOP to charges of arrogance.”  “‘I don’t understand why they’re doing this,’ said one 
GOP strategist close to the 1988 campaign.  ‘We’ve got a good candidate and we’ve got a 
good organization.  Why take the risk of turning Evan Bayh into a martyr?’”277 
Governor Orr defended his action as prudent and necessary.  While acknowledging 
the political risks involved, Orr argued that questions of Bayh’s eligibility were not simply 
going to go away and someone had to do something about it.  “‘If we don’t do this and Bayh 
wins, (Republicans) are going to blame me or the party hierarchy for not having acted.’”  
But anonymous Republican sources confirmed that many party faithful were nervous that 
the challenge would backfire.  These sources identified Frank O’Bannon as the only 
beneficiary of a Supreme Court ruling declaring Bayh to be ineligible, since the common 
presumption was that O’Bannon would then get the Democratic nomination.  One 
Republican officeholder commented, “if that happens, there would be hell to pay ….  That’s 
when the uproar would come from people who think this is crass.  Then Bayh would go 
around the state and tell all of his supporters that he got screwed and that they should 
support O’Bannon.”  Even a Republican member of Congress from Indiana, again 
anonymously, indicated that spending time challenging Bayh’s qualifications was “bad 
judgment and that Mutz ought to just get on with his campaign.”278 
 Mutz defended Governor Orr’s decision to initiate the investigation.  He argued that 
it was better to address the problem early in the campaign and have it resolved than to allow 
it to linger over the summer and into the fall.  “‘My frank feeling about this is that if this is 
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resolved quickly, this issue disappears,’ said Mutz.  ‘What makes it a problem is if it hangs 
over the election clear up until November.  You do things at the risk of creating a martyr if it 
hangs on for a long period of time.’”  While not conceding the point, Mutz seemed resigned 
to the fact that the public would view any decision by the state election board as motivated 
by partisan considerations.  But, in Mutz’s mind, what militated against that perception was 
the stature that a decision by the Indiana Supreme Court would command.  “‘I think that 
people in this country, while they may have all kinds of emotional feelings about one thing 
or another, do believe that the Supreme Court stands above partisan political bickering,’ 
Mutz said.”279 
Traub reported that all Republicans were becoming concerned that Durnil had 
become so tainted as to be “obsessed” with Bayh.  Traub also reported growing evidence 
that the residency controversy was hurting, not helping the Republicans.  In January, a voter 
from Bartholomew County had indicated he was supporting Mutz for governor.  By late 
February, that same voter was not so sure.  “I think it’s a petty issue,” he said.  “If anything, 
it makes them look bad … it looks like they’re grabbing at straws.”  He added, “It isn’t like 
we have Ho Chi Minh running against Mutz.”280  Much later, Mutz himself would maintain 
that he had cautioned Orr that the legal challenge could backfire.281 
 That same weekend, other newspapers commented on this emerging dilemma facing 
the Republicans and Mutz.  The Louisville Courier-Journal asked rhetorically how the 
challenge would affect voters’ perceptions as they went to the polls in November.  The 
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paper reported that “since the governor’s request to the board, Bayh’s name has been 
featured prominently in newspapers throughout the state.  The Courier-Journal, for example, 
carried stories about him on the front page of the Indiana section five of the six days 
immediately after Orr’s request.”  Durnil responded that such publicity had little if any 
effect since Bayh already enjoyed widespread name recognition.  To the contrary, Durnil 
questioned how many people actually read stories that closely.  Of those who did, Durnil 
believed that promoting the idea of Bayh’s time away from Indiana and, by inference, his 
relative inexperience in the public arena when compared to Mutz, inured to the benefit of 
Republicans. 282 
Commenting on the editorial page of the South Bend Tribune, Jack Colwell 
suggested that, if Bayh were ruled eligible, “his chances could be boosted by the eligibility 
dispute if Republicans look as though they were trying unfairly to take the race out of the 
hands of the voters.”  Colwell also observed that, if Bayh were ruled ineligible, O’Bannon 
might be the real beneficiary of all the attention surrounding the challenge.  While 
acknowledging Bayh’s status as a stronger candidate against Mutz than O’Bannon would 
be, Colwell characterized O’Bannon as “a highly respected legislative leader who could win 
in a situation in which there was a voter backlash against Republicans for knocking Bayh off 
the ballot.”283 
 As oral argument before the Indiana Supreme Court drew nearer, the parties engaged 
in final preparation.  The Court would be hearing a case of “first impression” – that is, a case 
involving a set of circumstances never before presented to the Supreme Court for its review.  
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In addition to the unique nature of the legal issues confronting the Supreme Court, several 
points need to be made about the Court itself in early 1988.  When the Supreme Court had 
decided the residency case of Judge Evrard in 1975, the Court was in the early years of a 
dramatic historical transformation.  Ever since the enactment of the second Indiana 
Constitution in 1851, the justices on the Supreme Court had been elected by the voters of the 
state.  The Evrard court consisted of three Republicans – Chief Justice Givan, Justice 
Hunter, and Justice Norman Arterburn.  The other two members were Democrats – Justices 
DeBruler and Prentice. 
But in 1970, the voters of Indiana had approved a constitutional amendment that 
would fundamentally change the method of selecting justices for the state’s high court.  
Vacancies on the court would now be filled by “merit selection” – appointment by the 
governor from a list of three names submitted by a state judicial nominating commission.  
At the end of the terms of those justices who were serving on the court when the 1970 
constitutional amendment became effective, those justices would stand for re-election not 
against a candidate of the opposing political party, but on a “retention ballot” on which the 
voters of the state would be entitled to vote “yes” or “no” as to whether the justice would be 
“retained” in office.  Once retained for the first time, a justice would stand for such a 
retention vote every ten years thereafter.  Under the new system, the Chief Justice was to be 
chosen by state judicial nominating commission every five years from among the justices on 
the court. 
 By 1988, this transformation was well underway.  While Chief Justice Givan (first 
elected in 1968) and Justice DeBruler (appointed to the Court in 1968 and elected in 1970) 
who had participated in the Evrard case continued to be members of the Court, Justices 
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Arterburn, Hunter, and Prentice had retired.  Each of those three had been replaced using the 
new merit selection system.  Justice Arterburn had been replaced when Governor Otis 
Bowen, a Republican, appointed Justice Alfred J. Pivarnik.  Justice Hunter had been 
replaced in 1985 when Governor Orr appointed Justice Randall T. Shepard.  Justice Prentice 
was replaced shortly thereafter when Governor Orr appointed Justice Brent Dickson who 
took office in early 1986.  And later in 1987, Shepard had replaced Givan as Chief Justice 
after a protracted contest with Pivarnik. 
 Although the partisanship of justices is not identified under the new merit selection 
process, the three new justices had been appointed by Republican governors and each of the 
three was known to be a Republican.  Thus the Court to which the politically charged 
residency dispute had come consisted of four Republicans and one Democrat.  But it was 
impossible to tell what role, if any, partisanship would play, especially because under the 
merit selection process, a justice would not have to seek re-nomination by his party, seek re-
election on a party ballot, or face a candidate from the opposite party.  In point of fact, just 
like Durnil and the Republicans and Bayh and the Democrats, the Supreme Court had a lot 
riding on the outcome of the residency case.  Merit selection had been sold to the people of 
Indiana as a way to take partisanship out of high court adjudication.  Court observers, as 
well as committed partisans, would be watching the residency case closely to see if that had 
in fact occurred. 
 As a technical matter, the state election board’s appeal of Judge Zore’s ruling was 
not an “appeal” at all but rather what the Supreme Court calls an “original action.”  Under 
Indiana court rules, only certain decisions of a trial court can be appealed and only at certain 
times.  Judge Zore’s ruling did not qualify as an “appealable order.”  (Furthermore, most 
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appeals must first go to the Indiana Court of Appeals for decision before they can be 
appealed to the Supreme Court.)  However, Supreme Court rules do permit one side in a 
lawsuit to file a challenge directly in the Supreme Court (hence, an “original action”) that 
contests the authority of the judge to act in the case at all.284 
 In legal terms, the election board was “alleg[ing] the absence of jurisdiction” of the 
Marion Superior Court and seeking an order (called a “writ of mandamus and prohibition”) 
prohibiting Judge Zore from ordering the board not to act and prohibiting him from 
considering the matter.  This explains the unusual name for the case:  “State of Indiana, on 
the relation of the State Election Board, Relator, v. The Superior Court of Marion County, 
Civil Division, Room No. 7, and the Honorable Gerald S. Zore, Judge thereof, 
Respondents.”  Bayh’s name did not even appear.  That is, the nominal parties or contestants 
in this “original action” were not the election board and Bayh but the election board and 
Judge Zore – the election board was asking the Supreme Court to take action not against 
Bayh but against Zore.  Of course, because Bayh opposed what the election board was 
seeking, his lawyers actually argued the case.  But as a technical matter, Judge Zore and his 
court were “parties” to this particular original action or dispute being litigated in the 
Supreme Court. 
 Sometimes called “writ proceedings,” Supreme Court rules provided that “original 
actions are viewed with disfavor and may not be used as substitutes for appeals.”285  As 
such, there was a slight bias in the Court’s rules against granting the order or “writ” that the 
Republican majority on the election board sought here. 
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And, in addition Bayh had not yet formally filed a declaration of candidacy.  
Therefore, the election board would need to argue that the dispute was “ripe,” that is, it 
possessed the authority to decide the appropriateness of a candidacy that, in a technical 
sense, did not exist. 
 Because of the unprecedented level of interest in the case, the Supreme Court made 
special arrangements to increase the seating capacity of its chambers from 80 to 250.  
Mulvaney, the Court’s administrator, commented, “in my 11 years, we’ve probably filled 
the courtroom only 5 or 10 times.”286  Coincidentally, the Court’s hearing was scheduled for 
the same day that the Indiana General Assembly was set to adjourn.  There was common 
belief that many, if not most, of the state’s legislators wanted to attend.  Although the 
jurisdictional question had made its way to the Supreme Court in only ten days, most 
observers recognized that the case would quickly find its way back to the Court for final 
review.  To that end, Indiana Supreme Court Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard was reported 
to have already assigned the Court’s law clerks to delve into the legal issues presented by 
the residency question on the merits.287 
 The Supreme Court was not the only venue making preparations for Monday, 
February 29.  While the state election board had agreed to forego any action pending the 
Supreme Court’s decision, the board announced that it intended to re-convene at 4:00 p.m. 
on Monday afternoon, anticipating that the 1:30 hearing before the Court would be 
concluded and a decision rendered by that time.  The board’s stated purpose was to discuss 
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how it would proceed with the scheduling of an evidentiary hearing.288  McNamar had 
already prepared a comprehensive legal memorandum for all members of the state election 
board.  He did so pursuant to his own suggestion at the board’s organizational meeting the 
previous week.  The memorandum was McNamar’s “analysis and thoughts as to the 
question of Bayh’s eligibility for the office of Governor of the State of Indiana ….”289 
McNamar summarized the relevant constitutional history and then concluded that 
the drafters defined physical presence in the state as being the standard by which 
“residency” was to be determined as opposed to the mere claim of intent to reside.  
“Concerning the analysis of physical presence in the State, the South Carolina language [in 
the Ravenel case] … states the rationale for such a requirement.”  Therefore, McNamar, in 
an effort to help the board understand the criteria they might use to determine whether Bayh 
met the constitutional requirement, suggested that “one indicia of residency is an address of 
where the individual … usually sleeps.”  Other criteria that courts have considered in 
determining residency were listed:  “drivers licenses and addresses on those; registration of 
motor vehicles; place of registration to vote; place of employment, and ‘where he sleeps’ the 
proximity thereto; addresses used for (a) clubs, (b) other organizations, (c) receipt of mail, 
(d) addresses used on applications for official documents; tax returns and indications utilized 
on those types of documents; marriage certificates and addresses used therein.”290  To the 
extent that McNamar was suggesting that the list was exhaustive in terms of the criteria to 
be used in determining residency, based on information already in the public domain, it was 
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clear that Bayh would be declared ineligible.  Remember, at the time, the state election 
board remained purportedly a “neutral” fact-finder and impartial decision maker.  Moreover, 
the role of counsel to the board was not to prosecute, but to advise.  To do otherwise would 
be to compromise the board’s impartiality. 
 On Monday, February 29, at 1:30 p.m., in packed chambers, oral argument was 
conducted before the Indiana Supreme Court for two hours.  Only four of the Court’s five 
justices took part in the proceeding.  The Court’s only Democrat, Justice Roger O. 
DeBruler, mysteriously disqualified himself from participation citing a conflict of interest. 
That the only Democrat on the Court was not participating was a source of great distress to 
the Bayh legal team.  But is also created a great irony for the Republicans:  what the 
Supreme Court would decide would be solely the decision of Republican justices.  There 
was no possibility that the four Republicans could be split such that the sole Democrat’s 
vote would be outcome determinative and shift the political onus of the decision to the 
Democrats.  The “good news/bad news” decision of whether the election board or the court 
decided the case rested entirely in the hands of the four Republican members of the Court.  
Attorneys for Bayh and the board were questioned extensively by members of the 
Court.  With respect to the issue of ripeness, McNamar conceded that the board’s claim of 
jurisdiction was unique because Bayh had not yet filed a declaration of candidacy.  
Nonetheless, he argued that the board’s authority was clear.  “I know of no other statute 
allowing a board to anticipate a law violation,” McNamar said.291 
The justices expressed concerns about proceeding before either forum, and how the 
case would be prosecuted thereafter.  Justice Dickson observed that, if the election board 
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were to find in Bayh’s favor, the constitutional question might remain unanswered.  
Similarly, the justices asked the lawyers to respond to the possibility that, in a case before 
Judge Zore, the election board might choose not to defend itself because it would no longer 
have any decided interest in the outcome.  Krahulik argued that Bayh would be prepared to 
find a voter who could challenge his eligibility if that were required.  Krahulik also left open 
the possibility of seeking to re-name Durnil as a defendant in the lawsuit. 
Following the hearing, the Court retired and deliberated for three and one-half hours.  
At the end of the day, the Court announced that its deliberation would continue into Tuesday 
because no decision had been reached.  Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard said “I’d rather be 
right than quick.”  The fact that the Court was unable to make a prompt decision was 
unusual.  According to court personnel, jurisdictional decisions were often made quickly, 
usually being disposed of by the Court within half an hour.  “But, this is not your normal 
case,” said one of the court employees.292 
 The 4:00 p.m. meeting of the state election board was initially delayed, then 
postponed altogether while the Court continued its deliberations.  By agreement with 
lawyers representing Bayh, the board indefinitely stayed the scheduling of a pre-hearing 
conference until after a Court decision was formally rendered.  McNamar relayed to the 
board that he had been told by Justice Givan that the Court had finished its deliberations for 
the day without a decision and that those deliberations would resume at 9:30 a.m. the 
following morning.293 
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 Then, on Tuesday, March 1, faced with the question of whether the election board or 
the Marion County court should proceed, the Supreme Court issued a decision that was 
really no decision at all.  “An apologetic Indiana Supreme Court said … it could not decide 
which authority should rule first on a residency eligibility dispute involving Secretary of 
State Evan Bayh.”294  The decision was issued at mid-day and confounded all of the parties 
involved.  The Court held that both the state election board and the Marion County Superior 
Court could proceed simultaneously with consideration of the case.295 
 We know from the written record that Justice Pivarnik agreed with Bayh’s position.  
“[T]he [Marion County] Court is the only forum which can conclusively put this issue to 
rest,” Pivarnik wrote.  “Because this requires decisions on legal and constitutional issues, the 
Election Board is not in a position to do this.”296 
Justice Givan took the opposite position, the one advocated by the Republican 
majority on the election board. 
In the case at bar, Evan Bayh is like all candidates seeking to have their 
name placed before the voting public.  He is subject to the constitutional and 
statutory qualifications for whatever office sought.  It is the responsibility of 
the State Election Board to determine that each candidate whose name is 
placed on the ballot is in fact qualified for such placement.  If Evan Bayh or 
any other candidate in like circumstance is dissatisfied with the decision 
made by the State Election Board, they may seek judicial review from such 
decision. 
 
As some of the other members of this Court have pointed out, under certain 
circumstances, including questions pending before administrative boards, it 
is proper to invoke the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.  However, I do 
not perceive that this is one of those situations.  This situation does not 
require an interpretation of the Indiana Constitution nor is the State Election 
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Board threatening to take any action which it is not authorized to take.  If the 
State Election Board’s action would be adverse to Evan Bayh’s interest, he 
could take his appeal.  Therefore during the course of such action, the 
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act should not be invoked.  If, on the other 
hand, the State Election Board rules that Evan Bayh’s name may go on the 
ballot and he is still concerned that he may be faced with a quo warranto 
action challenging his qualification to assume the office of Governor, he may 
invoke the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act to obtain a judicial 
determination of his qualifications.297 
 
The problem was that the remaining two justices participating in the decision, Chief Justice 
Shepard and Justice Dickson, apparently could not see their way clear to join either of these 
two positions.  Instead, they issued a joint statement allowing both the election board and 
the court to consider the matter.  (Justice Givan agreed with that portion of the Shepard-
Dickson statement allowing the board to proceed, thereby providing the majority vote 
needed for that result.  Similarly, Justice Pivarnik agreed with that portion of the Shepard-
Dickson statement allowing the court to proceed, thereby providing the majority vote 
needed for that result.) 
 The joint Shepard-Dickson statement read as follows: 
It is important to emphasize that the question before the Court is not whether 
Evan Bayh meets the constitutional residency requirement for the office of 
Governor.  That is a question for another day, a question all too likely to 
return to this Court for a final determination.  In effect, the current 
proceedings are but a way to define the path by which the final question will 
work its way back to this Court. 
 
The State Election Board seeks a writ prohibiting the Marion Superior Court 
from proceeding further in the action for declaratory judgment filed there by 
Evan Bayh.  Though we have some reservations about the impact of today’s 
decision on the state’s administrative law, the necessity that this Court come 
to a conclusion about the procedure to be used in determining Mr. Bayh’s 
eligibility for the office of Governor leads us to join in denying the relief 
requested by the Board.  In so doing, we join in holding that under some 
circumstances a declaratory judgment is an available alternative to 
exhaustion of administrative remedies and judicial review. 
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We also conclude that a candidate’s eligibility for placement on the ballot is 
a question which the statutes direct should customarily be decided by the 
Board.  The Indiana Code requires that such questions be resolved by a week 
from Friday when the Secretary of State is directed under the statutes to 
certify to the county clerks the names of those who should be on the ballot.  
We have substantial doubt that a trial court can bring to a final judgment the 
question presented to it within that time frame and thus believe it is 
appropriate to let the Board’s processes go forward.  Hence, we have joined 
in prohibiting the Marion Superior Court from entering injunctions against 
the Board without further proceedings in this Court. 
 
Even a decision by the Board favorable to Mr. Bayh’s candidacy, however, 
cannot “bring to rest” the constitutional question of his eligibility for the 
office.  Declaratory judgment is an excellent vehicle to bring about a final 
decision on that question.  Both Evan Bayh and the people of Indiana have 
an interest in an early and authoritative answer to that constitutional 
question. 
 
Whether the question of Evan Bayh’s eligibility under the Constitution 
returns to this Court as an appeal from an administrative determination or as 
an appeal from a declaratory judgment, all deliberate speed will be required.  
We wish that a majority of this Court could be mustered for a more orderly 
path back here for a final resolution.  As a Court functioning with only four 
members, today’s order seems to us the best available.298 
 
 Several points are worth emphasizing about this statement.  First, the Court denied 
the election board’s request for an order prohibiting the Marion County Superior Court from 
proceeding further on the Bayh case.  The Court said that “under some circumstances a 
declaratory judgment is an available alternative to exhaustion of administrative remedies 
and judicial review.”  Second, the Court also expressly prohibited the Marion County 
Superior Court from enjoining or preventing action by the election board because “a 
candidate’s eligibility for placement on the ballot is a question which the statutes direct 
should customarily be decided by the Board.”  Because of the timing constraints of ballot 
preparation, the Court reasoned that “we have substantial doubt that a trial court can bring to 
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a final judgment the question presented to it within that time frame and thus believe it is 
appropriate to let the Board’s processes go forward.”299  Third, Shepard and Dickson 
expressed frustration “that a majority of this Court could [not] be mustered for a more 
orderly path” and that the Court had been required to “function with only four members.” 
 Although having opposite positions on the case, Justices Pivarnik and Givan both 
expressed scorn for the result.  Pivarnik wrote:  “The effect of the majority position is to 
allow both forums to go forward on the same issue simultaneously.  I find this to be 
unjudicial and confusing,”300  Givan opined that it was an “unsavory situation [for] the State 
Election Board and a court of law [to] act simultaneously on the same subject.”301 
 The Court’s seeming indecision led the Indianapolis Star to declare in its March 2 
headline “Stumped Supreme Court ‘punts’ on Bayh issue.”302  The Court’s decision was met 
with surprise and bewilderment.  McNamar, the board’s counsel, observed that “it really 
doesn’t decide anything, except both sides go ahead.”  After having read the Court’s 
decision, Bayh commented, “it’s getting a little metaphysical here.”303  Legal observers 
were critical.  The Supreme Court is “required to make a decision.  They are the Supreme 
Court.  They should rule and they didn’t,” said one source, who asked for anonymity.304 
 What are we to make of the Court’s behavior in this case?  Faced with a test of 
whether the merit-selected Court could handle a highly politically charged case, the Court 
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had failed.  While the Court had not rendered a partisan decision, nor had its members 
broken out in partisan bickering, neither did the Court provide a workable answer to the key 
question that the election board, Governor Orr, Gordon Durnil, the Republican Party and 
Bayh had all asked. 
 Given the outcome and the three statements that accompanied it (one by Pivarnik, 
one by Givan, and the joint statement from Shepard and Dickson), it seems most likely that 
Chief Justice Shepard and Justice Dickson initially had had different views from one another 
– that one had been aligned with Justice Givan, the other with Justice Pivarnik – as to how 
the matter should be resolved.  But with Justice DeBruler not participating, this difference of 
opinion produced a 2-2 tie vote.  The fact that Justices Givan and Pivarnik each expressed 
his views in a separate statement suggests that they were dug into their respective positions 
and unwilling to compromise.  This situation likely gave Shepard and Dickson three 
choices.  First, they could continue to negotiate, trying to win a third vote for one position or 
the other.  The fact that their negotiations continued over parts of two days suggests that this 
choice was intensely pursued. 
Second, the Court could simply have announced that it was split 2-2 and so could 
render no decision on the election board’s request.  If the Court had taken this path, the 
practical effect would have been favorable to Bayh.  With the Court not granting the election 
board’s request, the case could go forward in Judge Zore’s court.  Most importantly, Judge 
Zore would not be constrained from enjoining proceedings before the election board.  There 
was, of course, no assurance that Zore would grant Bayh’s request to enjoin the board or, if 
he did, there was no assurance that the injunction would remain in place.  But it would have 
been both a legal and moral victory for Bayh if the Republican majority of the election 
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board, having requested action from a court consisting only of Republicans, got absolutely 
nothing of what it asked for. 
 The third choice open to Shepard and Dickson was the path they apparently ended 
up taking, namely, compromising with each other to allow both the election board and the 
court to proceed.  It was as if Solomon, when faced with the two women both claiming to be 
the mother of the same child, had resolved the case by saying, “I declare both of you to be 
the mother of the child.  You go and figure it out.”  Both the Republican majority on the 
election board and the Bayh forces faced uncertainty, but neither faction’s preferred route 
had been blocked by the decision. 
 The Court’s decision set off a flurry of new activity as both sides attempted to 
accelerate the process in their preferred venue—Bayh in the Marion County Superior Court 
and the Republicans before the state election board.  Reaction to the Court’s decision was so 
quick that both parties were back in Judge Zore’s courtroom by Tuesday afternoon.  Bayh’s 
lawyers filed a motion requesting an immediate trial setting and proposed that a trial 
commence at 8:30 a.m. Wednesday, the very next day.  The board’s attorneys filed a motion 
to move the court case outside of Marion County.  This request, known as a motion for 
change of venue, provides each party to a lawsuit with one opportunity, automatically 
granted, to have a case moved out of the county where it was originally filed.  Judge Zore 
granted the board’s motion and ordered the parties to agree or otherwise determine where 
the case would be transferred.  After conferring, McNamar reported to Judge Zore that the 
parties had struck from a list of contiguous counties and selected the Shelby County Circuit 
Court.  The Shelby County Circuit Court was presided over by Charles D. O’Connor, a 
Republican.  The transcript and record of the proceeding of the Marion County Superior 
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Court were certified and transmitted.  By 1:00 p.m. on Wednesday, March 2, Nora D. 
VanNatta, the Clerk of the Shelby County Circuit Court, acknowledged receipt of the 
record.  Judge O’Connor assumed jurisdiction and set a pre-trial conference for 8:30 a.m. on 
Thursday, March 3.305 
 At the time he received the Bayh residency case in March, 1988, Judge O’Connor 
was serving his first term as judge.  He had been appointed by Governor Orr to fill a 
vacancy on the bench in 1982 and had been elected to a full six-year term later that year.  He 
would be standing for re-election on the November, 1988 ballot.  At the age of 42, this 
graduate of Notre Dame and the Indiana University Law School at Indianapolis had a 
reputation for fairness and hard work. 
Also in the wake of the Supreme Court’s March 1 decision, the state election board 
announced that it would re-convene at 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday morning, March 2.  At that 
meeting, the board discussed the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision and whether, 
in light of that decision, it should proceed with its investigation into Bayh’s eligibility.  
McNamar argued for an immediate hearing because of the Supreme Court’s concern that 
questions of candidate eligibility be resolved by March 11.  “We have substantial doubt that 
a trial court can bring to a final judgment the question presented to it within that time 
frame.”306 
Krahulik then requested that, rather than proceed with its own investigation, the 
board join with Bayh to ensure that the Shelby County Circuit Court set the matter as 
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expeditiously as possible and, thereby, “avoid the confusion that would result if this board 
goes forward and the trial court simultaneously goes forward, with perhaps different 
opinions being reached in the two different forums and the procedural quagmire that would 
be encompassed there.”  Krahulik expressed Bayh’s intent to waive his right to ask for 
change of venue and also waive any notice of hearing requirements in order to obtain the 
earliest possible trial date in the Shelby County Circuit Court.307  Lastly, Krahulik 
contradicted McNamar’s assertion that March 11 was the operative deadline.  Rather, 
Krahulik argued the board had until Thursday, March 17, before it must act on challenges to 
declarations of candidacy.  Thus, the Shelby County Circuit Court had a little over two 
weeks to render a decision on the merits.308 
 Judge Puckett responded to counsels’ arguments by noting that, in his opinion, the 
Supreme Court’s primary interest was in finding the most timely resolution of the issue.  He 
concluded, therefore, that the board, as a precautionary measure, needed to set the matter for 
hearing so as to ensure that some decision would be made before any deadline was reached.  
However, Puckett expressed an open-mindedness about how best to achieve a prompt 
decision.  “If somehow [the Shelby County Circuit Court] can get on a track that will allow 
us to deal with it or allow them to deal with it in an appropriate way to meet this timeliness 
consideration of the Supreme Court, I can see that being an appropriate approach.” 
Puckett moved that the board set the matter for a hearing on Wednesday, March 9, 
and Thursday, March 10, with the commitment that the conduct of a hearing be reconsidered 
                                                 
 
307 Ibid., 7. 
308 Ibid., 14-15. 
 
137 
“if there is a report back to us with full cooperation that somehow the court can deal with it 
in a timely fashion.”  Puckett’s intention was “to avoid this race to judgment that the two-
track approach might give us.”309 Donald Cox concurred with Puckett saying “I think we 
would be shirking our responsibility and possibly setting a precedent if we do not hear 
this.”310  Thus, on another party-line vote, Puckett’s motion was approved.  The board gave 
each side until Friday, March 4, to file pre-trial statements along with legal briefs outlining 
the issues to be presented to the board as well as the anticipated testimony and evidence.  
Lastly, the board scheduled one final pre-hearing conference for 10:00 a.m. on Monday, 
March 7.311 
 Kevin Butler, the board’s Democratic member, then asked why the board was so 
insistent on moving forward given the lawyers’ acknowledgment that the court case was in 
the process of being moved to Shelby County and that no further procedural changes would 
be requested.  Butler’s concern about the process itself was not new.  In a previous meeting 
on February 22, Butler made the observation that, “I think I am tainted, as I think every 
member of this board is tainted.”312  Butler pointed out that not all members of the board 
were attorneys and he wondered whether they, as a board, were truly qualified to be 
deciding the “critical legal issues” presented by constitutional interpretation.313 
Consistent with this concern, Butler raised questions about the weight that board 
members were to give the previously submitted legal opinions and interpretations offered by 
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the board’s outside or “independent” counsel, particularly now that McNamar’s role had 
changed from that of board advisor to advocate.  In an opinion memorandum that had been 
distributed to the members of the board, McNamar opined that “if the rationale of having a 
residency requirement is met by a person living elsewhere for a duration of time and 
indicating his intent is always to return then there is no reason for the drafters of the 
constitution to put in the requirement” and he cited extensive case law which supported the 
idea that the term “residency” requires one’s physical presence.314  McNamar expressly 
admonished that the memo not be shared with those outside of the board because it was 
protected by the attorney-client privilege. 
Butler directly asked McNamar, “ … if I understand your memorandum correctly, 
David – that the board is to look at the issue of residency in the restrictive sense of 
habitation as opposed to domicile.”315  McNamar quickly retreated:  “I think that matter may 
be for your final determination on how you look at it.  I am merely, one, giving you my 
opinion; and, two, giving you the authorities from Indiana, as well as the United States, on 
how similar questions have been decided.  Again, that is your ultimate determination on 
how you view it.  Again, you are perfectly capable of interpreting the law of the State of 
Indiana.  There is a more ultimate authority to say whether you are right or wrong, but you 
have the initial authority and responsibility to do that.”316 
In spite of this qualification, others acknowledged this conflict.  As the Louisville 
Courier-Journal reported, “if the State Election Board follows its attorney’s 
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recommendation, it likely will find Evan Bayh ineligible to run for governor.”317  The 
newspaper also pointed out that “since the election board delved into the matter of Bayh’s 
eligibility on February 18, it has followed all recommendations from McNamar, who was 
appointed by Attorney General Linley Pearson to represent the board in this case.”318 
 Krahulik then asked, “if that is in the nature of a brief, are we going to exchange?”  
Puckett suggested that the board provide Bayh’s lawyers with copies of McNamar’s legal 
analysis.  Butler’s questions highlighted the fundamental tension underlying the decision-
making responsibility and process now confronting the board.  While board members were 
charged with interpreting the law, to what extent would their decisions be shaped by the 
legal opinions and authority previously provided to them by their “independent” legal 
counsel?  Abandoning the neutrality often associated with a legal advisor, McNamar had 
become an advocate, arguing for a particular legal position and for a particular outcome.  
From that point forward (and arguably, even earlier in the proceeding), McNamar was the 
principal legal proponent of the position that Bayh was constitutionally unqualified to serve 
as governor.  Election board member Butler observed that, in light of these changing 
circumstances, the board had now become “prosecutor and judge and jury.”319 
 Toward the end of the board’s hearing, McNamar caused some additional 
controversy, but this time among members of the press.  Prompted by another question from 
Butler, McNamar declared that the board’s deliberations in this matter would be privately 
conducted because they were not, in his opinion, subject to the Indiana Open Door law.  
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McNamar advised the board that, while all aspects of the investigation and hearing would be 
public, “your deliberations on this particular matter are your deliberations; so that at that 
point where you decide you want to meet and discuss items in the adjudication itself, the 
[Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act] would take precedence over the Open 
Door Act and you certainly are entitled to do that.”320 
A coalition of news organizations immediately took exception to this opinion.  
Robert P. Johnstone and Jan M. Carroll, attorneys for the Indianapolis Star and Indianapolis 
News, warned that a decision reached behind closed doors might not be valid.  “I am 
confident that after Mr. McNamar has had an opportunity to review the state’s Open Door 
Law and review the court decisions we have sent him, he will conclude the deliberations 
cannot be held in private ….  Certainly, they don’t want that further complication,” 
Johnstone said.321  Similarly, Richard W. Cardwell, attorney for the Hoosier State Press 
Association, warned that “there’s no exception to the Open Door Law in the adjudication 
process ….”322  In response, McNamar insisted that “there comes a point in the decision 
process where the board has a right – the internal obligation – to close themselves off and 
say, ‘What does the evidence mean?’ ….  They do need the privacy to reflect among 
themselves.”323  Furthermore, McNamar contended that the election board would, in this 
regard, be acting no differently than other similarly-situated state administrative agencies.  
Later that same week, however, a legal showdown with news organizations was averted 
when McNamar conceded that the board would conduct its discussions in public. 
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 Early the next day, the parties found themselves in Shelby County Circuit Court.  At 
8:30 a.m., on Thursday, March 3, Judge O’Connor held a ninety-minute pre-trial 
conference.  Bayh’s counsel re-filed a request for a jury trial.324  The board filed a motion to 
dismiss the action in its entirety.  Reflecting on the series of questions that the Supreme 
Court had asked during its oral argument, McNamar based his motion on the fact that, since 
the state election board had yet to make any ruling in the matter, it had nothing to defend.  
McNamar said that the election board should be allowed to reach its own decision on the 
Bayh question before a trial began. 
McNamar’s motion drew the immediate ire of Krahulik who argued that McNamar 
was violating the agreement that the parties had reached before the election board the 
previous evening when the commitment was made, in good faith, to work together to see if 
the court could hear the matter earlier than the date that the board had already set.  Krahulik 
argued that McNamar’s motion was intended to accomplish little but slow down the process 
in court.325  McNamar also moved to strike Bayh’s jury trial request, arguing that Bayh was 
not entitled to one.  Judge O’Connor set both of the board’s motions for legal argument the 
next day, March 4, at 8:30 a.m. 
Judge O’Connor also informed the parties that his court’s docket was filled with 
previously scheduled criminal proceedings.  The earliest the court’s calendar would allow 
for a “first choice” jury trial was Monday, March 14.  O’Connor gave the parties a “second 
choice” setting for Tuesday, March 8.  A “first choice” setting ensures that the trial will be 
heard that particular day.  A “second choice” setting holds out the potential of a trial date, 
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but makes the case subject to some other matter previously calendared.  In the alternative, a 
bench trial (a trial decided by judge and not jury) could be scheduled to begin on Friday, 
March 11.326  If the parties would accept a bench trial, Judge O’Connor expressed his 
willingness to hear testimony through Saturday, March 12 and Sunday, March 13, if need 
be.  Even with these accommodations, it appeared as if the board would win the race to 
judgment since it was scheduled to begin its hearing on Wednesday, March 9, and the 
earliest that the Shelby County Circuit Court would be sure to hear the case was either 
Friday, March 11, or Monday, March 14, depending on how the court ruled on the issue of 
whether Bayh was entitled to a jury trial.  McNamar confirmed that the board intended to go 
forward with its hearing because it was the earliest scheduled.  “The (trial) dates we have at 
this point would be after the board decides,” McNamar said.327 
 On Friday, March 4, the parties were back in the Shelby County Circuit Court where 
Judge O’Connor heard oral argument on Bayh’s request for a jury trial and on the board’s 
motion to dismiss.  After argument, O’Connor denied the board’s motion and asserted that 
the board should remain a defendant in the case.  “‘It’s more than abundantly clear there is a 
significant controversy’ over Bayh, O’Connor said.  ‘The people in this state certainly do 
have an interest in an early resolution.’”328  Judge O’Connor took Bayh’s jury trial request 
under advisement and indicated that he would issue a decision no later than Monday. 
 After the hearing, however, Krahulik offered to withdraw Bayh’s request for a jury 
trial if the board agreed in return to halt its investigation and postpone its March 9 hearing.  
                                                 
326 Record of Proceedings, Volume I, p. 159. 
327 Indianapolis News, March 3, 1988. 
 
328 Ibid., March 4, 1988. 
143 
Bayh explained that he authorized Krahulik’s offer because the election board was 
“dragging its feet” and he wanted to speed up the process.  “As much as I’ve wanted a jury 
trial, they’ve forced us to give up our request.”329  If required to choose, Bayh preferred 
letting a trial judge decide the issues rather than the election board.  Because the board was 
not scheduled to meet again until March 7, McNamar claimed that he was not authorized to 
respond to Bayh’s offer.  However, McNamar did express his own lack of enthusiasm for 
the offer.  “I don’t think they’re giving up anything,” because, in his opinion, the court 
would find that Bayh was not entitled to a jury trial anyway. 330 
 Meanwhile, in Indianapolis, at 10:00 a.m. in the office of the secretary of state, Bayh 
formally filed his declaration of candidacy for governor, along with all supporting petitions.  
Just before the close of business on the previous evening, O’Bannon had done the same 
thing.  As previously noted, O’Bannon’s filing for governor was encouraged by Bayh as a 
“precautionary measure.”  Bayh said, “if the effort to keep me off the ballot is successful, 
then I think Frank is the best candidate.”331 
 Later that afternoon, in the offices of Bayh’s attorneys, McNamar took Bayh’s 
deposition.332  McNamar interrogated Bayh for almost three hours.  Bayh was asked 
questions about his “residency intentions during 1983 and 1984.”333  He was also asked to 
comment on a variety of different documents, including his tax returns, driver’s licenses, 
personal correspondence, voter registration, professional memberships, and political 
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activity.  McNamar focused a series of questions as to why Bayh amended his 1983 Indiana 
state tax return just weeks before formally announcing his candidacy for governor.  
McNamar questioned Bayh about taking a deduction for moving expenses when he moved 
to Washington, D.C., to begin his work with the law firm of Hogan & Hartson in the 
summer of 1983.  McNamar also established that Bayh had driven a BMW while employed 
in Washington, D.C., and that he had never served in the military.  In spite of the 
deposition’s length, Bayh’s lawyers claimed that very little was uncovered that was not 
previously known.  “There was nothing surprising about it,” Krahulik said.  “It was 
everything you’ve heard about.”334 
 As another weekend approached, editorial writers and political columnists analyzed 
the previous week’s activities.  Several newspapers declared victory in their insistence that 
board deliberations be open and accessible.  Pat Traub of the Indianapolis Star reviewed the 
board’s intention to conduct closed deliberative conferences and pointedly declared, “it’s not 
the bureaucrats’ government.  It’s ours.”335  The Indianapolis News was even more direct, 
characterizing the state election board’s position as “nonsense.”  “How can election board 
members ask the people of Indiana to believe they acted openly and fairly if the board’s 
deliberations take place behind closed doors.”336  Just two days earlier, this same editorial 
page had strongly supported the state election board’s desire to press forward with its 
investigation of Bayh.  “An axiom of jurisprudence is that courts should defer to legislative 
and executive agencies unless there are clear and compelling reasons to do otherwise.  If 
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Bayh believed he was not given a fair hearing by the Election Board, or if the Election 
Board was dragging its heels or delaying a decision, obviously Bayh should have the 
recourse of going to the courts.  But that has not been shown to be the case.”337  Obviously, 
while the editorial board had supported the state election board’s jurisdiction to hear the 
case, when it became apparent how they intended to do that, their editorial tone changed 
appreciably. 
 Morris D. Wildey, the Indianapolis Star’s reporter on the economy, expressed his 
frustration with the time being spent on the residency challenge.  In his Sunday column 
entitled, “Campaign focus should be on jobs,” Wildey wrote that “until the nonsense about 
whether Secretary of State Evan Bayh meets the state’s residency requirements to run for 
governor is cleared up” there would not be a serious substantive discussion on the issue that 
was, in his opinion, the most critical to voters – jobs.  “For those who are interested in things 
such as who’s the best candidate, this whole mess seems ridiculous.”338  Also for the 
Indianapolis Star, Traub observed that Durnil’s own poll “shows that about half the state’s 
voters are familiar with the issue.  Not even some state politicians in office for eight years 
are known to the voters that well.”339 
 In addition, Mary Dieter, Indianapolis bureau chief for the Louisville Courier-
Journal, took the state election board to task for a series of decisions that, in her opinion, 
“smacks of a railroad job, carefully engineered and scripted to ensure that Bayh’s name 
doesn’t appear on the November ballot.”  Specifically, Dieter challenged McNamar’s self-
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proclaimed role of simply protecting “the integrity of the system” by pointing out that he 
had “pulled every legal maneuver he can find to stall a lawsuit filed to settle the matter, 
instead of promoting the election board’s efforts to decide it.”  Dieter also found 
disingenuous McNamar’s assertions that “until the board makes a decision and I am asked 
to defend that decision, I really don’t have a position on this.”340 
 WTHR television station in Indianapolis later reported that, immediately prior to the 
weekend of March 4 to 6, Bayh’s campaign called television and radio stations throughout 
Indiana and asked about the availability for purchase of advertising time in the coming week 
– a fact that would certainly be picked up by the Republicans.  According to WTHR, Bayh’s 
campaign planned to launch a comprehensive statewide media blitz against the Republicans 
if the state election board went forward with its hearing.341  Bayh was prepared to bypass the 
process controlled by the politicians and make his case directly to the people of Indiana by 
way of television.  Spending precious financial resources so early in a campaign was 
unorthodox and risky.  However, in the end, if Bayh were right about the partisan 
motivation of the election board, it might be the only remaining available option. 
On Monday, March 7, at 10:00 a.m., the election board convened its previously 
scheduled pre-hearing conference and Judge Puckett stunned the audience by announcing 
that, after consulting with Governor Orr the previous day, he was prepared to recommend 
that the board suspend its investigation and defer to the Shelby County Circuit Court.  
Puckett said his recommendation was based solely on the fact that Bayh’s offer to withdraw 
his request for a jury trial meant that Judge O’Connor would begin a bench trial on Friday, 
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March 11, only two days after the board had scheduled its hearing to begin.  “‘I think it’s 
chaotic’ for both the board and court to proceed on the Bayh matter ….  ‘It must look 
ridiculous to the people of this state.’”342  As a result, the board unanimously agreed to drop 
its March 9 hearing date. 
What, if any, effect that the threatened media blitz had on this decision is purely a 
matter of speculation.  What is clear, however, is that the Republicans appreciated how 
precarious their position was becoming in the eyes of the public.  Irrespective of the 
Republican motivation, the decision made by Judge Puckett (and apparently agreed to by 
Governor Orr) to let the court go first, was the single and fundamental turning point in the 
Bayh residency litigation.  Up to that time, the debate was over the appropriate forum.  Now 
the debate shifted to the merits of the case and in the forum that Bayh had wanted all along.  
Almost certain defeat had been avoided.  While the outcome was still unclear, Bayh’s legal 
and political fortunes were thereafter inalterably changed. 
 Governor Orr, who had prompted and insisted on the board’s action less than three 
weeks before, praised the board’s decision to defer to the court:  “I am pleased by the action 
the board took.  It is clear evidence that we made the right decision to have the state election 
board begin this process because it has forced an early resolution of this matter.”343  He 
insisted that the board’s decision was not motivated by the potential political backlash.  
“Those who suggest that Republicans were trying to cut their losses ‘would be wrong,’” the 
governor said.344 
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Bayh, too, was pleased by the board’s decision.  “We get a hearing before a judge 
we think is fair ….  So, a week from today it will all be decided.  I think that’s good news 
for everybody.”345  Bayh’s reference to the court’s timetable was based on Judge 
O’Connor’s assurance that a bench trial would be scheduled for Friday and, if necessary, 
Saturday, and that O’Connor would attempt to issue his ruling by Monday, March 14.  The 
election board did warn that, if Judge O’Connor were unable to adhere to that schedule, they 
would resume jurisdiction over the matter.  However, according to Puckett, once he heard 
that Judge O’Connor’s calendar would allow him to conduct a bench trial before the end of 
the week, he was convinced that it would be better for a ruling to come from the court. 
 Interestingly, at Governor Orr’s request, the board authorized McNamar to take an 
immediate appeal of Judge O’Connor’s decision, whatever it was, to the Indiana Supreme 
Court.  Orr said, “‘it would be in Evan Bayh’s best interest’ for an appeal to be made ‘on a 
totally impartial basis, a non-political basis.’”346  While indicating that he was not surprised 
by the governor’s call for an appeal, Bayh observed “I would never be one to call for an 
appeal of a court decision before I’ve read it.”347  By the end of the board’s twenty minute 
hearing, McNamar and Krahulik had agreed to cooperate in seeking an expedited appeal of 
O’Connor’s decision directly to the Supreme Court.348 
 Both sides spent the rest of the week preparing for trial.  McNamar repeated the 
assertion that, because the board had never adopted a formal position in the case, his role in 
court would be limited to testing Bayh’s evidence.  McNamar also argued that Bayh bore 
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the burden of proof in establishing that he met the constitutional residency requirements.  
“He made the allegation,” McNamar said.  “He should prove it.”349  The board was prepared 
to argue in the alternative.  First, McNamar asserted that a plain reading of the language of 
the Constitution required uninterrupted physical presence in the state for five years prior to 
the election.  Since it was uncontraverted that Bayh could not meet that standard, McNamar 
was confident that the court would find Bayh ineligible.  However, if the standard were 
Bayh’s intent as demonstrated by outward acts, McNamar intended to challenge the 
evidence presented by Bayh.  Taken as a whole, McNamar argued that the evidence with 
respect to intent would show Bayh to be at best non-committal about his residency and, at 
worst, not credible.  McNamar believed that the facts and the law would prove Bayh’s 
ineligibility. 
 Bayh accepted that he bore the burden of proving his case.  “I feel the facts are 
overwhelming,” Bayh said.  “It seems to me the burden of proof has been on me from the 
beginning.  I’ve never believed this was a legitimate issue.”350  Bayh’s lawyers planned to 
establish through evidence and testimony an unbroken expression of intent on Bayh’s part to 
maintain his residency in Indiana.  Krahulik explained that “Evan, as the son of an Indiana 
senator, was an Indiana resident ….  And he is (a resident) until he, as an adult, changes it.  
And he, as an adult, has never done that.”351  Krahulik argued that evidence of Bayh’s acts 
would show by a preponderance that his intent to remain a resident was manifest and 
believable.352 
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 Mutz did not comment in the week leading up to trial.  His campaign manager, 
Michael D. McDaniel, simply repeated that Bayh’s eligibility was “a question we believe 
should be heard.”353  Durnil remained adamant, however, that the trial would find Bayh 
ineligible because he did not keep his residency when he moved to Washington, D.C.  “It’s 
not what you say now, it’s what you did then,” he argued.  Durnil admitted, though, that he 
would be pleased just to have the matter resolved.  “The question wasn’t ‘if’ we have to go 
through this, Durnil said.  It was ‘when’ we have to go through this.”354 
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Chapter Six 
 
THE TRIAL 
 
“The Court hereby FINDS AND ADJUDGES that Plaintiff, Evan Bayh, is qualified, as 
prescribed by Article 5, Section 7, of the constitution of the State of Indiana, to be eligible to 
hold the office of Governor of the State of Indiana.” 
 
Opinion of the Shelby County Circuit Court 
March 14, 1988 
 
On Friday morning, March 11, in the Shelby County Circuit Court, the long-awaited 
residency trial of Evan Bayh began.  Bayh entered the courtroom at 8:30 a.m., accompanied 
by his spouse, Susan, and, upon seeing all the photographers, observed, “my goodness, an 
active day in Shelby County.”355  With Judge O’Connor presiding, a full gallery of 
spectators had gathered to observe the proceedings – over half of whom were members of 
the statewide press corps.  After an opening statement by Krahulik, McNamar moved to 
separate all witnesses so they could not listen to each other’s testimony.  The motion was 
granted. 
McNamar then offered to introduce into evidence 58 documents, ranging from 
Bayh’s tax returns to his personnel file from the law firm of Hogan & Hartson in 
Washington, D.C.  Bayh’s lawyers objected to the mass introduction of exhibits, arguing 
that they were entitled to preserve the opportunity to object to specific items on grounds of 
relevance or hearsay.  McNamar claimed that the introduction of all documents at the 
beginning of trial would expedite matters and would allow members of the press corps to 
follow the testimony more closely.   Judge O’Connor deferred ruling on the admissibility of 
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exhibits until such evidence was introduced through a particular witness.  With that, 
McNamar surrendered his opportunity to make an opening statement.  “Judge, the 
documents will speak for themselves, and speaking for the State Election Board, we’re 
ready to proceed.”356 
 Bayh called Sherry Perk Reider as his first witness.  Ms. Reider, who described 
herself as a lifelong friend of Bayh, testified that she and her husband, Jeff, spent a 
considerable amount of time with Bayh while he was clerking in Indianapolis for U.S. 
District Court Judge James Noland from March, 1982 through March, 1983.  While 
socializing together, Bayh discussed his personal goals and explained to the Reiders that, at 
the end of his clerkship, he wanted to obtain some “practical, hands-on kind of experience in 
a large Washington, D.C. firm.”  Bayh told the couple, however, that this would only be a 
temporary move and that he eventually wanted to return to Indiana “to pursue a career in 
public service.”  Reider also testified that, after having moved to Washington, Bayh came 
back to Indiana often in order to attend political functions.  At no point did Bayh ever 
indicate that he wanted to sever ties with Indiana.357 
Bayh next called Robert D. MacGill, a lawyer and friend who characterized himself 
as an active Republican.  MacGill testified that he had first met Bayh while they were 
undergraduates at Indiana University and that the two had enjoyed a close friendship since 
that time.  During Bayh’s clerkship with Judge Noland, Bayh and MacGill socialized often 
and, in the course of doing so, Bayh shared with MacGill some aspects of the decision-
making that Bayh was facing as he considered his next career steps. 
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MacGill explained that, during the fall of 1982 and early winter of 1983, Bayh 
expressed to MacGill his desire to one day practice law with his father.  In early 1981, after 
leaving the United States Senate, Bayh’s father had helped found the Indianapolis law firm, 
Bayh, Tabbert & Capehart.  Yet, Bayh told MacGill that, for a period of time, Bayh also 
wanted to avoid his father’s shadow and seek opportunities that would allow him to obtain 
“major litigation experience.”358  While Bayh considered joining several Indianapolis law 
firms, he ultimately accepted employment with Hogan & Hartson in Washington, because 
he felt that going to work for another firm in Indianapolis would put him in competition with 
his father.  Additionally, MacGill testified that, to his knowledge, Washington law firms 
viewed short-term employment commitments as “ordinary” and “the general rule, not the 
exception.”359  Eventually, Bayh wanted to return to Indiana, practice law with his father, 
and pursue a career in public life.  According to MacGill, that was why Bayh sat for the 
Indiana bar examination in February of 1983 in the final months of his clerkship with Judge 
Noland.  MacGill testified that Bayh returned to Indiana often while working in 
Washington.  He also recalled an occasion in April, 1984, when he had dinner with Bayh 
while in Washington on business.  Bayh expressed how anxious he was to return to 
Indiana.360 
 During his cross-examination of MacGill, McNamar established that, unknown to 
MacGill, Bayh had written a letter of acceptance of employment to several partners at 
Hogan & Hartson on October 15, 1982.  In that letter, Bayh expressed his interest in 
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establishing a “lengthy and mutually beneficial relationship” with that firm.361  This fact 
stood in contrast to MacGill’s belief that Bayh remained undecided about his future 
employment throughout 1982 and into the early winter of 1983.  McNamar also challenged 
the suggestion that Bayh wanted to avoid competing with his father by pointing out that 
Bayh’s father worked out of the Washington office of Bayh, Tabbert & Capehart.362 
 Bayh next called United States District Court Judge James E. Noland.  Judge Noland 
testified that, while Bayh clerked for him, the two often talked about Bayh’s career plans.  
Noland was aware that Bayh was contemplating offers from several Indianapolis firms, but 
that he had refrained from accepting them because of his desire to one day practice law with 
his father.  Based on his conversations with Bayh, Noland believed that Bayh’s acceptance 
of employment with Hogan & Hartson was “temporary” and “for a period of time before he 
returned to the Indianapolis office of Bayh, Tabbert & Capehart.”363 
During cross-examination, McNamar established that Judge Noland had been 
appointed to the federal bench in 1966 by President Lyndon Johnson, a Democrat, with 
support from Senator Birch Bayh.  In response to McNamar’s questions, Noland drew 
laughter from the crowd when he conceded, “I think I used to be a Democrat, yes.”  
McNamar also called to Judge Noland’s attention Bayh’s personal history statement, 
submitted to the court upon beginning his clerkship, on which Bayh listed his present 
address as “2919 Garfield Street, Washington, D.C.”  Noland responded that he understood 
that to be the address of Bayh’s father. 364 
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 Bayh next called Don Tabbert, a Republican, a former United States Attorney, and a 
founding partner of Bayh, Tabbert & Capehart.  Tabbert testified that, at the end of Bayh’s 
clerkship with Judge Noland, Tabbert recruited Bayh to join the firm.  Bayh told Tabbert 
that he wanted “to practice law with a firm that would give me the opportunity for 
substantial expertise, more than what Bayh, Tabbert & Capehart could offer at the time.”  
Bayh expressed to Tabbert that he intended to return to Indiana after a short period and join 
his father’s firm.  Bayh asked Tabbert if his decision to go to Washington would diminish 
his opportunity to return to practice there.  Tabbert assured him that “if you want to come 
back at anytime, if you go away and don’t practice with us immediately, you know there’s a 
place waiting for you.”365 
McNamar, during cross-examination, established that Tabbert, like MacGill, was 
unaware that Bayh had already accepted employment with Hogan & Hartson when Tabbert 
was recruiting him.  Tabbert also conceded that his law firm would not be interested in 
hiring associate lawyers for periods of short duration.  On re-direct, Tabbert acknowledged 
that he was unaware of how the hiring committees at Washington law firms viewed that 
issue.  On re-cross, Tabbert admitted that, although Bayh had expressed a desire to return to 
Indiana, he had not established any certain date of return.366 
 Former United States Congressman Paul G. Rogers was called as Bayh’s next 
witness.  Rogers was, at the time, a senior partner at Hogan & Hartson.  Rogers testified that 
employing associates for temporary periods of one or two years was “not unusual in our 
firm at all.”  Rogers observed, “we try to get outstanding young lawyers … we think they’re 
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competent when they come in ….  And so that association of doing business with wherever 
they may go, with that law firm, that association, we think, is good for the future of our firm, 
and it’s proved to be so.”  Rogers recalled that Bayh had clerked at Hogan & Hartson during 
a summer while he was still in law school.  After Bayh’s clerkship with Judge Noland, 
Rogers encouraged him to “come up here for a little while, and then you’ll get this 
experience, and then you can go on and run for office.”  Rogers also remembered Bayh 
returning to Indiana often during the time he was employed in Washington.367 
 Rogers’ testimony was reinforced by Bayh’s next witness, Daniel Cohen, who was 
also an associate lawyer at Hogan & Hartson during Bayh’s tenure there.  In fact, Cohen’s 
office was located right next door to Bayh’s and the two talked frequently about their 
futures.  Cohen testified it was clear from conversations they shared that Bayh “had no 
intention of staying in Washington very long, and had every intention of moving back to 
Indiana and running for, either running for office or doing something in public service.”368   
Cohen also reiterated Rogers’ previous testimony that turnover among associates at Hogan 
& Hartson was very high.  Several associates, including Cohen himself, worked with the 
firm for a short while and then returned to their homes to begin new chapters in their 
careers. 
 Bayh next called Judge Robert H. Staton of the Indiana Court of Appeals, who 
testified that he had arranged a private swearing-in ceremony for Bayh in the chambers of 
the Indiana Supreme Court on August 26, 1983, upon Bayh’s successful completion of the 
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Indiana bar examination.369  Judge Staton had initiated the arrangements when he found out 
that Bayh had missed the regular admissions ceremony.  Staton said that, in conversations 
the two shared, Bayh made clear that his work in Washington was temporary and that he 
intended to return to Indiana to practice law. 
Staton also testified that he had signed Bayh’s Affidavit of Intent to Practice in 
Support of Application for Admission, upon which Bayh had affirmed under oath that he 
promised “within two years of the date of my application, to engage actively in the practice 
of law in the State of Indiana.”370  On cross-examination, McNamar established that, at the 
time he signed Bayh’s affidavit, Staton was aware that Bayh was living and working in 
Washington, D.C.  McNamar later argued that such affidavits are unnecessary unless the 
applicant “is not a bona fide resident of Indiana.”371  According to McNamar, the fact that 
Bayh signed this “non-resident affidavit” clearly established that Bayh conceded he was not 
a resident of the state, but merely intended to return within two years.372  At the close of 
Staton’s testimony, Judge O’Connor adjourned for lunch and informed the parties that 
testimony would resume at 1:15 p.m. that afternoon. 
 In the afternoon, Bayh took the witness stand to testify in his own behalf.  Krahulik 
began his questioning of Bayh by outlining Bayh’s personal history.  Bayh testified that he 
was born in Terre Haute and had always considered his family’s farm to be his residence 
during his father’s years in the United States Senate.  For that reason, in 1974, Bayh 
registered to vote and registered for the Selective Service in Vigo County.  Bayh then 
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attended Indiana University as an undergraduate and paid in-state tuition.  He decided to 
pursue his law studies at the University of Virginia where he paid out-of-state tuition.  While 
in law school, during one summer, he clerked at Hogan & Hartson and became acquainted 
with the lawyers there.  Upon his graduation from law school in January, 1982, he sat for the 
Washington, D.C. bar examination.  Bayh explained that he wanted to “keep the option open 
of working for Hogan & Hartson, but also, from my father’s experience, I saw that a career 
in public service … that it was important to be admitted to the D.C. bar and to, uh, be 
familiar with administrative law there ….”373 
 Bayh then responded to questions about his clerkship with Judge Noland from 
March 1982 to March 1983.  When asked by Krahulik why he had not changed the 
Washington D.C., license plates on his car during this time, Bayh responded, “frankly, it 
never occurred to me.”  Bayh explained that, while clerking with Judge Noland, he 
interviewed with three Indianapolis law firms for employment but decided on accepting 
Hogan & Hartson’s offer for a variety of reasons.  First, he was interested in the high quality 
of legal experience that Hogan & Hartson would afford him.  Secondly, he wanted to be 
independent from his father.  Finally, he chose to go to Washington because he did not want 
to directly compete with his father’s law firm.  “I wanted to practice at a law firm where it 
didn’t matter my last name was Bayh.  My last name may [as] well have been Smith or 
Jones.”374 
 Bayh asserted that his employment with Hogan & Hartson was intended to be 
temporary in duration although he had written to lawyers expressing his interest in 
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establishing a “lengthy and mutually beneficial relationship.”  Bayh explained that he fully 
intended to maintain a good relationship with the members of that law firm for the duration 
of his legal career irrespective of how long he remained in their employ.  “I consider that I 
have had and still have a long and mutually beneficial relationship with men like Paul 
Rogers and friends of mine like Dan Cohen and some of the others.  As a matter of fact, 
after I left Hogan & Hartson, two members of that law firm served as groomsmen in my 
wedding and I still talk on the phone with some members of the firm and consider that many 
of them are still good friends of mine.”375 
 Bayh testified that, even after his October 15, 1982 letter of acceptance to Hogan & 
Hartson, he applied on November 8, 1982, to take the Indiana bar examination and sat for 
the examination in February of 1983.  At the end of his clerkship with Judge Noland, Bayh 
traveled extensively for four months and then went to Washington to begin work.  He never 
intended to make Washington his home.376 
As further evidence of this intent, Bayh recalled the return trips he made to Indiana 
while working for Hogan & Hartson.  In August 1983, he was sworn in as a member of the 
Indiana bar.  On that same trip, he attended the Indiana Democratic Editorial Association’s 
(“IDEA”) annual meeting in French Lick.  In April 1984, he attended the Indiana 
Democratic Party’s annual dinner in Indianapolis.  In June 1984, he returned for the Indiana 
Democratic Party’s State Convention.  In August of 1984, he once again returned to the 
IDEA Convention in French Lick.  And finally, in October 1984, he took a leave of absence 
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from Hogan & Hartson and came back to Indiana for several weeks to campaign on behalf 
of the statewide Democratic ticket. 
 While he worked in Washington, D.C., Bayh continuously subscribed to the 
Indianapolis Star to keep abreast of what was happening in Indiana, he paid dues to join the 
Indiana State Bar Association, and he paid the required Indiana Supreme Court disciplinary 
fee.  In May 1984, Bayh cast an absentee ballot in the Indiana primary.  That same month, 
Bayh was approached by Bill Moreau, then a representative of the campaign of Democratic 
gubernatorial nominee Wayne Townsend, and was asked if he would join the statewide 
ticket as the Democratic nominee for attorney general.  Bayh considered the offer, but, in the 
end, he declined.  He recalled observing that “in a year or two when I have married, settled 
and been tempered further – both personally and professionally – by life’s experience, then 
with an open heart and a clear conscience the answer may be yes.  But not today.”377 
 Bayh acknowledged that in both 1983 and 1984, he filed Indiana state income tax 
returns as a “part-year resident.”  Specifically, in 1983, Bayh paid Indiana state income tax 
on income derived from his employment with Judge Noland.  In 1984, Bayh paid state tax 
on income earned as an associate lawyer with Bayh, Tabbert & Capehart during the final 
month of that year.  He also filed income tax returns in the District of Columbia for 1983 
and 1984 reporting the income he earned from Hogan & Hartson. 
Bayh explained that he did all of this because that was what he thought he was 
supposed to do.  “It is my understanding that the appropriate way to handle a situation like 
this was to take the income that you earned in one jurisdiction and pay tax on that in that 
jurisdiction and take the income you earned in the second jurisdiction and pay income tax on 
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that income in the other jurisdiction.  And that the appropriate way to handle that was to get 
a part-year resident form that allowed for the bifurcated reporting of income and to handle it 
that way.”378  In neither year did Bayh intend the “part-year resident” declaration on his tax 
forms to be “an expression of intent to change domicile.”379  While the filing of “part-year 
resident” state income tax returns by Bayh garnered the lion’s share of attention, the fact that 
he even filed state tax returns during the years in question distinguished him from some of 
the other individuals profiled in analogous “residency” cases.  Neither Kit Bond in Missouri 
nor Pug Ravenel in South Carolina filed any state income tax returns at all during the 
durational residency period at issue in their cases.  Bond clearly generated taxable income 
within Missouri during the years when he was living outside the state.  Although he failed to 
file any state tax returns for any of those years, the court still found him eligible. 
 On cross-examination, McNamar attacked Bayh’s assertion that he had always 
considered Indiana his home.  Bayh admitted that he had never owned real estate in Indiana 
prior to June 1985, that he had not possessed an Indiana’s driver’s license until March 1986, 
and that he did not obtain Indiana license plates for any vehicles he owned until 1986. 380  
And while Bayh had entered into several leases for various apartments in and around the 
Washington, D.C., area over the years, Bayh had never even leased real estate in Indiana.  
McNamar argued that, in his application to take the bar examination, Bayh applied as a 
“non-resident” because he requested the application be sent to Marion County, the county 
where he intended to practice, rather than Vigo County, the county where he claimed a 
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voting residence.  According to McNamar, if the county where you send the application is 
not the county of your claimed voting residence, then you are conclusively making 
application as a “non-resident.”381 
McNamar focused his remaining cross-examination on several documents – Bayh’s 
acceptance letter of October 15, 1982, to Hogan & Hartson wherein he referred to his 
interest in establishing a “lengthy and mutually beneficial relationship” and his income tax 
returns.  Besides identifying himself as a “part-year resident” for the payment of 1983 and 
1984 Indiana state income tax, Bayh admitted mailing his 1983 federal income tax return to 
the Internal Revenue Service’s processing center in Philadelphia.  McNamar argued that this 
was a legally significant point. Income tax returns for residents of Washington, D.C., were 
sent to Philadelphia.  Indiana “residents” sent their federal income tax returns to a different 
IRS processing center.382  Bayh also acknowledged that, in 1983, he took a deduction on his 
federal income tax return for the cost of moving to Washington, “something that is 
allowable only if a move is considered permanent.”383  Under federal tax law, one is not 
eligible for the moving expense deduction if the move is only temporary.  McNamar also 
later pointed out that Bayh should not have taken the deduction under any circumstance 
because it is not allowed when one moves out of Indiana.384  McNamar also questioned 
Bayh about the several documents listing Washington as his “current” or “present” address.  
After two and one half hours on the witness stand, Bayh was finally excused.  Krahulik 
declared that Bayh would rest his case. 
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 When asked by the court to proceed with the case on behalf of the state election 
board, McNamar offered only a statement.  He asked the court to recognize the board’s role 
as the administrative agency of state government charged with the responsibility of 
determining the validity of declarations of candidacy, that Governor Orr had asked the board 
to investigate Bayh’s declaration, and that the board had deferred its jurisdiction to the court.  
McNamar then declared, to the extent that those matters were stipulated to, “the documents 
that have been presented into evidence in the Plaintiff’s case in chief will constitute the 
Defendant’s case in chief, and at this time, your Honor, we rest.”385  The court informed the 
parties that it would take the matter under advisement.  After that, court was adjourned. 
 The trial itself had lasted only one day.  Bayh presented a total of eight witnesses, 
including himself.  McNamar, on behalf of the state election board, offered no witnesses and 
no additional testimony beyond those documents entered into evidence through Bayh’s 
witnesses.  At the conclusion of the trial, Bayh noted the absence of evidence presented on 
behalf of the state election board and commented, “I thought that’s about all there was to 
their case from the beginning.”386  McNamar disagreed.  “The smoking gun was the 
documents from Hogan & Hartson in Washington.  They clearly show his intentions” – a 
reference to the letters from Bayh declaring his interest in a lengthy and mutually beneficial 
relationship.387  Furthermore, McNamar pointed to MacGill and Tabbert’s admissions that 
Bayh had led them to believe that he had not made up his mind regarding future 
employment when, in fact, he had already accepted employment.  “Intention is too slippery 
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an item.  One must look to the acts of the individual.”388  For his part, Judge O’Connor left 
the courthouse late that Friday afternoon and informed lingering reporters, “I’ll be here the 
better part of the weekend.”389 
 At 9:15 a.m. on the morning of Monday, March 14, Judge O’Connor issued his 
opinion, declaring that Evan Bayh “meets all constitutional qualifications to hold the office 
of governor of the State of Indiana as prescribed by Article 5, Section 7, of the Indiana 
Constitution.”390  O’Connor’s opinion, ten pages in length, included 35 individual findings 
of fact that he had adduced from the testimony presented the previous Friday.  Specifically, 
O’Connor made findings regarding Bayh’s biographical history from birth to present day 
and reiterated the facts concerning Bayh’s actions which made manifest his intent, as well as 
testimony presented by other witnesses regarding conversations with Bayh.  The court’s 
findings of fact also acknowledged and incorporated evidence emphasized by and relied on 
by McNamar, such as Bayh’s October 15, 1982, letter of acceptance of employment with 
Hogan & Hartson, Bayh’s 1983 and 1984 Indiana “non-resident” tax returns, and Bayh’s 
“moving deduction” for expenses associated with his move to Washington in 1983. 
 The court also made 23 separate conclusions of law which served as the basis for its 
ultimate judgment.  The court began by recognizing “domicile” as the threshold legal 
principle presented by the case.  The court acknowledged that the term “domicile” was not 
used in the Indiana constitution.  However, it found that the term “resident,” as used in 
Article 5, Section 7, should be considered as “requiring the same degree of permanent 
                                                 
388 Louisville Courier-Journal, March 12, 1988. 
389 Indianapolis News, March 12, 1988. 
390 Record of Proceedings, Volume II, p. 312. 
 
165 
attachment to the State as is usually recognized in the definition of the word ‘domicile.’”391  
In fact, the court concluded that the two terms could be used interchangeably.  In support of 
this conclusion, the court cited the language and rationale contained in the Indiana Supreme 
Court’s decision in the Evrard case. 
 The court then defined domicile to mean that place “where a person has his true, 
fixed, permanent home and principal establishment, and to which place he has, whenever he 
is absent, the intention of returning.”392  Furthermore, in order to change one’s domicile a 
person must affirmatively abandon it, acquire a new residence in another place and go there 
with the intent to remain and not return to his/her old domicile.  Judge O’Connor then 
described certain assumptions in law about “domicile”:  (1) domicile is acquired at birth, (2) 
an unemancipated minor’s domicile is that of his/her parents, (3) domicile is not lost if you 
are away on business of the state, and (4) domicile is not lost if, as a student, you go away to 
school.  Thus, Indiana was Bayh’s domicile by virtue of birth and was not lost simply 
because he grew up in Washington, D.C., while his father served in the United States Senate 
nor was it lost by his attending law school at the University of Virginia. 
 After emancipation, Bayh’s domicile would, therefore, be determined by Bayh’s 
intent, manifest by his acts and conduct.  That is to say, his conduct would determine 
whether he abandoned his domicile and acquired a new one in a new place.  O’Connor then 
held that “personal presence from one’s place of domicile is insufficient to change one’s 
domicile.”  Therefore, O’Connor rejected the “physical presence” test.  Rather, the court 
ruled that “one must move to another place with the intent to make it his home and without 
                                                 
391 Ibid., Volume II, p. 310. 
392 Ibid. 
166 
the intention of returning to this home as such.”  The court couched its conclusion in 
negative, not affirmative terms.  The judge said he was unable to conclude “that Plaintiff 
formed the unequivocal intent to abandon his Vigo County, Indiana, domicile and create a 
new domicile in the District of Columbia with the intent to remain thereafter and not to 
return to his Indiana domicile.”393 
 The decision ensured that Bayh’s name would at least appear on the ballot in the 
Democratic Party’s primary for governor on May 3, because the decision had been issued in 
advance of the ballot printing deadline imposed by Indiana law.  Upon hearing the news of 
Judge O’Connor’s decision, Bayh joked that “it looks like I am not going to have to apply 
for my green card after all.”394  On a more serious note, Bayh expressed his hope that “we 
can now deal with the issues (of the governor’s race) and put these peripheral matters behind 
us.”395  Bayh was hopeful that he would not have to endure the additional process of appeal. 
Interestingly, Bayh’s desire in that regard was beginning to meet with little 
opposition from the Mutz campaign.  To that point, Mutz had tried to remain a 
“dispassionate observer” as the residency issues had unfolded.  Now, however, it was 
unequivocally clear to the Mutz campaign that his gubernatorial effort was being side-
tracked by all the attention paid to Bayh and the residency challenge.  Mutz declared, “let’s 
get on with the campaign ….  This should not influence the selection of the person to fill the 
single most important governmental post in the state of Indiana.”  As for an appeal of the 
decision, Mutz was ambivalent.  “I don’t know whether it should be appealed or not,” he 
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said.  “There may have been a very good legal reason for doing so, but I’m not sure it’s the 
best thing to do politically.”396  The Indianapolis Star reported that the Mutz campaign had 
been increasingly “frustrated by the media attention Bayh and the residency question have 
received” and that they had been “mired in political quicksand since the residency issue 
surfaced.”  Many Republicans now feared that the residency challenge had become a 
“public relations nightmare” which had eviscerated Mutz’s desire to make the campaign 
about Bayh’s lack of experience.397 
 Some of Mutz’s Republican colleagues did not share his ambivalence.  Upon 
learning of Judge O’Connor’s decision, Governor Orr’s executive assistant, John Hammond, 
commented for the governor:  “most likely there’ll be an appeal to the Indiana Supreme 
Court by the State Election Board which reserved the right to do so.  And, certainly 
Governor Orr is in agreement with that.”398 
Durnil’s public reaction was uncharacteristic.  He expressed satisfaction that the 
process was moving forward.  “Our goal all along is to get this thing resolved as early as we 
can.”  Durnil did admit that, “I would have preferred it go the other way ….  There’s enough 
fact in there it can go either way.”399  This, of course, was a dramatic turnabout for Durnil 
who had insisted all along that Bayh had forfeited his residency when he moved to 
Washington.  When asked whether furthering the residency challenge was hurting 
Republican chances in the fall, Durnil refuted the suggestion.  “A lot of people have been 
getting queasy in the last couple of months, saying that we’re doing nothing but helping 
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build [Bayh’s] name recognition,” Durnil said.  “But he already had that.  None of this has 
improved his name recognition or his standing in any way.”400 
Democratic State Chair Livengood disagreed and contended that the entire affair had 
created enormous voter backlash.  “It’s not often that Republicans walk up to the 
Democratic state chairman and say, ‘I’m going to vote for a Democrat because of this.’  And 
I’ve had that happen to me.”  Livengood predicted that the residency issue would remain on 
the minds of voters throughout the rest of the campaign.401 
 Predictably, the attorneys for the parties offered contradictory assessments of Judge 
O’Connor’s decision.  Krahulik argued that the decision was well-reasoned and should end 
the controversy because “when you have the facts and you have the law, usually you 
win.”402  McNamar argued that the decision was flawed because it had failed to adequately 
address the requirement that one must be physically present to support a finding of 
residency.  Although he was unable to cite any Indiana authority for the proposition, 
McNamar steadfastly maintained that a standard of physical presence was intended by the 
constitutional authors.  “The bottom line of his decision, in my opinion, is we no longer 
have a residency requirement.”403  Finally, McNamar argued that Judge O’Connor had 
placed too much reliance on Bayh’s own testimony to the exclusion of other evidence, 
which, McNamar suggested, showed that Bayh’s intent was not so clear.404 
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McNamar pledged to immediately appeal the Shelby County Circuit Court decision.  
Krahulik expressed Bayh’s desire to fully cooperate in expediting an appeal.  While there 
was no expectation that the Indiana Supreme Court would be able to rule before the printing 
of primary ballots, McNamar hoped that an appellate decision could be announced before 
the primary so that “Democrats will not waste their votes.”405 
In the meantime, Bayh was taking full political advantage of the unfolding 
circumstances, including incorporating the residency challenge as a fundraising tool.  
Bayh’s campaign had previously mailed fundraising re-solicitations to Bayh donors on an 
average of once every six weeks.  Once the residency litigation began, that schedule was 
accelerated.  From February on, every Bayh fundraising re-solicitation emphasized the 
lengths to which the Republicans were going to deny Bayh the opportunity to run.  In fact, 
while the legal proceeding was pending, financial support to help fight the Republican 
challenge became the only message.  On the very same day that Judge O’Connor issued his 
decision, Bayh donors received “Urgent Cables” announcing that “we just won a critical 
victory.”  The cablegram warned, though, that “while our campaign has been forced to wage 
legal battles, John Mutz has been busy stockpiling a huge campaign war chest.”406  The 
response was significant.  Nearly $15,000 in small dollar contributions were returned in the 
first few days alone.  In comparison, a similar re-solicitation mailed out to coincide with 
Bayh’s November 1987 announcement had returned only $6,200 in the same amount of 
time.  Bayh was experiencing a threefold increase in financial support.407 
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Bayh’s campaign also used phone banks to reach out to previously uncommitted 
potential donors asking them to join with Bayh in fighting the Republican effort to take 
away the right of voters to choose their next governor.  Throughout March and April, 
Bayh’s campaign “prospected” thousands of voters through telemarketing trying to persuade 
the voters to support Bayh’s candidacy and help defray the costs associated with the legal 
battle by contributing to the campaign.408 
The residency challenge was affording Bayh an unprecedented amount of public 
exposure.  It had dominated the political discussion surrounding the governor’s race to the 
exclusion of, arguably, more pertinent issues.  In addition, it was compromising John Mutz’s 
ability to argue that Evan Bayh was not experienced enough to serve as governor and, at the 
same time, giving a significant boost to the Bayh fundraising machine.  The Mutz campaign 
realized painfully that all of this was going to continue during the process of appeal.  A 
Republican trial court judge had ruled Bayh eligible after having reviewed all the evidence 
that the Republican Party could accumulate.  Now the case would return to a Supreme Court 
made up of four Republicans and one Democrat.  The Indiana high court was Durnil’s and 
the Republican Party’s last hope if they were to avoid Evan Bayh’s presence on the 
November 1988 general election ballot. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
THE SECOND APPEAL 
 
“The people of Indiana have been well served because both the Governor and the Secretary 
of State sought a prompt resolution of the issue of Bayh’s eligibility.” 
 
Opinion of the Indiana Supreme Court 
April 28, 1988 
 
On March 18, four days after Judge O’Connor’s decision, the state election board 
initiated an appeal by filing a motion to correct errors, which allows a trial court to 
reconsider its decision.  In most instances, these motions are routinely denied and are 
viewed as the required procedural step before a case can be transferred to the appellate 
court.  Nothing was routine in the Bayh residency case, however.  In the motion to correct 
errors, McNamar alleged that “newly discovered and material evidence has been discovered 
since the trial, namely Plaintiff’s application for a passport in which Plaintiff declares that 
his permanent residence is in Washington, D.C.”409  In February 1983, before beginning 
several months of travel abroad, Bayh made application for the issuance of a new passport, 
upon which he listed Indianapolis as his “mailing address” and 2919 Garfield Street in 
Washington, D.C., as his “permanent address.”  In addition, Bayh acknowledged on the 
application that he had lost his previous passport as a result of “moving from one residence 
to another.”410  The court took the motion to correct errors under advisement and permitted 
Bayh’s lawyers until March 22 to file a statement in opposition. 
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Even the passport disclosure created controversy.  Apparently, McNamar had used a 
subpoena issued by the Shelby County Clerk to obtain a copy of the passport application 
from the United States Department of State.  According to law, however, only court-ordered 
subpoenas can be honored by the State Department.  In spite of these federal privacy 
protections, McNamar somehow obtained the document and, in so doing, caused 
embarrassment to the State Department.  While this fumble’s value was marginal, it gave 
Bayh the opportunity to renew his themes about the process.  “I think the important thing 
here is the whole process is political ….  They’re trying to take this election away from the 
voters.” 
 While the parties were satisfying the legal prerequisites for appeal, reaction to the 
Shelby County Circuit Court’s decision emerged in the press.  Several editorial pages 
throughout the state questioned the wisdom of the decision to appeal the trial court decision.  
The Gary Post-Tribune characterized “continuing the hassle” over the Bayh residency issue 
as “foolish.”  “What the Republican leaders are doing is proclaiming that they see Bayh as a 
candidate to be feared.  The more they yell, the worse they look.”411  The Ball State Daily 
News in Muncie observed that the Republicans were “giving Bayh several opportunities for 
free publicity” and that, ultimately, “the election should be about voting for the guy with the 
best credentials and ideas, not for the team that tries to eliminate the opponent.”412  The 
Lafayette Journal and Courier suggested that the Republicans who wanted to appeal should 
“shut up, and get on with the campaign.”  “Politically, the Republicans have been fools all 
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along to be that picky about Evan Bayh’s Hoosier pedigree.  And they will be bigger fools 
to belabor and prolong that pickiness by appeal.”413 
Indianapolis News columnists, Richard K. Shull and Ed Ziegner, also questioned the 
Republican strategy.  Shull’s column, which reflected on the residency trial and its outcome, 
was entitled “If this was a victory, who needs a defeat?”414 Ziegner observed that Bayh had 
become Durnil’s “obsession.”  “The ceaseless attacks on Bayh strongly remind one of the 
old story about the man who kept hitting himself over the head with a hammer ‘because it 
feels so good when I stop.’”415  The Shelbyville News, not surprisingly, supported the “good 
sense, non-political decision” of one of its own – Shelby Circuit Court Judge O’Connor.  
The editorial writer went on to say, “perhaps the new Republican strategy is to keep the 
voters confused as long as possible, believing that their smoke-screen will tarnish the Bayh 
charisma enough to keep some Democrats and cross-over Republicans at home on election 
day ….  The issue – if there ever was a legitimate issue in the first place – has been resolved.  
The voters should pick the next governor, not the courts.”416 
 In his weekend political column, Jack Colwell of the South Bend Tribune asked 
rhetorically, if a Shelby County judge who happens to be a Republican ruled in Bayh’s 
favor, why then are the Republicans pursuing an appeal?  Colwell answered his own 
question with the observation:  “Bayh does seem to be coming out ahead in this.  But there 
still is a chance, although perhaps now slim, that the five justices on the Supreme Court, four 
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of whom happen to be Republicans, will overturn the lower court decision and throw Bayh 
out of the race.”417 
 The complaints expressed by editorial writers and political columnists were shared 
by Republican activists, including the Mutz campaign staffers.  The rift between those in 
support of Durnil’s attacks and those who feared a backlash against Mutz was widening and 
becoming increasingly open.  Mutz publicly expressed displeasure that he had not been 
consulted when the decision was made to proceed with an appeal and admitted his 
frustration that his campaign was being “sidetracked” by the residency case and all of the 
public attention that it was affording Bayh.  While Mutz acknowledged that Orr had 
previously indicated an appeal would be taken regardless of the trial court outcome, Mutz 
was upset that more reflection had not been given once the Shelby County court decision 
was finally issued.  “I heard what the governor said ….  But it’s still my assumption those 
decisions were made one-by-one.”  Durnil countered that there really was no choice but to 
pursue an appeal, observing that “if it doesn’t go through the appeal process, we’ll still be 
talking about it all summer.” 
Bayh expressed confusion about the public disagreement between Mutz, Durnil, and 
Orr.  “He (Mutz) should have more control over the actions of one of his main supporters – 
the man who started all this – and his partner in government.”418  Colwell of the South Bend 
Tribune reported that “Lt. Gov. John Mutz, who will be the Republican nominee for 
governor, says he asked Gov. Bob Orr not to pursue the appeal.  ‘I don’t think it’s very good 
politics,’ Mutz says of all the preoccupation with the Bayh residency issue.  But Mutz says 
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he understands the governor’s argument that the issue ought to be resolved at the state’s 
highest court level.  And you can bet that Mutz would shed no tears over a decision that 
knocked out his most formidable foe for governor.”419 
 Irrespective of growing public sentiment about the residency challenge, Durnil 
maintained that there were other tangible political benefits to pursuing the litigation.  Durnil 
seemed convinced that facts uncovered during the trial left Bayh “wide open” to attack.  
Durnil pointed to his moving deduction as evidence that Bayh had “cheated” on his taxes.  
Durnil also argued that Bayh’s admissions that he had never held a full-time job longer than 
16 months and the fact that he drove a German-made BMW until he became a candidate for 
political office would prove embarrassing.420  According to Durnil, “it’s his whole life living 
off his last name, his whole silver-spooned, elitist attitude about everything … that 
eventually will catch up with him ….  You put the whole story together with some of the 
information that came out of the trial, and you’ve got a whole package.”421  Mutz, however, 
openly sparred with Durnil over whether any of the information was particularly useful and 
expressed his desire to focus on other issues.  “‘I’m sick and tired of having an issue like this 
overshadow all the important issues in this state,’ Mutz said.  ‘I say, on with the campaign.  
We need to get this past us so we can get on with the issues of importance.’”422   
When asked if the residency challenge caused Republicans to appear arrogant and 
out-of-touch, Durnil shot back:  “The most arrogant thing is some elitist [Bayh] from St. 
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Alban’s who doesn’t think the Constitution applies to him.”423  Durnil also repeated that the 
publicity for Bayh generated by the residency challenge was short-lived and geographically 
concentrated.  He denied that it had been pursued because Bayh was the leader in 
contemporaneous public opinion polls. 
 On March 28, Judge O’Connor denied the state election board’s motion to correct 
errors.  O’Connor also denied McNamar’s motion to have the court consider Bayh’s 
passport application as “newly-discovered” evidence.  O’Connor found that the evidence 
was “cumulative” and that “such evidence would probably not produce a different result 
upon retrial.”424  O’Connor also ordered the clerk of the Shelby County Circuit Court to 
immediately prepare a transcript of the proceeding so that an expedited appeal could be 
taken.  In spite of Mutz’s opposition, Orr spokeswoman Dollyne Pettingill announced that, 
“the governor’s position has not changed.  He is interested in a final determination, one that 
cannot be challenged.  And that must come from the state’s highest court.”425 
In normal circumstances, cases from a trial court are appealed first to the Indiana 
Court of Appeals and, after a decision by that court, to the Indiana Supreme Court.  The 
Indiana Supreme Court has a rule, however, under which it will allow a case to bypass that 
established procedure if the matter involves a question of substantial public importance.426  
McNamar’s colleague, Michael R. Franceschini, asserted that the necessary appeal 
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documents could be prepared and filed for the Supreme Court’s consideration within three 
weeks. 
 While the parties to the lawsuit prepared for their final skirmish before the Indiana 
Supreme Court, the political parties continued to posture for partisan advantage.  Durnil and 
Livengood had a joint appearance before the Kiwanis Club of Indianapolis on Friday, March 
18.  Livengood created a stir by asserting that because the Republican Party was responsible 
for bringing the residency challenge, they, rather than Hoosier taxpayers, ought to be 
bearing the costs associated with it.  By that point, over $8,000 in public funds had been 
spent pursuing the litigation.  McNamar’s special representation of the election board had 
cost about $4,000.  In addition, another $4,000 was necessary to pay the special chairman of 
the election board, Judge Puckett.  Livengood argued that the issue was a “partisan” creation 
by those who supported Mutz’s campaign for governor.  Thus, the partisans who were 
responsible for it ought to pay for it.427 
Durnil responded to Livengood by saying the Bayh case was “totally a government 
action.”  Alternatively, Durnil argued that Bayh should pay the costs since he was the one 
who had initiated the declaratory judgment action in the Marion County Superior Court.  
According to Durnil, the amount of money involved was unimportant.  “That’s a small 
amount of money,” he said.  “It doesn’t make a difference.”428  The Mutz campaign also 
responded.  McDaniel said of Livengood, “He’s a desperate guy.  Everybody knows that if 
Evan Bayh would gain control of his party, John Livengood would probably be one of the 
first to go.  He’s not had a good record as a county chairman and he’s not had a good record 
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as a state chairman.”429  Livengood countered:  “Republicans say the matter must be 
dragged out, must be appealed ….  Maybe they’d feel differently if they had to pay for the 
appeal themselves.”430 
 On Tuesday, April 5, the transcript of the proceedings before Judge O’Connor was 
filed in the office of the joint clerk for the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.  McNamar 
requested that the case be allowed to bypass the Indiana Court of Appeals and be sent 
directly to the Indiana Supreme Court.  Karl Mulvaney, the Supreme Court’s administrator, 
indicated that the Supreme Court would decide by the end of the week whether to transfer 
the case to it from the Court of Appeals.431 
On that same day, WTHR-TV of Indianapolis released the results of a statewide 
survey that it had conducted from March 5 through March 27 showing that Bayh had 
increased his lead over Mutz among likely voters:  the gap now stood at 45.6 percent to 28 
percent.432  At a statewide gathering of local Republican Party officials, attendees knew 
intuitively that the intense coverage given to Bayh during the residency challenge had made 
a difference.  Ralph Morgan of Washington, Indiana, said, “they (the Democrats) have got a 
million dollars of free publicity.”  Karen E. Mitchell of Seymour countered, “I think we 
need to forget the free publicity and start concentrating on [Bayh’s] experience.”  Betty 
Morgan, also of Washington, Indiana, agreed:  “I think it should be proven that he is eligible 
… then, I think we should put it all behind us and go forward.”433  While most Republican 
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leaders had been supportive of the challenge initially, they all wanted it to end so as not to 
obscure the more important issues of the campaign. 
 On Thursday, April 7, the Supreme Court granted the state election board’s petition 
for an immediate transfer of the appeal to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals.  
The Supreme Court also issued an accelerated briefing schedule.  Mulvaney suggested that 
if briefs were submitted by April 15, there existed a “reasonable chance” that the Supreme 
Court would be able to render a decision in advance of the May 3 primary.434  It was also 
announced that state election officials were printing primary ballots which included Bayh’s 
name.  The Supreme Court set the matter for oral argument to be conducted on Monday, 
April 25, at 10:30 a.m.  Each side was granted thirty minutes to present its case and orally 
supplement the written arguments that would be filed. 
On Monday, April 11, the state election board submitted its brief.435  In it, McNamar 
reiterated the board’s position that the history surrounding the drafting of the Indiana 
constitution supported the interpretation that constitutional authors meant physical presence 
when they referred to “residence.”  In the alternative, even if continuous physical presence 
were not the standard, McNamar argued that Bayh had failed to satisfy his burden of 
showing that he possessed the requisite intent to maintain his residency in Indiana.  
McNamar pointed to Bayh’s application for a passport (which McNamar also requested the 
Supreme Court to consider) as evidence that Bayh’s actions were indicative of an intent to 
“reside” in Washington, D.C., at least for some portion of the constitutionally required five-
year period.  
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 On April 18, Krahulik filed Bayh’s response brief, arguing that the state election 
board’s insistence on physical presence was unsupported by any case law.  He argued that 
the physical presence standard was also unworkable.  “Over what period does one test to 
determine usual sleeping habits?  Residence, under the board’s theory, would fluctuate with 
each movement or at least on some kind of time basis.  Would it be determined monthly, 
semi-annually, or every three years?”436  Further, Krahulik argued that many Indiana cases, 
as well as numerous decisions from other states, had found the concepts of residency and 
domicile to be intertwined.  Domicile, he argued, was determined by one’s intent.  The 
evidence presented at trial conclusively established that Bayh never intended to live 
anywhere other than Indiana. 
Lastly, Krahulik maintained that, if the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s 
decision, it would be replacing its judgment for that of the trial court, something no appellate 
court could appropriately do.437  This last argument well illustrated how much the ground 
had shifted in the debate.  Remember that one of Bayh’s principal concerns over having the 
matter first considered by the state election board was that in any subsequent judicial review 
of a board decision, the court would be required to give deference to the board’s findings 
about his residency.  Now the shoe was on the other foot.  Not only had Bayh avoided the 
election board having made any findings about his residency, a trial court had made findings 
in his favor.  For many of the same policy reasons that a court reviewing the findings of an 
administrative agency gives deference to them, a court in an appeal gives deference to the 
findings of the trial court.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has a special rule that applied in the 
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Bayh residency case:  “On appeal of claims tried by the court without a jury … , the court on 
appeal shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses.”438  It 
was now Bayh asserting that a reviewing court could not appropriately examine the facts de 
novo.  “  we should be mindful of the well-settled and time-honored standards of review.”439  
To do otherwise, according to Bayh, would be for the Supreme Court to re-weigh the 
evidence and substitute its own conclusions for those of the trier of fact.440 
The Bayh residency case was now before the Indiana Supreme Court for the second 
time.  Given that the Court had been unable to adhere to its announced timetable initially 
and then only cobbled together a decision that decided almost nothing, it was unclear what 
the result would be this time.  But there were several aspects of the case that made it 
different the second time around. 
First, the case now was in the form of a conventional appeal of a trial court’s 
decision, not the highly technical challenge to a trial court’s jurisdiction as it had been 
before.  This could be seen in the names of the two cases themselves.  Now the Supreme 
Court was being asked to decide a case with the straightforward name of State Election 
Board, Appellant (Defendant Below) v. Evan Bayh, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).  While the 
current case had reached the high court without an intervening stop in the Court of Appeals, 
that was not at all unusual.  The Court would be in its normal rhythm considering this 
appeal, unlike the earlier “writ” proceeding. 
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Second, perhaps because Judge Zore was no longer a party to the case or perhaps for 
some other reason, Justice DeBruler would be participating in the decision this time.  This 
meant not only that at least one Democratic justice would have a say in the outcome, but 
also the Court would have the benefit of the counsel of its most experienced member. 
Third, as just discussed, the standard or test that the Court would use to review the 
trial court’s decision this time was quite clear – the Supreme Court would “not set aside the 
findings or judgment [of the trial court] unless clearly erroneous, and due regard [would] be 
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”  In 
contrast, in the earlier writ proceeding, the applicable Court rule dictated that, “original 
actions are viewed with disfavor and may not be used as substitutes for appeals.”441 
Fourth, in the intervening weeks since the Court had first confronted the case, the 
political situation had taken greater shape.  For example, pre-primary finance reports were 
filed by both campaigns on April 22.  Bayh maintained his record pace in money raised 
compared to any previous Democratic gubernatorial candidate in Indiana.  By early April, 
Bayh had raised nearly $1.1 million.  Similarly, Mutz was benefiting from the traditional 
fundraising advantages that Indiana Republicans held over Democrats.  He reported having 
raised a total of $1.6 million.  His campaign announced a total campaign budget goal of $3.5 
million.  Despite Mutz’s overall advantage, Bayh’s report was quite encouraging for two 
reasons.  First, he was receiving considerable financial support although, throughout the 
entire fundraising period, the status of his eligibility to even have his name on the ballot was 
in doubt.  Secondly, while Mutz outpaced Bayh in money raised, he was also outpacing 
Bayh in money spent.  During the reporting period, the Mutz campaign reported spending 
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$217,466 while Bayh’s campaign spent only $64,143.  Therefore, at the end of the period, 
Mutz enjoyed only a slight advantage in terms of cash-on-hand, $965,000 for Mutz to 
$874,000 for Bayh.442  Bayh’s ability to neutralize the inherent Republican fundraising 
advantage would prove increasingly important as the campaign progressed. 
 In addition, the residency dispute was proving to be disastrous for the Republicans 
and their candidate, Mutz, in the court of public opinion.  On the very morning of oral 
argument in the Bayh case, the Indianapolis Star published the results of another statewide 
poll that it had commissioned.  Those results confirmed that Bayh had lengthened his lead 
over Mutz among likely voters.  Bayh had the support of 48 percent while Mutz was 
supported by 33 percent – a difference of 15 points.  This was in contrast to the 10 
percentage point lead he had enjoyed in early January.  Not only was the size of Bayh’s lead 
over Mutz increasing, but fewer Hoosiers remained undecided as Bayh was now receiving 
support from nearly one half of all of those polled. In January, Bayh led Mutz 38 percent to 
28 percent with 34 percent undecided.  By the end of April, only 19 percent of voters 
considered themselves undecided.  The poll also indicated that Bayh’s primary victory over 
Democratic primary rival, Stephen Daily, was virtually assured. 
With respect to the residency challenge itself, the poll revealed that, for the most 
part, voters were reacting negatively.  “Although 80 percent of those polled said the dispute 
would have no impact on their vote for governor, it’s clear that Bayh has benefited from it.  
‘It did not play well,’ poll director [Anthony M.] Casale said.  ‘It gave Bayh some support 
and hurt the Republicans.’”443  Specifically, over half of the 800 people surveyed said they 
had heard of or read about the residency challenge.  Of those who said they were aware of it, 
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47 percent said that they believed it was an attempt to sabotage Bayh’s candidacy and 15 
percent said they were more likely to vote for Bayh because of the challenge.  In the area 
where coverage was most saturated – the Indianapolis metropolitan area – Bayh led Mutz by 
18 percentage points.  He had trailed Mutz by 12 points in that same area in the Star’s 
January poll.444 
 Republican political leaders explained that Bayh’s 15 point lead had been driven by 
the “sympathy blip” created by the challenge to Bayh’s residency.  McDaniel, Mutz’s 
campaign manager, said “that is why we wanted this (the challenge) over quickly, so it 
would be finished, the damage felt and we could get our message out.”  This statement 
constituted the first public admission by the Mutz campaign that the residency challenge had 
been a mistake that had caused damage.  To date, the public’s focus in the governor’s race 
had been on Bayh.  The Mutz message had gotten swallowed up by the relentless 
Republican attacks on residency. 
Despite the poll numbers, Mutz remained publicly optimistic.  “I can’t imagine the 
average person has any idea what Evan’s idea of the future is, or what his plans are or what 
he had done … I know it may sound strange based on the numbers and the change in the 
numbers, but I am feeling better by the day.”  As well Mutz should.  The end of the 
residency challenge was nearly in sight. 
Perhaps the most ironic comments were made by Durnil.  When asked to describe 
the strategy for a Mutz victory, Durnil explained that once Mutz “brings home the 
Republicans, recovers from the residency dispute and starts to get his message out through 
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television and direct mail, this race will close up real quick.”445  Durnil seemed to be 
acknowledging that the residence dispute that he, Durnil, had done so much to foster had 
backfired and had damaged Mutz’s candidacy. 
 On April 25, 1988, the oral argument before the Indiana Supreme Court lasted just 
over one hour.  The state election board had its final opportunity to persuade a court that 
Bayh was not eligible.  All five justices participated.  Both McNamar and Bayh’s lawyer, 
John P. Price, were peppered with questions by members of the Court concerning their legal 
positions.  McNamar repeated one final time the argument for a standard of physical 
presence.  “To have any meaning at all, residency cannot be given some Lewis Carroll, 
Humpty Dumpty definition, when convenient.”446  McNamar also reviewed all of the 
“various addresses at which Bayh has lived since his birth in Terre Haute, and noted that 
Bayh did not own a home to which he could return.”447  Justice Dickson quizzed McNamar 
about his argument, that equated the residency requirements of candidates with those for 
voters.  Dickson “suggested that stricter residency requirements are placed on voters 
because they are not exposed to scrutiny.  A gubernatorial candidate is heavily scrutinized,” 
he said, “and the electorate may reject ‘carpetbaggers.’”448 
Price took aim at McNamar’s historical argument regarding “physical presence” by 
noting that two participants in Indiana’s 1851 constitutional convention later became 
justices on the Indiana Supreme Court.  That very same Supreme Court, when asked to rule 
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on its first case concerning residency, held that “a New Albany man who traveled in Europe 
for three years never lost his residency in Floyd County.”449  At the close of the argument, 
Chief Justice Shepard indicated that the Supreme Court would do its best to render a timely 
decision.  “We are mindful of the urgency of the matter, and we will do our best to be 
prompt.”450  A spokeswoman for the court administrator’s office had been told to expect a 
decision no later than Thursday of that week.451 
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Chapter Eight 
 
THE DECISION 
 
“The question is whether Secretary of State Evan Bayh presently meets our Constitution’s 
residency requirement for the office of Governor.  We hold that he does.” 
 
Opinion of the Indiana Supreme Court 
April 28, 1988 
 
Three days later, on Thursday, April 28, the Indiana Supreme Court issued its 
unanimous opinion upholding Judge O’Connor’s decision and declaring Bayh to be 
constitutionally qualified to serve as governor if elected.452  In a ten-page opinion written by 
Chief Justice Shepard, the Supreme Court first complimented Governor Orr and Bayh 
himself for taking steps to ensure that questions surrounding Bayh’s eligibility were 
answered in a timely way.  “This pre-empted the unseemly possibility of a later quo 
warranto action challenging Bayh’s residency should he become governor.”453  The Court 
then recounted the procedural steps taken before the state election board, the Marion 
Superior Court, and the Shelby County Circuit Court that caused the matter to be before the 
Court on an expedited appeal. 
 The Court acknowledged Judge O’Connor’s “extensive and careful” findings of fact 
and declared them to be “most helpful.”  Recognizing that Judge O’Connor had found that 
“the ultimate facts were in favor of Bayh,” the Court next explained that its standard of 
review was narrow.  Making the point about deference to the findings of the trial court 
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discussed above, the Court’s opinion declared, “We will neither reweigh the evidence nor 
reassess the credibility of the witnesses and will not set aside the fact-finding of the trial 
court unless it is clearly erroneous.”  Thus, the primary task of the Court’s review was to 
“interpret the Indiana Constitution’s residency requirement for the office of Governor.”454 
 As it focused on the specific language contained in Article 5, Section 7, the Court 
admitted that the framers left “little to discern their intention about the meaning of the 
phrase ‘resident of the State.’”  The Court pointed out that both the Northwest Ordinance of 
1787 and the first Indiana Constitution had durational residency requirements for governors.  
However, the first constitution required the citizen to “have resided in the State five years” 
before election.  At the 1850 constitutional convention, an effort had been made to eliminate 
residency language altogether, but it failed.  But the Court noted that the earlier requirement 
to “reside in” the state had been changed to require that the individual be a “resident of.”  “It 
could reasonably be concluded that by … adopting ‘resident of’ instead of ‘resided in’ 
language, the 1851 Constitution embraced a pure domicile theory.”  The Court also noted 
that two other states had found residency provisions to require continual physical presence, 
but found those were distinguishable from the Bayh case because they both required 
gubernatorial candidates to be both a citizen of the state and a resident of the state.  If 
physical presence were not required, then the language requiring citizenship and residence 
would be “mere surplusage.”  Indiana was different in that one is required to be a “citizen of 
the United States” and “a resident of the state.”  “We therefore have no reason to conclude 
from the constitutional language that residency requires continual physical presence.”455 
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 With that important threshold inquiry established, the Court then turned its attention 
to examining residency as domicile.  Noting that residency requirements in democratic 
societies are meant to ensure that the candidates are sufficiently acquainted with the state 
and that the voters have the opportunity to scrutinize the candidates, the Court found that the 
concept of domicile satisfied these purposes.  The Court found that domicile meant “the 
place where a person has his true, fixed, permanent home and principal establishment, and 
to which place he has, whenever he is absent, the intention of returning.”  Domicile could be 
established in any one of three ways:  by birth, by choice, or by operation of law.  Once 
domicile is established, however, it is presumed to continue.  “A change of domicile 
requires an actual moving with an intent to go to a given place and remain there.”  The 
Court further declared that “a person who leaves his place of residence temporarily, but with 
the intention of returning, has not lost his original residence.”456  Since the trial court had 
appropriately applied the law and had found that Bayh did not intend to abandon his Indiana 
domicile and establish a new, permanent residence elsewhere, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial court’s ruling. 
 Bayh was pleased.  “I’m probably the only candidate ever to run for state office in 
the state of Indiana who has had a court of law rule that I am a Hoosier.”457  He noted that 
“all six judges involved in the case – five of whom are Republican – had upheld his right to 
run and serve as governor.”458  Bayh also echoed the recurrent theme that his time away 
from Indiana had never been a legitimate criticism of his candidacy.  Rather, his campaign 
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intended to point out “‘the need to have a breath of fresh air’ in Indiana government and that 
the residency fight is ‘symptomatic’ of the incumbent’s self-serving attitude.”459 
Mutz’s reaction was understated.  “All the court decided today was that Evan Bayh 
meets the minimum requirements to be governor of Indiana.  The question now is which of 
us meets the requirements of the people of Indiana for the next governor of Indiana.”460  
Mutz conceded that the controversy had given Bayh exposure that he would not have 
otherwise received, but he believed that any support Bayh had received on that basis would 
dissipate quickly.  Mutz’s campaign manager, Michael D. McDaniel, refused to second-
guess the strategy employed by Republicans in pursuing the residency challenge, but 
admitted that he would not want to repeat it.  “What do you think I am, a glutton for 
punishment and pain?”461 
 Governor Orr expressed satisfaction that the issue had been conclusively resolved.  
“‘There can be no challenge to his right and privilege to govern the state, and there would 
always be that question mark’ if the Supreme Court had not ruled.”462  Durnil claimed that 
he was glad the matter was over because “Evan Bayh has had this to hide behind.”  Durnil 
acknowledged, however, that “we have built the wall to allow him to hide behind.”  He 
expressed confidence that the issue would not create backlash against Mutz or the 
Republicans, arguing that “this is not the kind of issue that moves voters.”463  He observed 
that his only regret was that the state election board had deferred its decision-making to the 
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trial court.  According to Durnil, “the board could have found different facts in the case, thus 
presenting a different case on appeal to the Supreme Court.”464  He maintained that he 
personally had not been hurt by the issue although, admittedly, he had been identified as 
Bayh’s chief antagonist.  “My role the last 20 years has been to be the point man,” Durnil 
said.  As a campaign manager and state chairman, he said he would “match my record with 
anybody.”465 
 As might be imagined, the editorial commentary was varied.  The Indianapolis Star 
characterized the Republicans’ residency challenge as “testy,” but dismissed the notion that 
it would ultimately affect the outcome of the race itself.  “Some political pundits predict that 
contesting Bayh’s eligibility will boomerang on the Republicans.  That hardly seems likely.  
Once the residency challenge was made, voters were entitled to have any question of 
constitutionality laid to rest.”466  The Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette was not so charitable.  
Calling the debate “an unfortunate charade,” the paper opined that “the sad thing is that the 
debate proved such a distraction.  Often the views of the leading candidates got lost in the 
shuffle, as leaders of both parties argued over Bayh’s residency.  In the end, it probably hurt 
the Republicans, who raised the question in the first place.  Now, it’s up to the voters to 
decide Bayh’s qualifications to be governor – which is precisely the way it should have been 
all along.”467 
 The South Bend Tribune echoed these sentiments.  “Durnil, who has seemed 
obsessed by the Bayh issue, reacted with a characteristic lack of grace.  Maybe the opinion 
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was not unanimous to begin with, he grumbled.  The justices can react to that as they 
choose.  The chairman added that now Bayh will be forced to discuss the issues.  That is 
something all of us could have been doing all along, had it not been for the Great Durnil 
Panic Ploy ….  The impression formed by millions of Hoosiers, however, is that Durnil not 
only shot himself in the foot, but showed the governor how to do it too.”468 
 As to the Supreme Court, its decision did it credit.  It had decided the case extremely 
rapidly – prior to primary election day – and had clearly and unambiguously resolved the 
issue of Bayh’s eligibility.  Indeed, the Court made explicit not only that Bayh was eligible 
to run, but also that if elected, his ability to take office was beyond challenge.  The Court 
seemed to go out of its way to compliment Governor Orr, not only for seeking a prompt 
resolution of the issue of Bayh’s eligibility but also for “appoint[ing] an independent 
chairman to take [the Governor’s] place on the Board for the purpose of investigating the 
validity of Bayh’s declaration of candidacy.”  As we have seen, Puckett was far from 
independent of Orr, taking his instructions on allowing the trial court to consider the matter 
first and on appealing the trial court’s decision.  But the Supreme Court also complimented 
Bayh for seeking prompt resolution of the issue and was not in any way backhanded in 
declaring from the very outset of its decision that “Secretary of State Evan Bayh presently 
meets our Constitution’s residency requirement for the office of Governor.”469 
 The fact that the other four justices – DeBruler, Givan, Pivarnik and Dickson – all 
joined without comment the 2,900 word decision penned by Shepard was impressive.  
Recall that in the writ proceeding, four justices issued three separate statements.  While it is 
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by no means unusual for the Court to speak with one voice, the ability of the five to find 
total consensus on a matter of such visibility and importance reflected well upon it. 
 It is interesting to reflect on whether the relatively new merit-selecting process for 
choosing and retaining justices played a role in the Court’s decision.  Certainly, it could be 
argued that it would have been inconceivable for a Court with four Republican justices to 
have voted against the professed position of their state party chairman if they themselves 
faced re-election.  On the other hand, by the time the Court decided the case, public opinion 
on the issue so clearly favored Bayh that a decision against him would in all likelihood have 
been against the best interests of the Republican party. 
 But the merit-selection system clearly did permit the members of the Court to 
consider the merits of the legal issues presented to it without having to consider in any way 
whether there would be personal political consequences.  The ability of the justices to be fair 
and impartial in this way is an impressive feature of the Indiana judicial system.  Indeed, 
when Bayh pointed out that, of the six judges who had passed favorably on his case, five 
were Republican, he made a positive statement not only about the strength of his position on 
the issue but on the fairness and impartiality of Indiana judges. 
 On Tuesday, May 3, 1988, Evan Bayh won the Democratic nomination for governor 
with a resounding primary victory.  Bayh captured 493,198 votes (82 percent) to Daily’s 
66,242 votes (12 percent).  O’Bannon garnered 34,360 votes (6 percent).  In accepting his 
party’s nomination, Bayh called for an “open state government” that could only be brought 
about by “new leadership.”470  “I’m very gratified,” said Bayh.  “The Democratic Party is 
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united, and I’m convinced that in the fall, independents and Republicans will join us in 
opening up state government and providing new leadership as we enter the ‘90’s.”471 
In the aftermath of the legal failure to have Bayh declared ineligible, the Mutz 
campaign immediately started broadcasting a television commercial which compared the 
voluminous experience Mutz possessed in government to the “one-page resume” offered to 
Hoosier voters by Bayh.  The commercial highlighted Mutz’s governmental experience as a 
long-time state legislator and as lieutenant governor in contrast to Bayh’s 15 months as 
secretary of state.  “Quite a difference,” the commercial concluded.472  The Mutz campaign 
spent $350,000 statewide during a run of about ten days surrounding the primary election.  
While effective in contrasting the two candidates’ resumes, the commercial in that particular 
form never aired again.  Not surprisingly, the public did not find the argument persuasive. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 On Tuesday, November 8, 1988, Democrat Evan Bayh was elected governor of 
Indiana defeating Republican John Mutz.  Bayh garnered 1,138,574 votes to Mutz’s 
1,002,207, a margin of 53 percent to 47 percent.473  While Bayh’s 136,000 vote plurality out 
of approximately 2.1 million total votes cast may appear narrow, it was a significant victory, 
particularly when viewed in the context of the other Indiana statewide results.  Vice 
President George H. W. Bush, along with his Hoosier vice-presidential running mate, 
Senator Dan Quayle, carried Indiana by nearly 440,000 votes over his Democratic opponent, 
Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis – a margin of 60 percent to 40 percent.  The 
differential between the margins of victory enjoyed by Republican George Bush and 
Democrat Evan Bayh was nearly 575,000 votes.  That is to say, well over a quarter of a 
million Hoosiers voted for Republican George Bush for president and Democrat Evan Bayh 
for governor. 
In addition, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar was re-elected to a third term, capturing 68 
percent of the vote against Democrat Jack Wickes.  Even more remarkable and historic is 
the 900,000 vote differential between the margins of victory of Lugar and Bayh.  In excess 
of 400,000 voters cast their ballot for Republican Richard Lugar for senator then switched 
tickets and voted for Democrat Evan Bayh for governor.  Almost one out of every five 
voters who cast ballots in 1988 voted for both Lugar and Bayh.  To this day, that level of 
ticket-splitting remains unprecedented. 
The Republicans also handily won all other statewide races.  Incumbent Republican 
Attorney General Linley Pearson easily defeated John Rumple and incumbent Republican 
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State Superintendent of Public Instruction H. Dean Evans was elected over Mary Petterson.  
By most benchmarks, 1988 was an incredibly successful year for almost all Republican 
statewide candidates in Indiana.  Yet, in the midst of this Republican success, Bayh, and his 
running mate Frank O’Bannon, also won comfortably. 
The 1988 gubernatorial campaign was hard fought.  At the time, it was the most 
expensive political effort in Indiana history with each candidate raising over $4 million in 
furtherance of his campaign.  Some observers regarded it as “the nastiest campaign for 
governor they’d ever seen.”474  While many factors were involved in Bayh’s victory, it is 
impossible to ignore the role that the gubernatorial residency challenge played in the 
election’s outcome. 
As previously noted, the enormous profile it granted Bayh throughout the first four 
months of 1988 was invaluable.  Durnil routinely dismissed as unimportant the notoriety 
that the case afforded Bayh, arguing that he already enjoyed a high level of name 
recognition.  As a result of his success in the 1986 secretary of state’s race and because of 
his well-known father, it is true that Bayh possessed an unusually high degree of statewide 
name recognition, particularly for someone so early in his public life.  But the near daily 
attention given to the residency challenge by the press over this four-month period assisted 
Bayh far beyond an increased awareness of his last name.  In many respects, it helped shape 
a new Indiana political personality. 
 It offered Bayh repeated opportunities to emphasize two themes that were central to 
his candidacy:  that after twenty uninterrupted years of one-party control of the governor’s 
office it was time for a change; and that the Republicans had become so entrenched that they 
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were willing to go to any lengths to maintain control, including denying Bayh even the 
chance to run.  It allowed Bayh the opportunity to become, in effect, a political martyr, the 
victim of a legal attack brought by those who would rather see politicians select Indiana’s 
next governor instead of the voters themselves.  As O’Bannon declared during the 
campaign, “… it is fair to say, I believe, that the Republican leadership of this state is getting 
complacent.  There is not a freshness in the air.  New ideas are not usually welcome.  There 
is a lack of energy to tackle the challenges that must be met.  Too many Republicans have 
come to think that vast areas of this state are their own personal property.  They feel that 
what is good for them is what is good for the State of Indiana, and that is simply not so.”475 
Beyond the thematic consistency it provided, the publicity surrounding the residency 
challenge enabled Bayh to emerge from the long political shadow cast by his father.  During 
this period, Evan Bayh truly “came of age” and began to be seen as an individual possessed 
with his own “political persona” and his own set of priorities.  Those who previously may 
have recognized only the “Bayh” political name were now able to separate father from son – 
Evan from Birch.  Consequently, Republicans were unable to take advantage of any 
lingering disenchantment that some voters might have felt toward Birch Bayh.  More 
particularly, Republicans were not able to re-run the successful political campaign they had 
waged against the father in 1980.  The public had, for an extended period of time, witnessed 
Evan Bayh, standing on his own, absorbing and responding to the enormous pressure of a 
concerted political and legal challenge by his opponents. 
In addition, the public opinion polling conducted during the residency challenge 
(particularly by non-partisan sponsors) confirms that Bayh was able to expand upon his 
early campaign lead.  Since no other substantive issues were subject to vigorous debate so 
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early in the election season, the shifts in voting preference were due largely to the residency 
challenge.  The table below shows these shifts as they occurred during the course of the 
litigation: 
 
Date of Poll Source Bayh Mutz Undecided 
January 10, 1988 Indianapolis Star 38% 28% 34% 
April 5, 1988 WTHR-TV (Indianapolis) 46% 28% 26% 
April 25, 1988 Indianapolis Star 48% 33% 19% 
 
 
From January, 1988 to primary election day, Bayh’s lead over Mutz increased by 5 
percentage points – not an insignificant change, given that it came at a time when most 
people were not focused on elections or campaigns for public office.  Just as important is the 
fact that the number of undecided voters decreased by 15 percentage points – from 34 to 19 
percent.  Of those undecided voters who were making up their minds during this period, 
they chose Bayh over Mutz at a rate of 2 to 1. 
In addition, both the February poll commissioned by Livengood and the April poll 
by the Indianapolis Star confirmed voters’ negative reaction to the Republican efforts to 
have Bayh disqualified.  The February poll suggested that over one-third of all voters would 
look less favorably on the Republicans if Bayh were declared ineligible to run.  The 
Indianapolis Star poll conducted in April revealed that over half of all voters surveyed had 
heard of the residency challenge and, of that number, 47 percent believed it to be a political 
attempt by Republicans to “sabotage” Bayh’s candidacy.  A total of 15 percent of all of 
those polled said they were more likely to vote for Bayh because of the residency challenge.  
If it can be said that 15 percent of the electorate eventually made its gubernatorial choice on 
the basis that Republicans had attempted to keep Bayh off the ballot, his election might very 
well be defined accordingly. 
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The residency challenge was not solely responsible for Evan Bayh’s election.  That 
conclusion overreaches.  Like any race for governor in any particular election year, more 
was involved.  But to suggest, as did some Republicans, that voters completely forgot the 
residency challenge by November, or that it played little, if any, role in the election would 
be an equally uninformed point of view.  As the polling data confirm, there is no question 
that people were aware of the effort and, for the most part, reacted unfavorably.  It did 
inexorably alter public perception, particularly with respect to the partisan motivations 
behind challenging Bayh’s residency.  This lingering perception could not have served the 
Republicans well as they entered the decisive period of the fall campaign.  And the result 
validates this conclusion.  As Jack Colwell predicted in March of 1988, “if the final decision 
is to be made by voters rather than judges, Bayh is being helped by this.  In other words, 
Republicans, having gone the court-challenge route, had better win there or face the 
prospect of Bayh being even stronger in a vote challenge.”476 
Throughout and after the residency challenge, Bayh never lost his advantage.  In 
fact, the question repeatedly asked during the summer and fall of 1988 was not who was 
ahead, but how wide was Bayh’s lead?  Certainly, there are circumstances that could have 
altered the eventual outcome.  The fact is, however, once the residency litigation was 
resolved, Bayh possessed the upper hand for the duration of the campaign.  The 
announcement of Dan Quayle as George Bush’s running mate in August was as close as the 
Republicans would come to an outcome-altering event.  While Quayle’s presence on the 
national ticket provided Indiana Republicans an enormous boost of confidence and 
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optimism, even that was not enough to deny the Bayh-O’Bannon ticket its place in Indiana 
political history. 
Thus, the question must be asked – if the residency challenge proved instrumental to 
Bayh’s victory, why did the Republicans pursue it in the first place?  More acutely, why was 
it pursued to the bitter end?  Why was the issue allowed to consume nearly four months of 
the campaign in light of the ever-growing perception that the public was reacting 
negatively?  Explaining it away as a terrible miscalculation is too simple.  It does not give 
the Republican Party enough credit.  Miscalculations were not part of their playbook.  The 
primary actors – Mutz, Durnil, Orr – were all political veterans.  They did not blindly follow 
a flawed course of action without an appreciable sensitivity to all of the possible political 
consequences.  How, then, should it be understood? 
Republicans (particularly, Mutz) recognized the unique position the party faced in 
the 1988 election – twenty years of uninterrupted control of the governor’s office combined 
with a challenge by an attractive and articulate opponent promising change.  In accordance 
with normal political rhythms, “change” would be an undeniably natural predisposition 
among the electorate.  This was the political context in which the decisions by Republicans 
concerning Bayh’s residency were made.  Given that context, it is not difficult to understand 
why many of them were attracted to any argument that might alter that political 
environment.  Although Republicans repeatedly emphasized that Mutz was their “most 
experienced gubernatorial candidate ever,” some were fearful that 1988 might be the type of 
political year when that argument would not matter.  In fact, Bayh’s candidacy was 
particularly appealing because it offered a public inclined toward change a shift in direction 
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that was safe and reassuring.  And in their efforts to address Bayh’s appeal, Republicans 
made several critical errors. 
First, they lacked consensus regarding the risk management applicable to the 
residency challenge.  If a challenge was to be made, how should it be pursued?  Once 
started, what was the possibility of getting out if political losses started to mount?  There 
appeared to be little agreement among Republicans on these important strategic questions.  
This incongruity contributed to the perception that Mutz lacked any control over the matter.  
Similar to the incident regarding Rob Bowen (who, embarrassingly, was informed by a 
reporter how his own name would appear on the 1986 election ballot), there were times 
when Mutz appeared unable to exert control over developments that were consuming his 
campaign.  In contrast, Bayh exercised complete control over his campaign’s legal and 
political strategies and responses.  At all times, he remained good-humored, but determined.  
No surrogate ever spoke for him.  He accepted responsibility over the tactical decisions 
made.  His calm demeanor in the face of inordinate confusion no doubt reassured Hoosiers 
that he possessed a level of maturity belied by his age. 
This Republican discord may very well have been an important reason why the 
residency challenge spun out of control.  To this day, the question of who was making final 
decisions for Republicans (both legally and politically) remains unclear.  Was it Governor 
Orr, who convened the state election board and ordered the investigation of Bayh?  Was it 
Durnil, the state party chair, who, throughout, was the most outspoken proponent of 
challenging Bayh’s eligiblity?  Was it Mutz, who, as the party’s gubernatorial nominee, had 
the most at stake? 
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For his part, concerns over issues of constitutionalism appear to have genuinely 
troubled Governor Orr.  Having served as governor for eight years, Orr appreciated better 
than anyone the burden that would haunt Bayh, if elected, with unresolved questions 
surrounding his eligibility to serve.  Admittedly, Orr was not oblivious to the political 
benefit that would result from having Bayh disqualified.  Bayh was by far the strongest 
Democratic opponent to Mutz.  Again, as Jack Colwell observed, “Bayh poses a real threat 
to continued Republican control of the Statehouse.  No other Democrat would have much of 
a chance ….  If Bayh can’t run, it wouldn’t matter how much sympathy there was among 
voters.”477  But Orr’s primary motivation seemed to be avoiding the possibility of 
compromising a governor’s authority. 
To his credit, Orr took affirmative steps to modify the more overtly partisan aspects 
of the state election board process.  In addition, Orr agreed with Judge Puckett’s decision to 
suspend the state election board’s investigation of Bayh and allow the matter to be decided 
by the Shelby County Circuit Court.  Likewise, Orr’s insistence that Judge O’Connor’s 
verdict be appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court appeared motivated more by Orr’s desire 
for finality of judgment than any interest he may have had in clinging to already desperate 
partisan political hopes.  More cynical observers (and those more critical of Governor Orr) 
could argue with all of these observations.  Without question, Orr possessed a partisan 
preference in the campaign.  But Orr’s actions appeared measured and prudent and, 
primarily, motivated by a concern for a governor’s authority under the constitution. 
Obviously, the same cannot be said for Durnil.  Then again, as the state party chair, 
Durnil had a job to do – that is, to elect Republican candidates.  And as he repeatedly 
boasted, Durnil had proven capable of doing just that, with aplomb, over the course of the 
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preceding eight years.  He prided himself that he had been mentored by the Indiana 
Republican political icon, L. Keith Bulen.  Somewhere, however, Durnil had lost his way.  
Durnil had surrendered the noble conviction of political victory by honorable means to the 
notion of winning elections at any cost, even at risk of substantial negative political 
reverberation.  Bayh’s astonishing victory in the 1986 secretary of state’s race had tarnished 
Durnil’s veneer of invincibility.  With a prize as cherished as the governor’s office at stake, 
to lose in successive cycles to the same person was unthinkable. 
Colwell characterized Durnil’s relentless pursuit of the residency challenge this way:  
“[Bayh] proved to be a superb candidate in beating the powerful Indiana Republican 
organization in the secretary of state’s race in 1986.  And he appears to have the potential to 
take advantage of a time-for-a-change feeling in Indiana and again smite Goliath.  Goliath 
doesn’t like being smited once and can’t stand the thought of it happening twice.”478  Durnil 
responded to the political pressures of 1988 in a way that his questionable conduct in 1986 
had presaged.  Several contemporaneous press accounts concluded that Durnil was 
“obsessed” with Bayh.  They were not mistaken.  Defeating Bayh became Durnil’s sole 
focus.  Over time, this obsession substantially impaired his judgment. 
In his defense, much of Durnil’s doggedness was no doubt the result of his reliance 
upon his lawyers’ advice.  When his lawyers opined that the case against Bayh was 
winnable, Durnil was certainly not predisposed to question that legal recommendation.  Yet, 
from the beginning, a “favorable” outcome was largely dependent on control over forum.  
Durnil understood and appreciated this.  To the extent that it was imperative for the state 
election board to make the initial decision, Durnil’s unalterable insistence in that regard can 
                                                 
478 Ibid. 
 
204 
be better understood.  Once the Indiana Supreme Court, in its March 2 order, allowed both 
forums to proceed simultaneously, Durnil had obtained his wish – the state election board 
was now free to proceed to determine Bayh’s eligibility without fear of court injunction. 
At a minimum, a ruling by the state election board likely would have precluded any 
decision being rendered by Judge O’Connor.  If an initial determination had already been 
made, it is unlikely that the trial before Judge O’Connor would have occurred.  O’Connor 
could have justifiably dismissed Bayh’s pending lawsuit and allowed the board’s 
administrative determination to be appealed through normal avenues of judicial review.  It 
must be re-emphasized that Durnil’s only publicly expressed regret throughout the entire 
Bayh residency challenge was that the state election board had deferred decision making to 
a court of law. 
As a purely pragmatic political matter, Durnil was focused on winning a legal 
victory.  If Bayh was thrown off the ballot, Durnil was convinced that Mutz would win in 
the fall.  However, the question became:  at what price was that course of action justifiable?  
The issue caused some people to begin to openly challenge Durnil’s judgment.  As time 
wore on, Durnil’s strategy was criticized as being shortsighted – that is, Durnil’s plan might 
“win the battle, but lose the war.”  Republicans began to fear that the backlash would be so 
overwhelming that O’Bannon would be the only beneficiary of the Bayh residency 
challenge.  In a final twist of irony, Republicans lost both – the battle and the war. 
Had Durnil’s strategy been carried out, Bayh’s name would probably not have 
appeared on the November ballot.  No doubt, an election between Mutz and O’Bannon 
would have been close.  O’Bannon would have been afforded full benefit of the argument 
that Mutz (and his surrogates) had used the legal system for political advantage.  However, 
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given the margins of Republican political victories in every other statewide race that year, 
Democratic success in the governor’s race would certainly not have been guaranteed.  In 
fact, despite the enormous political turmoil that would have ensued from Bayh being 
declared ineligible, it is entirely possible that Mutz would have won the governor’s race. 
The Republican leader placed in the strangest and most uncomfortable position was 
John Mutz himself.  It remains unclear what role Mutz played in the decisions surrounding 
how the residency challenge was handled.  Other than Bayh, Mutz had the most at stake.  As 
Governor Orr’s eight-year partner in government, the two shared a cooperative working 
relationship, both governmentally and politically, and they communicated frequently.479 
That having been said, some Mutz partisans advised Mutz that he needed to publicly 
“break” from Orr because of the overwhelming “time for a change” mood among the 
electorate.  “According to his campaign manager, Mike McDaniel, ‘Mutz said, I’ll have 
none of that.  [Orr’s] been too good to us.’”480  Orr and Mutz discussed the possible 
consequences of the course of action that Orr was setting in motion.  Yet, at many critical 
junctures, Mutz appeared to be unable to convince the governor of the adverse political 
consequences that some of Orr’s decisions were having on Mutz’s own campaign. 
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Similarly, as the Republican Party’s gubernatorial standard-bearer, Mutz possessed 
at least some authority over Durnil, the state party chair.  To conclude otherwise would be to 
suggest that Mutz was politically impotent.  It is possible, perhaps, that Mutz and Durnil did 
not share a close personal relationship.  Yet that conclusion would be at odds with the public 
record, given that it had been Durnil who, early on, declared his unconditional support for 
Mutz for governor in the face of a significant potential primary challenge from Hudnut.  
Similarly, Durnil had to have realized that his continued service as the state party chair was 
dependent on two things:  Mutz’s election and Mutz’s continued support.  However, 
communication between the Mutz campaign and the state Republican Party was strained 
throughout the campaign.  Oftentimes, the statements issued were not well-coordinated and, 
at times, appeared contradictory.  As Douglas Davidoff, political reporter for the 
Indianapolis News confirmed, the relationship between Mutz and Durnil deteriorated as the 
residency controversy dragged on.481 
There is no question that Mutz initially supported the effort to challenge Bayh’s 
eligibility.  While Mutz attempted to refrain from direct involvement, his decision in 
January 1988 to release five years of income tax returns was irrefutably designed to force 
Bayh’s hand as a lead-up to the legal challenge, particularly as it related to what was thought 
to be critical evidence – Bayh’s 1983 and 1984 state income tax returns.  Traub commented 
that, throughout January and February, most Republicans supported a challenge to Bayh’s 
residency – Mutz included.  But, by late February and into March, 1988, Mutz and his 
advisors became increasingly concerned over the way the challenge was evolving.  At first, 
the objections were privately raised.  Then, with a greater sense of urgency, the objections 
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became public.  By the time that there was full public commentary on the wisdom of 
Durnil’s residency strategy, it was too late.  Organizational Republicans were too enmeshed 
in the challenge to cut their political losses and move on. 
By March 14 (the date of Judge O’Connor’s decision), Mutz’s patience was finally 
exhausted.  He publicly acknowledged, with insistence that all parties should “get on with 
the campaign.”  While he reluctantly conceded the appropriateness of pursuing a finality of 
legal judgment, he also admitted that Republican efforts to keep Bayh off the ballot had 
backfired.  Mutz wanted the residency challenge over with as soon as possible.  By late 
March, he expressed his displeasure that an appeal was being pursued.  He complained that 
he had not been consulted with respect to that decision.  Mutz, in effect, was conceding that 
the challenge to Bayh’s residency had significantly affected his campaign and, in an ironic 
twist, it made him look “inexperienced.” 
In the final analysis, Mutz’s attempt to “have it both ways” was a crucial error.  On 
the one hand, he appreciated the political advantage of having Bayh declared ineligible.  
Mutz did not want Evan Bayh as an opponent in the fall.  After all, Bayh was the only 
potential opponent that he trailed in the polls.  At the same time, Mutz wanted to avoid the 
perception that he was unwilling to take on all comers.  Perhaps he was convinced that, as 
long as Durnil and Governor Orr took the public lead on the issue, he could distance himself 
from any negative political repercussions.  However, Mutz’s attempt to straddle the fence 
impaired his credibility whenever he spoke on the issue.  He would have been better served 
to make a decision, one way or the other, and remain steadfast to it. 
Second, beyond this lack of consensus, the Republicans also underestimated Evan 
Bayh.  They underestimated his judgment – his intuitively deft responses to all levels of 
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political attack.  They underestimated his shrewd appreciation for the political and legal 
positioning that played such a pivotal role in the way the public perceived what was 
occurring and why.  And they underestimated his persuasiveness – the ability to convince 
Hoosier voters that he was a victim of a political attack promoted by partisans whose 
primary motivation was political power and control. 
In the end, Republicans deluded themselves into believing their own political 
rhetoric – that Bayh was too young and inexperienced to be governor.  They thought he was 
incapable of withstanding the cauldron of a coordinated political firestorm.  They thought he 
would be unable to control the more aggressive elements within his own party, particularly 
his primary opponents.  They thought that his fundraising would suffer and considerably 
diminish.  They were convinced he would make mistakes.  And, as will be discussed later, 
in the final analysis, they had become convinced that they would prevail in their effort to 
have Bayh declared ineligible. 
It was Frank O’Bannon, Bayh’s running mate, who would best articulate the 
Republicans’ dilemma.  In an interview on the eve of the 1988 election with Indianapolis 
Star reporter Joe Gelarden, O’Bannon admitted that there had been a time when O’Bannon 
himself “underestimated Bayh’s political abilities, but [he] had come to know how good 
Bayh really was.  ‘Once we joined our campaigns, I knew the Republicans would 
underestimate him, too,’ [O’Bannon] said.”482  In that regard, Wayne Townsend and former 
Indiana Governor Matthew Welsh must be given credit for recognizing Bayh’s enormous 
potential early on, although many others believed Bayh had yet to “pay his dues.”  They saw 
something in Bayh that the Republicans failed to fully recognize. 
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At his announcement for governor in November of 1987, Mutz was already captive 
of this institutional underestimation.  Mutz characterized Bayh as superficial.  Mutz 
cautioned voters that “Indiana cannot afford to let image makers decide its choice for chief 
executive.  The times do not permit it.  The ever-escalating demands of a changing world 
allow no substitute for a proven record of experience and leadership.”  Mutz went on to 
assert, “I am not interested in slick campaign commercials.”483  Republicans dismissed Bayh 
as an intellectual lightweight whose previous electoral success had been attributable more to 
Madison Avenue advertising than to substance. 
With respect to these observations, Mutz was not alone.  Durnil and Republican 
leadership, including Governor Orr, underestimated Bayh as well.  They feared him 
politically, but for the wrong reasons.  They feared his poise and his charisma.  They 
complained that he was so young that he lacked a public record that could be analyzed and 
attacked.  What they should have feared was the depth of his intelligence – his ability to 
respond decisively as events and situations evolved.  What they should have feared was his 
discipline, in both legal and political judgment. 
Again, as Stoner observed, “ultimately, the contrast between Mutz and Bayh was not 
favorable [to Mutz].  While lacking Mutz’s experience in state government, Bayh seemed to 
have a confidence and a natural ease to him ….  He railed against twenty years of 
Republican rule but did it in a way that did not annoy or put off Hoosiers.  Bayh also 
successfully ‘stole’ the right flank from Republicans, consistently hitting on his plans to 
lower state spending, cut taxes and be a ‘true fiscal conservative.’”484  On this point, 
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Stoner’s analysis is particularly astute.  As early as November, 1987, Bayh had already 
decided that his campaign would not follow the predictable course of attacking Mutz on 
issues of Republican weakness.  Rather, Bayh insisted that his campaign make a full frontal 
assault on those issues perceived as areas of greatest Republican strength – taxes and job 
creation. 
Third, by having his residency challenged, Bayh was able to use the lawsuit to 
successfully negate the criticism that he was “inexperienced.”  Instead, Bayh went on the 
offensive and turned the “experience” argument on its head.  Rather than shy away from it, 
Bayh made it a centerpiece of his campaign.  On his gubernatorial announcement day, Bayh 
thundered away at the so-called Republican “experience”:  “During the last eight years, 
those who now come before us touting their ‘experience’ have given Hoosier taxpayers the 
two largest tax increases in the history of our state.  They have raised state spending in real 
terms by 38%.  They have dramatically increased the number of state employees.  During 
this same period of ‘experienced leadership,’ we have seen virtually every criteria of 
evaluation of our education system decline, per capita income of the average Hoosier has 
eroded [and], by their own admission, the condition of our roads and bridges and highways 
has reached a critical point.”485  To underscore the authenticity of sentiment behind these 
ideas, it should be noted that Bayh had no campaign speechwriter.  These were political 
arguments that were his, and his alone. 
Fourth, the Republicans never anticipated that Bayh and O’Bannon would join 
forces as a ticket, presenting a unified political party, collectively pursuing a single goal – 
Democratic victory in November.  For the same reasons that they underestimated Bayh, 
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Republicans did not believe that O’Bannon possessed the self-assurance and courage to 
subjugate his own immediate political fortunes for the collective good.  In this regard, 
Republicans underestimated Frank O’Bannon as well.  Without specific intention, 
O’Bannon foreshadowed the best argument for the potential of this joint effort in his May, 
1987 gubernatorial announcement speech:  “We must show the ability to lead in a new, 
creative way, and we must have a candidate who can unite the Democratic Party.”486 
In the end, the Republican effort to have Bayh declared ineligible unified Democrats 
to an even higher degree.  All Democrats, even skeptical ones, eventually acknowledged 
that the residency challenge was an admission of Republican weakness, not strength.  It also 
accelerated the “healing process” among O’Bannon loyalists who may have been initially 
disgruntled by O’Bannon’s decision to abandon his gubernatorial campaign, arguing that 
given the age differential, “it was Frank’s turn.”  Unlike most political marriages, the 
Bayh/O’Bannon ticket was immediately called upon to “circle the wagons” and join 
together in a united fight for political survival to overcome an intense assault by their 
political opponents. 
Bayh’s willingness to do whatever was necessary to ensure O’Bannon’s nomination 
for governor, if the courts ruled against Bayh, went a long way toward confirming Bayh’s 
commitment to O’Bannon.  If Bayh had been declared ineligible, the Bayh/O’Bannon team 
would have become the O’Bannon team, with the Bayh camp doing all that it could to 
ensure O’Bannon the party’s nomination and a victory in the November general election.  
As awkward as it was to have O’Bannon’s name appear on the primary ballot for governor, 
the fact that Bayh wholeheartedly supported the effort to ensure O’Bannon’s ascendancy if 
the Republican residency challenge would prove successful, convinced skeptical Democrats 
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that Bayh and O’Bannon were committed to the same end – one of them would be the next 
governor of Indiana. 
Fifth, Republicans discounted most of the more obvious political downsides that 
could occur as a result of the residency challenge because they assumed that they would 
win.  Certain of victory, Durnil trusted that Republicans would be vindicated eventually in 
the eyes of the public.  Durnil was prepared to accept, in the short term, an initial and 
reasonably predictable negative reaction by the public because, in the end, the challenge 
would be seen by the public as having been justified on constitutional grounds, once it was 
established that Bayh was, in fact, ineligible. 
Durnil obviously preferred that a challenge against Bayh be initiated by Democrats.  
After all, in the two most recent cases where durational residency requirements for governor 
had been litigated (Missouri and South Carolina), challenges had come from within the 
candidate’s own political party – a Republican primary challenger sued Republican Kit 
Bond in Missouri, and a “friendly” lawsuit instituted by the state Democratic chair had 
begun the litigation against Democrat Charles “Pug” Ravenel in South Carolina.  A Bayh 
residency challenge brought by Democrats, whether “friendly” or otherwise, would have 
been in many ways a political victory for Republicans, irrespective of the legal outcome. 
However, absent a challenge from within the Democratic Party itself, Republicans 
also believed that Bayh could ultimately be forced to initiate his own lawsuit because of the 
perception that he needed to “clear title” in his run for the governor’s office.  Many political 
commentators agreed with this view.  Because resolution of the “residency issue” appeared 
to be fundamental to Bayh’s own candidacy, many believed that he was the one who was 
obligated to resolve the question.  The fact that Bayh refrained from filing a lawsuit until it 
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was ultimately necessary to protect his own political interests against actions already 
initiated by Republicans is further proof of how much the Republicans underestimated his 
level of political discipline. 
Admittedly, there did exist some cases from other states which supported the 
argument that durational residency language required continued “physical presence.”  If that 
standard were applied in this case, Bayh was ineligible.  However, given the Indiana 
Supreme Court’s decision in Evrard, it was more likely that “residency as domicile” would 
be the standard applied.  Even so, apparently convinced by his lawyers that there was 
evidence sufficient to show that Bayh had abandoned his domicile in Indiana and 
established it elsewhere, Durnil was determined to pursue it to its logical extreme. 
The lawyers advising Durnil were not the same lawyers who carried the public 
burden once the litigation ensued.  Much like John Mutz, the lawyers advising the 
Republican Party appeared desirous of having it both ways.  While they were quite willing 
to counsel Republican leadership on legal strategy, they were reluctant to publicly represent 
their position once the matter got to court.  Perhaps they feared that any public profile 
contrary to the interests of an individual who could be the next governor of Indiana was not 
prudent.  To his credit, Daniel F. Evans, Jr., did enter his personal appearance on behalf of 
Durnil once Bayh’s lawsuit was filed.  He was successful in having Durnil dismissed as a 
defendant.  However, at no time on any court documents did Evans identify his legal 
association or in any way indicate that he was, in fact, a profiled partner in a prominent 
Indianapolis law firm. 
Durnil repeatedly assured Republican activists that Evans and his colleagues at the 
law firm did the bulk of the legal research necessary to advise him regarding Republican 
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legal options.  Ironically, after his two terms as governor, Bayh accepted employment with 
the very same law firm – a law firm which had devoted countless hours and enormous legal 
expertise to prevent Bayh from running for governor in the first place.  In this respect, 
McNamar, the lawyer hired by the state election board, should be given some latitude.  He is 
not the one who developed the legal strategy.  He was simply hired, at public expense, to put 
a public face on it. 
Although the Republicans initiated their own “lawsuit,” they were convinced that the 
public would eventually see the challenge as completely justifiable.  With the state election 
board as forum, a decision declaring Bayh ineligible was highly likely.  With that decision 
being subject to multiple layers of judicial review, Bayh would have been afforded his “day 
in court.”  And because the scope of judicial review would be confined and narrow, the state 
election board’s decision would be upheld.  Bayh would be declared ineligible and a fall 
campaign would proceed between O’Bannon and Mutz. 
Bayh responded to the state election board investigation with a declaratory judgment 
action of his own.  Republicans were comforted, no doubt, by the Indiana Supreme Court’s 
March 2 decision that prevented the trial court from restraining the election board in any 
way.  This decision forced Bayh to compromise.  He agreed not to challenge the Shelby 
County venue and he voluntarily abandoned his request for a jury trial in an effort to secure 
an earlier bench trial date.  These compromises assured Republican leadership that the case 
would be solely decided by a Republican judge.  In addition, Republicans had the comfort of 
knowing that any decision of a Republican trial court judge would be reviewable on appeal 
by the Indiana Supreme Court, consisting of four Republicans (two of whom had been 
appointed by Governor Orr) and only one Democrat.  Durnil’s confidence in the outcome, 
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therefore, was not misguided.  He was not a risk-taker.  He knew what he was doing, 
calculated the odds, and made political decisions accordingly.  He preferred the state 
election board route, but became convinced that the probability of success in a court of law 
was still quite high, given the circumstances. 
Yet when Judge O’Connor issued his decision, Republicans were dealt a significant 
setback.  They should not have been surprised.  As early as February 1, in the memo 
prepared by Bayh’s panel of legal experts, it was clear that “residency as domicile” was 
quite likely to be the applicable standard in defining the constitutional concept of 
“residency.”  How that standard would be applied to the facts remained an unknown.  But it 
should have been accepted that, in all likelihood, in order to win, Republicans would be 
required to do more than try to poke holes in evidence that Bayh produced.  They needed 
proof that he clearly and unequivocally intended to abandon his domicile in Indiana and 
establish it elsewhere.  When that did not occur, the Indiana political world was turned 
upside down.  As WTHR-TV later summarized:  “In court, Bayh won a clear cut [legal] 
victory.  The residency challenge allowed Evan Bayh to dominate the earned media for 
months, exploiting the issue of fairness against John Mutz.  It also deprived Mutz [of] the 
potent line of attack ….  Bayh observed, ‘Maybe in the way I handled it, by not losing my 
cool, by trying to remain steady and calm, reassured some people.’”487 
Republicans also underestimated the independence of the third branch of 
government – the judiciary.  While Durnil may have been justified in believing that he could 
exert partisan control over a decision by the state election board, any thought that 
Republican trial and appellate court judges could be relied upon to “do the right thing” was 
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uninformed.  To the extent that Durnil possessed such a belief, this revealed a woefully 
antiquated understanding of how seriously judges take their responsibility and how 
protective they are of the integrity of the judiciary. 
To be sure, Shelby County Circuit Court Judge Charles O’Connor is a Republican.  
When he sits on the bench, however, he does not view legal issues from a partisan 
perspective.  The people of Indiana are well served because of public servants like Judge 
O’Connor who, once elected, leave their partisan stripes at home.  Profiles in courage rarely 
come without a price.  Despite his well-established reputation for fairness and sound 
judgment, Judge O’Connor has been often overlooked for promotion within the federal 
judicial system by Republican-controlled panels.  In extremely partisan circles, Judge 
O’Connor is still regarded as “the Republican judge who let Evan Bayh run for governor.”  
Despite significant systemic reforms, partisan memory is long in Indiana.  Judge O’Connor 
may be the only true “victim” of the Bayh residency challenge. 
The integrity and independence of the judiciary can also be said to have been 
sustained by the late Judge James Puckett.  In his private sanctuary, Judge Puckett was a 
loyal Republican.  He would not have been selected by Governor Orr for the role he was 
asked to play if that were not the case.  But, for Puckett, rule of law trumped partisan 
considerations.  In the Bayh case, he recommended that the state election board suspend its 
investigation and defer to the Shelby County Circuit Court because it was legally 
appropriate, it made sense, and it was in the public’s best interest.  While he was, no doubt, 
relieved that his patron, Governor Orr, agreed with his decision, Judge Puckett may have 
ultimately possessed the courage to make that decision irrespective of the governor’s 
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opinion.  At an extremely tenuous time in our state’s political history, the tempered wisdom 
of Judge Puckett served Indiana citizens well. 
The same must ultimately be said about our Indiana Supreme Court.  While the court 
may have stumbled in its initial consideration of the election board versus trial court 
jurisdiction issue and was largely protected from political pressure by the retention vote 
system, the fact that, despite its partisan make-up, it unanimously affirmed Judge 
O’Connor’s trial court findings should be recognized by the public as our judicial branch of 
government elevating legal principle over political pressure and expectation. 
As a final observation, Republicans fundamentally underestimated the public.  
Whether plausible or not, Republicans believed that the average voter would not accept 
Bayh’s explanation how he satisfied the required five year residency period prior to election 
day.  Republicans assumed that the “residency as domicile” standard would be viewed as 
some type of contorted legal “hocus-pocus” that amounted to nothing more than an effort to 
change the rules for Bayh. 
To the contrary, Republicans believed that their own explanation would be more 
persuasive.  Every other candidate for governor in the history of our state had been required 
to satisfy Indiana’s durational constitutional residency requirement.  Why not Bayh?  Or, as 
Mutz would later describe, “do you want somebody making decisions for you who has only 
been here for 22 months and who really has not lived here even the five years that the 
Indiana constitution says the guy is supposed to.”488 
Republicans were convinced the public would understand that the Indiana 
constitution requires a candidate to have lived here for five years, and Evan Bayh had not 
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physically lived here for five years.  For Mutz campaign manager Mike McDaniel, the 
residency challenge was entirely legitimate.  “‘… Evan Bayh had clearly not lived in 
Indiana,’ McDaniel said.  ‘There is no question about that.  He grew up in D.C., he really 
had, and we had plenty of evidence that he had not really lived in Indiana.’”489 
Many prominent Indiana Republicans were convinced of the same notion – Bayh 
did not satisfy the constitutional residency requirement because Bayh had lived most of his 
life outside the state of Indiana.  To this day, some Republicans bristle at the suggestion that 
the Bayh case was rightfully decided.  Republicans can be often overheard to grumble that 
“residency” after the Bayh case does not mean anything anymore.  To these partisans, Bayh 
grew up in Washington, D.C.  He spent most of his life outside of Indiana, including 
attending law school at the University of Virginia, as well as working for a Washington, 
D.C., law firm.  They believed he returned to Indiana for the sole purpose of trading on his 
father’s famous name and running for political office.  For them, the antiquated language of 
Indiana’s constitution provided a bona fide (if not, intoxicating) reason to challenge Bayh’s 
eligibility to even be on the ballot. 
Yet, in truth, this argument is not really a legal argument at all.  Rather, it is simply a 
different version of the familiar political refrain leveled against any so-called 
“carpetbagger.”  In their desire to ensure political control, many Republicans confused what 
may have been an effective “political” argument against an alleged “carpetbagger” 
(particularly when combined with the legitimate political criticism about Bayh’s level of 
experience) with a highly technical constitutional argument about Bayh’s “residency.”  
Years later, McDaniel, Mutz’s campaign manager, confirmed this assessment.  “In 
                                                 
489 Stoner, Legacy of a Governor, 129. 
 
219 
retrospect now, there is no question in my mind that we would have been better off if we 
had played the ‘carpetbagger’ issue during the campaign as opposed to acting like the big 
guys who want to keep the new young guy out of the race,” McDaniel said.  “Clearly it 
spilled over onto the campaign.  That is all water over the dam now, but it had an effect.”490 
In this regard, to most ordinary Hoosier voters, the Republican argument was simply 
not credible.  How could anyone with a straight face argue that Birch Bayh’s son was not a 
Hoosier?  Whether Democrat or Republican, Birch Bayh friend or foe, you had to 
acknowledge that Birch Bayh was Hoosier to the core.  How could his son not be?  On top 
of that, Senator Birch Bayh’s father, Birch Bayh, Sr. (Evan Bayh’s grandfather) had 
officiated seven times in the Indiana state high school basketball tournament final game.  As 
Jack Colwell observed, “you just can’t have much more Hoosier heritage than that.”491  And 
most people believed that, if for some reason Evan Bayh was determined to not be a 
Hoosier, it had to be the result of some hyper-technical reason that might make sense to 
politicians, but not to the public. 
WISH-TV reporter Jim Shella, who covered the residency challenge in its entirety, 
echoed that sentiment.  Shella observed that the residency challenge was “a colossal 
mistake.  What came out of that was this message that they [the Republicans] were afraid of 
Evan Bayh.  They tried to make the argument that Birch Bayh’s son is not a Hoosier.  The 
public said, first of all, that you cannot tell me that Birch Bayh’s son is not a Hoosier, and 
                                                 
490 Ibid., 130. 
491 South Bend Tribune, March 20, 1988. 
220 
second of all, why are you so afraid to run against him anyway?  I think they may have lost 
that race then and there.”492 
Stoner asserts that, “to most insiders, the residency challenge looked and smelled 
like fear on the part of the Republicans.  To ‘Joe and Martha Hoosier,’ it just looked 
ridiculous that anyone would even try to argue that Birch Bayh’s son was not a Hoosier.”493  
Yet as Stoner also observes, “[Republican] concern bubbled over, it seems, in a strange and 
ultimately harmful effort to try and deny Bayh even the chance to run.  After months of bad-
mouthing Bayh as an alleged ‘carpetbagger’ returning to Indiana for political opportunity, 
Durnil and other Republicans began to question whether Bayh met the state’s constitutional 
requirement to hold office for governor ….  From the start, it was an odd effort, but one 
most Republicans were absolutely determined to pursue.”494 
An odd effort, indeed.  Yet, an oddity that helped shape the course of Indiana’s 
political history for an entire generation.  Just as Birch Bayh’s final re-election to the U.S. 
Senate in 1974 closed one chapter of Indiana political history, his son’s election as governor 
in 1988 ushered in a new era when Indiana Democrats throughout the 1990’s re-asserted 
electoral competitiveness in nearly all levels of government. 
In 1986, Bayh’s victory in the secretary of state’s race helped Indiana Democrats 
establish a 6 to 4 majority in the partisan make-up of Indiana’s congressional delegation.  
Between 1986 and 1990, the Democratic majority in the Indiana congressional delegation 
further expanded to 8-2. 
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Following Bayh’s 1988 election as governor, and for the first time in our state’s 
history, the two major political parties were evenly split at 50 Republicans and 50 
Democrats in the 100-member Indiana House of Representatives.  In one of his final acts as 
secretary of state, Bayh helped forge a unique power-sharing compromise between 
Republicans and Democrats in which the two parties would alternatively exert daily control 
over the legislative body under the leadership of Co-Speakers of the House:  Republican 
Paul S. Mannweiler and Democrat Michael K. Phillips. 
In the years following Bayh’s 1988 election as governor, the Indiana Democratic 
Party enjoyed election victories in other races that it had not experienced in twenty years.  In 
1990, Democrats obtained a majority in the Indiana House of Representatives after fourteen 
consecutive years of minority status.  Bayh himself was re-elected to a second term as 
governor in 1992 by a record-setting margin, capturing 63 percent of the vote.  Bayh’s 
partner in government, Lieutenant Governor Frank O’Bannon, was thereafter twice elected 
governor.  Between Bayh and O’Bannon, this sixteen-year period represented the longest 
consecutive period that Democrats have held the governor’s office since five different 
Democrats held the office from December 1843 until January 1861.495 
During this same Bayh-O’Bannon sixteen-year period, Democrats enjoyed notable 
victories in several other statewide contests.  Indiana Democrats elected two African-
Americans to statewide office:  in 1990, Dwayne Brown was elected Clerk of the State 
Supreme and Appellate Courts and, in 1992, Pamela Fanning Carter was elected Indiana’s 
first female, as well as first African-American, Attorney General.  During the Bayh years as 
governor, other Bayh-supported Democrats launched prominent careers.  In 1990, Bayh aide 
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Jeffrey Modisett was elected Marion County Prosecutor – the first Democrat to be elected to 
that office since 1974.  Thereafter, Modisett went on to be elected Indiana Attorney General 
in 1996.  One of Bayh’s closest friends and his former chief-of-staff, Bart Peterson, was 
elected mayor of Indianapolis in 1999, ending thirty-two uninterrupted years of Republican 
occupancy of that office.  To this day, Mayor Peterson enjoys an unlimited political future.  
Joseph J. Andrew, one of the Indiana Democratic Party chairs under Bayh, went on to 
become the chairperson of the Democratic National Committee in 1999.  All of these 
success stories were, in no small measure, attributable to the groundwork laid by the 1988 
Bayh gubernatorial victory. 
 Evan Bayh might very well have been elected governor in November of 1988 even 
if no attempt had been made to keep him off the ballot.  However, any honest reflection on 
the gubernatorial campaign of 1988 requires an examination of the residency challenge and 
the role that it played.  Hardly an election season passes without some controversy surfacing 
concerning a candidate’s residency which, inevitably, encourages a revisiting of the Bayh 
case.  In the 2003 New Albany city elections, a candidate for city council was alleged to live 
outside the city’s limits.  He explained that he owned property both inside and outside the 
city’s limits and that he “divides his time between two homes.”  The precedent established 
in the Bayh case was immediately referenced when contemporaneous newspaper accounts 
reported on the controversy. 496 
In 2004, a candidate for the state legislature from Vigo County, Jeffrey M. Lee, 
sought and won the Republican primary nomination but, subsequently, attempted to 
withdraw his candidacy claiming he was no longer a “resident” of the district where he 
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originally filed.  His opponents maintained that Lee had not changed his residence and that 
he, therefore, remained a bona fide candidate in that district.  The trial court, citing the 
precedent established in State Election Board v. Bayh, insisted that the evidence showed that 
Lee never abandoned his residency in Vigo County.  Because the court found evidence 
sufficient to show that Lee continued to reside in the applicable House district, he was 
initially restrained from withdrawing his candidacy.  The Republican Party was temporarily 
prohibited from conducting a caucus to replace him as the duly nominated candidate in the 
November election.497 
The “residency” of Indiana governors remains, to this day, an extremely sensitive 
issue.  In 2005, when it was announced that Governor Mitchell E. “Mitch” Daniels intended 
to build a home for his family in Hamilton County, Indiana, because the official governor’s 
residence on North Meridian Street in Indianapolis was in need of repair, serious objections 
were raised, including reference to the constitutional obligation for governors to reside “at 
the seat of government,” pursuant to Article 6, Section 5 of the Indiana Constitution.  At the 
time, Daniels claimed to be unaware of the requirement and indicated that he would have his 
lawyer research the question.  Daniels said, “all I can tell you is I’m going to be in full 
compliance with the constitution, whatever it means.  If it means the residence must be in 
Marion County, then, by gosh, mine will be.”  When he was asked about the possibility of 
alternative interpretations, to a plain reading of the applicable constitutional provision, 
Daniels replied, “Well, I don’t know.  There’s been a lot of ambiguity about residences, as I 
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recall.”498  Daniels ended the speculation, however, when he announced that he was 
proceeding with his family’s desire to build a new home in Hamilton County.  The 
Indianapolis Star reported that “once it’s completed, Daniels … will divide [his] time 
between that home and the governor’s official residence at 4750 N. Meridian Street, in 
Indianapolis ….”499 
 These examples are smaller iterations of the much larger conflict which took center 
stage in 1988.  But they are its logical progeny.  It is unassailable that Bayh’s election in 
1988 altered Indiana’s political landscape in significant ways.  Evan Bayh, a two-term 
Indiana governor, is now a two-term United States Senator from Indiana.  He is widely 
regarded as possessing what it takes to be seriously considered for the presidency or the vice 
presidency of the United States of America.  As Clifford L. Staten opines:  “contemplating 
Bayh’s possible candidacy for president, Brian Vargus, noted Indiana pollster, observed 
that:  ‘The gubernatorial years for Evan Bayh will probably be regarded as a chapter in a 
much larger volume ….  The chapter is going to be less significant than the chapters of the 
rest of his career, which I expect to be very distinguished.’”500  Because of his potential, 
Bayh’s election as governor in 1988 may very well play a role in American political history.  
Only time will tell.  If his election as governor launched a political career that might one day 
find him serving as vice president, or perhaps even president, then the effort by Republicans 
in 1988 to have Bayh legally disqualified from seeking office in 1988 will be judged with 
even sharper scrutiny.  For now, and for all of the foregoing reasons, the careful review and 
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consideration of the events which helped shape the Indiana 1988 election season are 
justifiable and worthy of our collective reflection. 
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